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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. This study assesses the present state of the EU-Georgia discussions on a 
free trade agreement—to say ‘negotiations’ would be premature since 
the European Commission has insisted on a hugely demanding set of 
preconditions before agreeing to open negotiations.  
2. The case of Georgia is unique in two respects. On the one hand, 
Georgia’s own trade policy is more open towards the EU than vice 
versa, and Georgia has achieved governance reforms on a par with 
some of the old and new EU member states. On the other hand, the 
Commission is insisting on a complex set of preconditions being met 
before the opening of negotiations, which it has not done in the case of 
other neighbouring countries (Eastern or Southern). Taking both factors 
into account, the Commission’s approach is strikingly anomalous. 
3. This study argues that the Commission’s approach is bad from three 
perspectives. It is bad development policy for Georgia. It requires 
Georgia to adopt and implement an enormous amount of imprecisely 
identified EU internal market regulations that go way beyond strictly 
trade-related matters, with no attempt to identify those that make 
sound economic sense for Georgia (and indeed for the Eastern 
neighbours in general). The burdensome regulatory changes imposed 
on Georgia are equivalent to taxing Georgian production—endangering 
its growth and the sustainability of its reforms and successful fight 
against corruption, which is so crucial for its long-term development. 
4. For instance, the preconditions on industrial technical norms amount to a 
tax on Georgian industrial production, which would inevitably slow 
down and distort Georgia’s process of industrialization. The 
preconditions in sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures would trigger 
an average price increase of 90% for the key food products purchased 
by the one-third of Georgian population who live in poverty. Finally, 
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some requirements simply lack any rationale, such as the obligation to 
implement EU norms on cable cars and lifts when Georgia does not 
produce these products. 
5. The Commission’s approach is also bad commercial policy for the EU 
since it would lead to an expansion of the trade between Georgia and 
non-EU countries, rather than between Georgia and the EU. Georgian 
consumers would be induced to import what Georgian producers could 
no longer sell because of EU norms; and their low incomes will induce 
them to turn to imports from non-EU sources that are less expensive 
than those from the EU. Meanwhile, in order to survive, the vast 
majority of Georgian producers who would not be able to sell their 
products anymore on Georgian markets under EU norms would try to 
sell them to foreign markets not observing EU norms, thereby 
artificially boosting Georgia’s exports to non-EU countries. 
6. Finally, the Commission’s approach is bad foreign policy for the EU. All 
these preconditions portray the EU as being hegemonic towards its 
very much smaller neighbour and not an enlightened and trustable 
anchor. They are being imposed on a country that is granted no EU 
membership perspective (even the accession candidates did not have to 
comply with such norms before the opening of their negotiations). They 
would make EU DCFTA (deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreement) partners appear like EU member state clones, but i) without 
full access to the EU markets in agriculture and services, ii) without EU 
aid and iii) without a voice in future EU decisions—clearly an 
unacceptable proposition. 
7. There is thus an urgent need to reshape the Commission’s approach. 
The evaluations of the current preconditions made in this study suggest 
a set of four concrete proposals: 
i. The EU should open negotiations with Georgia without further 
delay since Georgia has more than satisfied the relevant subset of 
preconditions. 
ii. The EU should make use of recent developments in the body of 
EU law and practices, which are ignored by the Commission’s 
current approach. This body is rich enough to cope with many of 
the current difficulties, as shown by the nine detailed proposals 
suggested by this study. 
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iii. More broadly, the EU should design a pro-growth DCFTA 
process based on an integrated sequence of successive sets of 
commitments. Georgia would be asked to take on board these 
successive sets of commitments as and when its GDP per capita 
will reach agreed thresholds (as the acquis consists of fixed costs, 
it is easier to absorb when the income level is higher). 
iv. The EU should encourage—not restrain—Georgia to pursue and 
develop its successful ongoing unilateral reforms. 
8. The proposals focus on Georgia’s side because this study relies on the 
proposition that a DCFTA should first and foremost boost the EU 
partner’s growth and development. However, this study also points to 
the need for serious reforms on the EU side: 
i. The DCFTA doctrine should be made clearer and adapted to the 
circumstances of the EU partner, rather push a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
dogma for all of Eastern Europe (in contrast to the approach taken 
towards the partners in the South Mediterranean neighbourhood, 
all of which have quite different trade agreements with the EU). 
ii. The Commission should improve its coordination among its 
services if the EU wants ambitious DCFTAs covering topics far 
removed from pure trade issues. 
9. These steps should be set in motion well before the Eastern Partnership 
Summit in the autumn of 2011. 
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INTRODUCTION 
his study appraises the EU’s policy towards its Eastern neighbours. 
As these neighbours have very different political and economic 
structures and features, the study focuses on Georgia, which is a 
particularly interesting case for two reasons. As a small, lower-middle 
income country located in a tormented region, it faces challenges. At the 
same time, Georgia is the EU neighbour that has undertaken unilaterally 
the most dramatic reforms—with great success. In short, Georgia is the 
archetype of a neighbour that would immensely benefit from strong EU 
support, and which—in return—would establish the reputation of the EU 
as strong economic and political anchor. 
Georgia’s track record for economic reform since the mid-2000s is 
outstanding by any standards. Since 2006, it implemented basic free trade 
unilaterally for its imports from the whole of the world, such that its 
average industrial tariff is now 0.3%, compared with 4.6% for the EU. But 
its reforms have gone far deeper still, unilaterally opening all its markets to 
foreign direct investment and recognizing the technical standards for 
imports from all OECD countries, including the EU. Its governance reforms 
were such that its ranking under international surveys of ‘ease of doing 
business’ and ‘de-corruption’ have improved to the point of being now 
superior to various EU member states (hereafter MS).  
The EU’s slow and reluctant response to Georgia’s reforms 
While Georgia has been acting fast and decisively, the EU for its part has 
responded only very slowly and reluctantly. In November 2006, the EU and 
Georgia signed a European Neighbourhood Action Plan (ENP) which 
included the “possible establishment of a free trade agreement” between 
the EU and Georgia. This provision was introduced on Georgia’s request 
while facing strong objections from the European Commission. It took 
T
2 | INTRODUCTION 
 
more than a year to agree on an innocuous wording specifying that such a 
free trade agreement (FTA) would be subject to a study in order to find out 
whether it would be feasible. The so-called ‘feasibility study’ was finalized 
in March 2008, and advocated a ‘deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreement’ (DCFTA). 
In October 2008, soon after the war with Russia, the Commission sent a 
fact-finding mission to Georgia. In March 2009, it sent to the Government of 
Georgia a ‘matrix’ (hereafter, the 2009 Matrix) of preconditions in 11 areas 
(see Chapter 3). These preconditions were divided into two sets: those to be 
fulfilled before the start of DCFTA negotiations and those to be met after the 
formal launch of negotiations to facilitate a smooth implementation of 
the—yet undefined—DCFTA, also chosen unilaterally by the Commission. 
Out of these 11 preconditions, four were chosen unilaterally by the 
Commission as key: technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures, competition policy and intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
There is a last precondition on the origin of the products; however, as this 
precondition raises the political question of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it 
is not examined in this economic study. 
For all the preconditions, the Commission’s language is very fuzzy, full of 
expressions such as “sufficient progress”, “adequate system”, “effective 
and proper implementation”, etc. without defining what sufficient, 
adequate, effective or proper exactly means. In short, the preconditions are 
written in an open-ended language that gives the Commission absolute 
power to decide whether the preconditions are met or not. 
In December 2010, the Commission sent to Georgia a document (hereafter 
the 2010 Document) which amplifies the asymmetrical nature of the 2009 
Matrix by shifting some preconditions to be met after the launch of the 
negotiations according to the 2009 Matrix into the list of the preconditions 
to be met before. The 2010 Document also amplifies the absolute power of 
the Commission by adding more open-ended language. 
The fundamental choice to be made by the EU 
For Georgia, a DCFTA or a FTA (free trade agreement) is a logical follow-
up to the unilateral dramatic reforms it has undertaken since 2004: almost 
no tariffs in industry, very moderate tariffs in agriculture, no barriers to 
foreign direct investment in the whole Georgian economy and 
unconditional mutual recognition of the technical norms of all OECD 
countries—all reforms that the EU has not yet achieved, including among 
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the EU member states themselves in the case of the technical norms. A 
DCFTA with a much larger and richer economy has two key potential 
benefits for the smaller partner, as illustrated by the North American Free 
Trade Agreement for (NAFTA) with Mexico. It is a way to consolidate the 
unilateral reforms done by the smaller partner by locking them into an 
international agreement. Looking ahead, it is a way to open a huge—in 
relative terms—market to the potential exporters of the smaller partner 
which are spurred by the reforms already undertaken, hence to boost its 
growth and development. 
However, it takes two to tango. The role that a DCFTA could play depends 
largely on the approach taken by the larger trading partner—the EU in this 
case. The EU has a choice between two very different approaches. 
A global vision 
The first alternative is to develop the DCFTA within a global vision. In such 
a perspective, the EU realizes that the DCFTA should deliver to the small 
partner the expected economic benefits in terms of growth and 
development as quickly as possible. It also realizes that the economic 
benefits it will draw from a DCFTA will be small for a very simple 
reason—the relative size of the two partners. This is easy to illustrate in the 
case of Georgia: Georgia’s current GDP is roughly 0.10% of the EU GDP 
and, even when the Georgians will be as rich as the Europeans, its GDP 
will be 1% of the EU GDP (this reflects the scale of the Georgian population 
compared to the EU population). 
In such a vision, the EU realizes that the benefits it will reap from a DCFTA 
with a smaller partner are essentially political. If such a DCFTA is well 
designed and succeeds, it will show the EU’s capacity to act as an anchor 
for growth and prosperity, attracting other neighbours. In this perspective, 
it is essential to realize that the political benefits for the EU of a DCFTA 
with a small country go far beyond the economic size of the partner. The 
EU will emerge as an attractive anchor for a whole region, at a time when 
there are plenty of emerging challengers to the EU leadership from all over 
the world. In short, a DCFTA is an integral and key part of EU foreign 
policy. 
A narrow-minded approach 
Alternatively, the EU can view the small economic interests it has at stake 
in the very small Georgian market as a reason not to be much concerned, 
and, to the extent that it has to get involved for reasons of neighbourhood 
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policy doctrine, to use its overwhelming relative size and strength to 
simply dictate its conditions. This is what the implicit current DCFTA 
doctrine seems to amount to. Some Commission officials seem to regard 
such small neighbours as just too much trouble for a tailor-made policy. 
Therefore they demand that the partner swallows loads of the EU acquis 
communautaire 1 wholesale, and simply assert that this is automatically good 
for the partner.  
Such an approach is a route full of hazards in the 21st century of 
‘multipolarity’. This word is much nicer than the reality, in particular for 
the EU. It means that potential competing anchors are emerging fast. This is 
a lesson to be drawn from the increasingly tormented relations between the 
EU and many African countries, with the growing influence of China and 
India in Africa. Tbilisi is as close to Mumbai as it is to Antwerp—and, in 
such matters, geographical distances count even less than economic 
dynamism. 
There is no reason to limit the list of the EU challengers to the largest 
potential candidates. Smaller regional anchors such as Turkey or the Gulf 
states may also be competitive, offering Georgia alternatives. The relative 
size of Georgia compared to Turkey is the same as the relative size of 
Bulgaria plus Romania compared to the whole EU. For the EU to represent 
an attractive role model in these conditions, it has to prove as agile as other 
foreign policy actors and tailor its offers of cooperation to the needs and 
demands of the partner, rather than simply throw the Brussels rule book at 
the partner without an intelligent selection and adaptation of its 
instruments. There are lessons to be drawn from the current evolution of 
Turkey. 
The current situation: Very unsatisfactory 
The highest EU authorities—Council and Parliament—have not yet clearly 
decided which of these two options they want to adopt. Failing to clarify 
this point by the time of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Summit in Autumn 
2011 would cost the EU influence on its borders. Pending this choice, the 
current situation is based on a choice left de facto to the Commission which 
is very unsatisfactory for the following reasons. 
                                                     
1 The acquis refers to the body of EU Directives, Regulations and all the other legal 
texts to be enforced by all the EU MS. 
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First, strangely enough, the Commission does not define clearly what a 
DCFTA is supposed to achieve (see Chapter 1). Worse, the preconditions 
imposed unilaterally by the Commission on Georgia are similar to the 
conditions that a fully-fledged EU MS should adopt when acceding. This 
leads to an awkward situation where a DCFTA signatory could be best 
described as an EU MS, but one: 
• without full access to the EU markets (very limited access to EU 
agricultural markets), 
• without full access to EU aid and 
• without voting rights in the EU decision-making. 
This is clearly not a sustainable approach. 
Second, the Commission’s preconditions, which focus on regulatory 
matters, fail to recognize the new world as it is (see Chapter 2). Georgia 
scores better than quite a number of old and new EU MS in terms of 
effective regulatory quality and the EU MS exhibit surprisingly different 
levels of regulatory quality. These two facts are crucial for designing an 
economically sound DCFTA. Georgia’s good regulatory performance 
means that the Commission should appreciate the EU neighbours for what 
they have done, not for what they were. The wide range of regulatory 
quality among the EU MS, which have shared the same formal acquis 
communautaire for several decades in some cases, raises serious questions 
about how much importance is actually attached to this formal (legal) 
convergence of regulations [Messerlin, 2008]. 
Third, the preconditions imposed by the Commission on Georgia before 
opening DCFTA negotiations are based on a ‘one size fits all’ approach. As 
shown in Chapters 3 to 6, they constitute: 
• Bad development policy for Georgia. The burdensome reforms 
imposed on Georgia are equivalent to a tax on Georgian production 
sold in Georgian markets. In the industrial sector, they would 
inevitably slow down and distort the industrialization process of 
Georgia, and hence endanger her growth. In the agricultural sector, 
they are expected to increase by 90% on average the prices of the food 
products consumed by the poorest Georgians—one third of the 
Georgian population lives in poverty. Such price hikes would greatly 
endanger the country’s political stability and fuel an anti-European 
sentiment. 
• Bad commercial policy for the EU. By imposing a tax on Georgian 
products sold on Georgian markets, the preconditions will induce 
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Georgian consumers to look for imports they can afford to buy, that 
is, goods that are unlikely to come from the EU and likely to come 
from non-EU countries. In short, they will divert Georgia’s trade 
flows to non-EU countries, and will be mostly beneficial to Georgia’s 
neighbours that do not have a DCFTA with the EU and to the 
emerging economies challenging the EU leadership. 
• Bad foreign policy for the EU. They show the EU as an aggressive and 
careless neighbour, not as a trustworthy anchor. In particular, the 
Commission’s preconditions will again fuel corruption, which has 
been successfully cut at great pain during the last decade—the last 
thing that one would like to inflict on a country having so clearly 
turned its back on 70 years of Soviet rule. 
For all these reasons, the future of the current discussions is quite 
uncertain. Will the EU’s highest authorities confirm the approach taken so 
far by the Commission, or will they instruct the Commission to defend the 
broad EU interests in a more enlightened manner? Will Georgia continue 
on a pro-European path with an EU that appears not to value its successful 
reforms, or will it consider that the burdens demanded by the EU are not 
worth the pain and expense, and instead turn to an alternative policy à la 
Chile consisting of making FTAs with every willing partner—including the 
US and China? 
Proposals: An overview 
The EU should use the unique opportunity of Georgia’s demonstrated 
capacity to reform of the last seven years—and of the emerging benefits of 
its policies—to launch an innovative ‘pro-growth DCFTA’ which could be 
used as a blueprint for other EU neighbours. 
A pro-growth DCFTA should be a process allowing Georgia to absorb 
progressively the EU acquis through an integrated sequence of successive 
sets of commitments, starting with those considered as the most helpful 
from a growth perspective. Georgia would then be asked to take on board 
the other sets of commitments as and when its GDP per capita reaches 
agreed thresholds. As the acquis consists mostly of fixed costs, the costs of 
implementation, which would amount today to 5% of Georgia’s GDP, 
would cost only 2% in 10 to 20 years from now, depending on Georgia’s 
growth rate. Such an approach has the important advantage of making 
both parties interested in Georgia’s high growth rates. 
TRADE POLICY TOWARDS ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURS: THE CASE OF EU GEORGIA | 7 
The study makes precise proposals related to the current discussions 
between the Commission and Georgia. First and foremost, the DCFTA 
negotiations between the EU and Georgia should start without further 
delay since Georgia fulfils the relevant subset of the 2009 Matrix 
preconditions. We consider the 2009 Matrix as the only text to take into 
account, whereas we see the 2010 Document as a document of lower legal 
status breaching the initial conditions set up by the Commission’s 2009 
Matrix. 
Second, the study tables nine detailed proposals focusing on the four key 
preconditions imposed by the Commission. These proposals are 
summarized in Box 1. The broad aim of the proposals is to make the 
preconditions affordable by the Georgian economy and contributing to her 
growth. For this purpose, they draw on some existing elements of the rich 
body of EU law and practices that could both help the Government of 
Georgia and firms to reduce implementation costs, and the most dynamic 
Georgian firms to start deriving positive benefits from the EU acquis, while 
allowing the others some breathing space to adapt. They also use a better 
scheduling based on the objective criterion of Georgia’s GDP per capita for 
achieving the same results. 
These proposals should also be taken into account in the general review of 
the European neighbourhood policy currently underway in the EU 
institutions, which should therefore include a review of DCFTA policy. 
This could have implications for the cases also of Ukraine and Moldova, 
which are currently the subject of negotiations or pre-negotiations. 
However it would be beyond the scope of this study to make precise 
recommendations for these other cases. 
Conclusion: The Autumn Summit on the Eastern Partnership 
Georgia is one of the steadiest reformers among the EU’s Eastern and 
Southern neighbours and its reforms are yielding impressive performances. 
That makes Georgia the best imaginable trading partner with whom the EU 
could build a ‘DCFTA model’, bringing long-term growth to its Eastern (or 
Southern) partners, and building the EUs reputation as an attractive 
economic and political anchor. 
Europe should not miss this unique opportunity at the Autumn Summit on 
Eastern Partnership. If it does, its neighbours will quickly find alternatives 
among the many dynamic and tough emerging challengers to the EU as a 
global or even regional leader. 
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Box 1. Nine detailed proposals on the four key preconditions 
First and foremost, the DCFTA negotiations between the EU and Georgia should 
start without further delay since Georgia fulfils the relevant subset of the 2009 
Matrix preconditions (Chapter 3 of the study argues that the 2010 Document is an 
unjustifiable breach of the 2009 Matrix). 
I. Proposals specific to Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) (Chapter 4) 
The EU-Georgia DCFTA should include: 
1. A provision facilitating the implementation of EU norms by Georgian 
exporters by allowing Georgia to have recourse to the national accreditation 
and certification bodies of an EU member state. 
2. A provision exempting Georgian firms from EU norms when selling in the 
Georgian national market; the timing of the transposition of the first six New 
Approach Directives should be revised. 
3. A provision releasing Georgia from any obligation to transpose the other 
New Approach Directives, except if Georgia decides otherwise. 
4. Possibly a provision defining transition periods on the basis of an objective 
measure of the improvement of the Georgian economy, such as its GDP per 
capita. 
Georgia should keep its own policy of unconditional mutual recognition which is 
more fully in line with the spirit of EU case law (Cassis de Dijon case) than the EU’s 
current acquis. 
II. Proposals specific to Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures (Chapter 5) 
The EU-Georgia DCFTA should include: 
5. A provision excluding the small-farm sector from the EU SPS acquis for what 
would be a long transition period; fixing this transition period on indicators 
such as the GDP per capita is not a solution because the small-farm sector is 
so large and disconnected from the rest of the economy; the transition 
period should rely on a review of the situation on a regular basis. 
6. A provision allowing a very progressive introduction of the general food 
safety laws in the interest of Georgian consumers; the progressivity 
dimension is crucial in order to minimize the risks of destabilizing food 
price surges. 
7. A provision defining a mechanism ensuring Georgian compliance with the 
SPS acquis for Georgian major agricultural exports to the EU; this mechanism 
should be implemented in a progressive way, that is, as and when Georgian 
exports become notable (in quantities) and regular (in time). 
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III. Proposals specific to Competition Policy (Chapter 6) 
The EU-Georgia DCFTA should include: 
8. A provision imposing EU-type state aid disciplines on Georgia in exchange 
of the renunciation of the use of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard 
measures by the EU. 
9. Possibly a provision supporting—not forcing—Georgia’s cooperation with 
EU MS competition authorities on the competition issues strictly speaking 
(excluding state aid). 
Georgia should be supported to make a more productive use of its Competition 
Authority by granting it (or a sister institution) the role of evaluating the impact of 
regulations similar to the one played by the Australian Productivity Commission. 
IV. Proposals specific to intellectual property rights (IPRs) (Chapter 6) 
The EU-Georgia DCFTA should recognize the fact that Georgia is a lower-middle 
income country and that most of the counterfeited goods in Georgia are imported 
from much larger economies. As a result, it should be pragmatic and focus on 
supporting Georgia’s policy of adherence to international IPR treaties, and 
Georgia’s fight against piracy and counterfeiting at a pace compatible with its 
economic growth and political stability. 
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PART I. ‘NEW WORLD’ 
Part I sets the background of the choices to be made by the EU with respect 
to negotiating a DCFTA with Georgia.  
Chapter 1 shows that the EU has no operational definition of what a ‘deep 
and comprehensive free trade agreement’ should be about. This vacuum 
triggers decisions that are felt as arbitrary and unfair by the EU partners. It 
also raises a fundamental issue—the regulator (the EU in this context) does 
not take the responsibilities flowing from the imposition of its regulations. 
The study suggests a definition: a pro-growth DCFTA is about boosting 
growth of the EU partners and establishing the EU’s reputation as an 
attractive anchor. It suggests several proposals on how to make such an 
approach operational. 
Chapter 2 shows that the EU often fails to realize how much the world has 
changed since the 1990s—and hence fails to value its neighbours. Many 
countries have made unilateral reforms. A close look at the hard facts 
available shows that Georgia fares better than many EU member states, an 
outstanding result of its reforms. It also shows that the EU MS fare very 
differently despite their common exposure to the acquis communautaire—an 
observation that should trigger serious thinking in the EU. 
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1. THE FORGOTTEN QUESTION:  
WHAT IS A DCFTA ALL ABOUT? 
Summary 
1. The Commission’s insistence to use the concept of a deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreement as the only model for the EU Eastern neighbours is at odds 
with the golden rule of the EU neighbourhood policy—not to favour the Eastern or 
Southern region at the expense of the other. 
2. The desirable goals of a DCFTA are two-fold: 
• an economic one for the EU partner: to boost its economic growth and 
development and 
• a political one for the EU itself: to build its reputation as a trustworthy 
anchor, a role that is increasingly challenged by the new emerging global or 
regional powers. 
3. The current Commission’s approach to DCFTA provides no clarity about the 
content of a DCFTA, generating great frustration among EU negotiating partners. 
4. This chapter provides the basic elements of what a DCFTA should be: 
• The DCFTA should be conceived as a process in which the EU acquis is 
absorbed through an integrated sequence of sets of commitments selected 
for being in line with the economic interests of the EU partner. 
• Only the few EU regulations to be considered with high confidence as 
critical for boosting the growth of the EU partner should be part of the first 
set of commitments. 
• The remaining EU regulations should be introduced progressively in the 
subsequent stages. 
• The link integrating the various stages should be clear and economically 
meaningful indicators of the convergence of the EU partner on the EU’s 
economic development, such as the GDP per capita of the EU partner. 
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• The regulations to be included in each set of commitments should be jointly 
defined by the EU and its negotiating partner—not unilaterally by the 
Commission—because each partner is different, particularly in its capacity 
to implement its commitments. 
• The Commission should produce a DCFTA Handbook, assessing the costs 
and benefits for its partner states of implementing all parts of the EU acquis 
that it considers relevant. 
 
This chapter sets the background of the current discussions between the 
Commission and Georgia. It is organized as follows. Section 1 puts the EU 
notion of a ‘deep and comprehensive free trade agreement’ (DCFTA) in the 
wider context of the EU’s neighbourhood policy. It underscores the 
contradiction between the primary political rule of the neighbourhood 
policy—not to favour the Eastern or Southern region at the expense of the 
other—and the Commission’s insistence on the DCFTA concept as the only 
model it is willing to contemplate for the Eastern neighbours. It argues that 
any reference to the EU enlargement to Central Europe in the 1990s for 
justifying this insistence is a serious anachronism—there are crucial 
differences between the Central European countries in the 1990s, now EU 
member states, and the Eastern neighbours today.  
Section 2 defines the desirable goals of a DCFTA for the EU’s partners as 
well as for the EU itself. A DCFTA should deliver mostly economic gains to 
the EU partners—faster growth and development—and mostly political 
gains to the EU—the reputation to be an economic and political anchor that 
can be trusted. These gains are essential for both sides in the long term. 
More growth is crucial for the EU’s neighbours located in tormented 
regions. Being a trustable anchor is crucial for the EU if it aims to be a 
significant world power, a role that is increasingly challenged by the new 
emerging global or regional powers. 
Finally, sections 3 and 4 tackle the more precise question of how to define a 
DCFTA. Section 3 shows that, today, this question has no clear answer. 
This situation is a source of deep frustration among the EU’s neighbours, 
which observe that they are treated very differently without justification. 
Paradoxically, this situation is also a source of economic costs for the EU, as 
shown below. As a result, section 4 provides basic proposals that would 
allow a consistent approach to a DCFTA, generating a robust, fair and 
predictable process capable of delivering a beneficial outcome to the EU’s 
partners as well as to the EU itself. The need for a Handbook to guide 
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selective adoption of the EU acquis by non-member partner states is 
stressed. 
1.1 DCFTAs and the EU’s neighbourhood policy 
The EU has established a single European neighbourhood policy, with two 
branches: the South Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. This golden rule—
having a single neighbourhood policy—was driven as a matter of political 
principle, which made also sense from a trade and economic perspective: to 
avoid favouring one sub-region (Southern or Eastern) at the expense of the 
other. 
However a second principle is that there has to be differentiation in the 
speed and level of ambition in negotiating agreements and action plans 
made with individual partner states, depending on the political will, 
economic structures and administrative capacities of the partner states. The 
principle of differentiation is seen in the current processes of negotiating 
association agreements, including free trade agreements. Some countries, 
notably Ukraine and Morocco, have been singled out as candidates for the 
new-style association agreements. Morocco has concluded such an 
agreement, whereas in the case of Ukraine the negotiations remain 
ongoing, with the free trade element of the agreement proving still elusive, 
whereas other elements are understood to be agreed. 
When one focuses on the free trade component of the neighbourhood 
policy, there is a major difference in the EU’s policy with its neighbours. 
With its Southern Mediterranean neighbours, the EU was willing under the 
Barcelona process, initiated in 1995, to make ‘basic’ free trade agreements, 
with asymmetrical transition periods for the phasing in of free trade 
conditions—many years for the South, short periods for the EU. This first 
generation of agreements was basic in that it did not go far into the 
liberalization of service sectors or in seeking to extend much of the EU’s 
internal market acquis into these countries. In recent years, the action plans 
of the neighbourhood policy for the Southern partner states have sought to 
add these features to the basic free trade agreements. But, preconditions 
were not set for the opening of these free trade negotiations (now strikingly 
illustrated by the case of Libya, a country very far away from any intention 
to converge on European political or economic norms). On the contrary the 
EU sought to open these negotiations with all South Mediterranean states 
in parallel. 
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In sharp contrast, the EU has been following a very different general 
approach for the Eastern neighbours, insisting on the concept of a DCFTA 
as the only model it is willing to contemplate. 
There is no official explanation for why this different approach was 
adopted. One explanation (others will be examined in the following 
chapters) is the EU’s experience with its enlargement to the Central 
European countries, which required indeed a deep and comprehensive 
adoption of all EU acquis as absolute condition for accession.2 This has been 
recognized as a real transformative process in which the EU’s economic 
and political order was introduced wholesale to replace the collapsed 
communist regimes. Economists have researched the mechanisms through 
which this process achieved dramatic and largely positive results. Broadly 
speaking the economists’ analysis extended beyond the traditional trade 
aspects (tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade) into the much deeper 
matters of improved internal economic governance in the economy as a 
whole. Many studies, for example undertaken by the World Bank, have 
tended to show that the benefits from improved economic governance 
(regulatory reforms leading to the reduction of corruption) can be large 
multiples of the gains from moves in a narrowly conceived trade policy. 
However, relying on the parallel with the EU’s Central European 
enlargement for designing the current EU neighbourhood policy misses a 
crucial point: the EU enlargement to Central Europe occurred almost 
simultaneously with the reforms that the Central European countries (now 
EU MS) were undertaking unilaterally in their transition from communist 
to market economies. The case of Georgia is quite different since it has 
already introduced the major reforms needed for building an open and 
market-based economy. In this context, it should be recalled that, in the 
early 1990s, the Central European countries that dared to made deeper 
reforms than those required by the EU enlargement were forced by the EU 
to withdraw these reforms—such as Czechoslovakia, Estonia and Poland in 
trade liberalization, or Estonia in agricultural policy, to mention the most 
significant cases.3 
                                                     
2 In this study, Central Europe refers to the 12 most recent EU MS. Eastern Europe 
refers to the European countries outside the EU, except Russia and the Balkan 
countries not yet members of the EU. 
3 History tends to repeat itself. In the early 1990s, Central European countries 
turned to EU membership as a last-resort solution, having realized that NATO 
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The situation is quite different for the EU’s current Eastern neighbours. As 
shown below, there is no simultaneity between their unilateral reforms—
already enforced for a notable number of years—and possible agreements 
with the EU—which are still in the making, if indeed they happen. This is 
best illustrated by Georgia which, as shown in Chapter 2, has undertaken a 
series of reforms on its own that no Central European country made in the 
1990s outside the enlargement process. Some Eastern neighbours may still 
now be hesitating on the path of reform, but this option was simply 
unconceivable in the 1990s when the Central European embarked upon the 
sweeping accession process. In other words, the EU’s decision to go ahead 
with a DCFTA negotiation with Ukraine was quite a different bet than 
those taken 15 years before with the Central European countries—indeed, 
such a bet probably cannot be explained without the initially euphoric 
atmosphere prompted by Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. 
1.2 What should a DCFTA be about? Delivering growth and 
reputation 
For both the EU and its neighbours, the stakes are of great importance. The 
EU’s neighbours see a DCFTA (or a FTA) as a source of additional growth 
and development. The EU markets give the benefits of scale economies and 
the possibilities offered by the endless range of varieties of products that 
characterize modern economies. A DCFTA that will not deliver these 
benefits will not survive: sooner or later, the EU’s neighbours will learn the 
lesson, and will look for more attractive economic anchors and will leave 
the EU’s sphere of influence. 
A DCFTA is intended to establish the EU’s reputation as a crucial and 
trustable anchor. But the belief that there is no alternative to the EU as an 
anchor is an illusion - in a world where geographical distance counts much 
less than economic dynamism and political vision. 
In order to get a sense of the main economic aspects of a DCFTA for the 
Eastern neighbours, Table 1.1 provides basic macroeconomic indicators. It 
splits the EU into seven ‘cohorts’ defined by the date of accession of their 
respective EU MS. For more precision, the 10 Central European countries 
                                                                                                                                       
membership was impossible for some time. Their desire to adopt market-oriented 
reforms and deep trade liberalization faced strong opposition from Commission 
officials who initially wanted to renew the existing trade agreements in force (with 
Hungary) and later pushed them to keep high GATT-WTO tariffs (Romania) or to 
re-introduce them (Poland) [Messerlin, 1992]. 
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having joined the EU in 2004 have been divided into two different groups: 
the three Baltic EU MS (EU-2004b) and the seven other Central and 
European EU MS (EU-2004a). For simplicity sake, the three comments 
suggested by Table 1.1 focus on the case of Georgia. 
First, as Georgia is a relatively small country in terms of population, it will 
always be a relatively small economy. Even when Georgians might be as 
rich as the Europeans, Georgia’s GDP would represent only 1% of the EU’s 
GDP. As a result, the DCFTA between the EU and Georgia is unlikely to 
have any significant impact on the EU economy. This makes the EU-
Georgia DCFTA totally different from both the EU-Korea FTA (Korea is 
one-tenth of the EU economy) and from the EU-Turkey customs union in 
the long term (Turkey’s population is 15% of the EU’s population, hence 
Turkey would represent 15% of the EU’s GDP when Turks would be as rich 
as the Europeans). 
Table 1.1. Macroeconomic indicators setting the perspective for a DCFTA 
 
a cer: current exchange rates.  
b PPP: exchange rates at the PPP.  
c For the EU cohorts, this is the GDP-weighted national trade/GDP ratios.  
d Annual average growth rates (unweighted by country size) from 2000 to 2010. 
Sources: WTO Trade profiles (website) except for growth rates [EBRD, Economic indicators (website)]. 
Population Trade/GDP Avg growth 
(millions) Cer a PPP b cer a PPP b c % rate d 
EU cohorts
EU‐1958 232.5 9422.0 8181.9 40519 35186 78 1.5
EU‐1973 71.8 2711.3 2643.8 37753 36813 67 2.1
EU‐1980s 67.9 2017.9 2085.8 29730 30731 58 2.3
EU‐1995 23.0 1028.5 861.7 44709 37457 73 1.9
EU‐2004a 67.0 910.3 1390.1 13588 20750 114 3.5
EU‐2004b 6.9 82.5 115.7 11894 16691 120 4.8
EU‐2007 29.1 208.2 402.8 7163 13856 88 4.6
Countries under accession negotiations 
Croatia 4.4 63.0 87.8 14222 19803 87 3.1
Macedonia 2.0 9.2 22.1 4516 10824 118 2.6
Turkey 74.8 617.1 1040.3 8248 13904 50 3.7
Countries under DCFTA negotiations
Ukraine 46.0 113.5 291.1 2468 6327 98 4.6
Countries willing to open DCFTA negotiations
Armenia 3.1 8.7 16.3 2826 5286 56 8.8
Georgia 4.3 10.7 21.0 2520 4920 84 5.8
Moldova 3.6 5.4 1.5 1500 2824 145 4.8
GDP ($ billions) GDP per capita ($) 
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The small size of Georgia implies that the EU’s benefits from a DCFTA with 
Georgia will have to be political, not commercial or economic. If the 
DCFTA between the EU and Georgia does not work, the EU should 
abandon any hope to conclude a truly successful DCFTA with any of its 
Eastern (or Southern) neighbours. Large and powerful challengers of the 
EU as a world power will quickly understand that they may have a 
fantastic opportunity to offer better alternatives than the EU to countries 
close to the EU borders. No need to go as far as China or India: Table 1.1 
shows that the ratio between the Georgian and Turkish populations (and 
economies) is the same than the ratio between the EU-2007 (Bulgaria and 
Romania) and the whole EU. 
Second, Georgia is classified as a lower-middle income country by the 
World Bank. Its among the poorest countries selected in Table 1.1, with a 
GDP per capita that is one-fourth that of Bulgaria, the current poorest EU 
MS. This makes it hard to understand the Commission’s motive behind 
imposing on Georgia as preconditions for negotiating a DCFTA the most 
costly elements of the EU acquis (such as the EU technical regulations in the 
industrial sector or of the EU sanitary and phytosanitary measures in the 
farm and food sectors). It is useful to mention here the huge difficulties the 
Central European EU MS have had to implement these parts of the acquis, 
despite the huge amount of aid they received from the EU when acceding 
to the EU. In other words, the Commission is taking serious risks to impose 
an excessively heavy burden on the vibrant but still fragile Georgian 
economy, and to be a severe drag on its growth rather than a boost, as 
documented in chapters 4 and 5. 
Third, countries that are ambitious in terms of regulatory reforms exhibit 
better growth rates in the long run, even if they may have experienced 
more accentuated ups and downs. (In short, regulatory shyness does not 
pay once one takes a long-term perspective: it gives the impression to be 
the right approach only in the short run.) This is illustrated by a 
comparison between the EU-2004b (the Baltics) and the EU-2004a (the other 
Central European EU MS) cohorts. On the one hand, Table 1.1 shows that, 
over the same period, the Baltics have an annual growth rate that is one 
percentage point higher than the EU-2004a cohort, despite the huge 
negative shock of the Great Crisis on their economies. On the other hand, 
Chapter 2 shows that, over the decade 2000-10, the Baltics exhibit 
systematically better performances in regulatory quality than the other 
Central European EU MS, despite the fact that they were an integral part of 
the Soviet Union and started their reforms later. 
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In this respect, Figure 1.1 suggests two additional useful observations. First, 
Georgia is more similar to the Baltic EU MS than to the other Central 
European EU MS in terms of growth pattern, a result not surprising when 
one takes into account the similarities in the rapidity and intensity of her 
regulatory reforms. This is despite the fact that the year 2008 was 
particularly difficult for Georgia which has had to absorb two—not one—
severe shocks: not only the Great Crisis with its impact on the FDI inflows 
and on the remittances from the Georgian diasporas (a non-negligible 
portion of foreign inflows) but also the war with Russia a couple of months 
before, with its severe impact on the foreign investment climate, 
remittances and infrastructure (not to mention the cuts in the Russian 
supply of natural gas). 
Figure 1.1. Growth rates, Central European EU MS and Georgia, 2000-2010 
 
Source: EBRD, Economic indicators (website). 
 
Second, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Georgia needs a serious 
boost to its current growth. Its growth rate for 2010 is again positive: it was 
initially estimated at 2% for the whole year 2010 (as indicated in Figure 1.1) 
and it has been recently revised to 6.5%. This last result is very good in 
current circumstances. But, higher growth is needed. Of course, this is for 
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the usual economic reasons: i) the urgent need to improve a very 
insufficient infrastructure and ii) the longer-term objective to catch up 
globally and to fight poverty and inequality problems made more blatant 
by the success of only a portion of the economy. But, this is also for political 
reasons quite specific to Georgia. One of the peaceful ways for Georgia to 
recover the control of her whole territory is to be a vibrant economy, as 
West Germany or South Korea has been or is with respect to East Germany 
or North Korea.  
1.3 Defining a DCFTA: In desperate need for clarity 
The DCFTA negotiations lack elementary fairness and transparency 
because the Commission has never clearly defined what a DCFTA is to be. 
As a result, DCFTA negotiations consist of an unpredictable, open-ended 
journey during which the Commission shows little sign of valuing efforts 
made by the EU negotiating partners. During this journey, the attraction 
initially exerted by the EU on its neighbours is rapidly vanishing. 
Ultimately, the staunchest supporters of a DCFTA in the EU negotiating 
partners are shrinking to those who believe that their country cannot move 
without a strong external force, an unattractive prospect since the EU’s 
regulatory performance is not always that good, as documented in Chapter 
2. 
In order to overcome the uncertainties over what the DCFTA should cover, 
it has been suggested to the Commission on a number of occasions that all 
the relevant Commission’s Directorates General should undertake a 
combined project to prepare a “Handbook on the Costs and Benefits of EU 
Acquis Compliance by European Neighbourhood Policy Partner States”. 
This has never been attempted by the Commission, doubtless because it 
would be a very challenging task both of analyzing the costs and benefits of 
a huge number of regulations, and of coordinating such a project across the 
many Commission services involved (Trade, Enterprise, Market, 
Competition, Agriculture, Food Safety, Transport, Energy, Environment, 
etc.). When the EU decided to complete its internal market by 1992, the 
Commission undertook a vast set of studies on precisely this question, 
publishing a synthesis book [Emerson et al., 1988], supported by 24 
volumes of sector-specific studies. The President of the Commission at that 
time, Jacques Delors, judged that it would be impossible politically to 
secure the backing of the EU MS for this extremely ambitious legislative 
programme without ample justification.  
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Something on this scale would not be necessary for the DCFTA, yet a 
slimmed down version of it is desperately needed. In reply to such 
proposals, the Commission has indicated that it is for the individual 
partner states to work out themselves what they want to do. This attitude is 
both indefensible and contradicted by the current Commission’s policy. 
Indefensible, because only the Commission’s services have easy access to 
the basic technical information on which to base such evaluations. If such a 
task is difficult for the Commission to undertake, how much more so 
would it be for the administrations of the Eastern neighbour states to do 
this? And it is contradicted by the Commission’s current policy of imposing 
large-scale preconditions for acquis compliance by Georgia. The 
Commission should already have prepared a “DCFTA Handbook”, and 
should not be dictating indiscriminate and/or erratic waves of acquis 
compliance in its absence. 
1.3.1 The current approach to DCFTAs: Both vague and brutal 
As of today, DCFTAs are not defined, but only described in very vague 
terms. For instance, the Commission’s Communication on Eastern 
Partnership [2008, p. 5] describes the DCFTAs as follows: 
They [DCFTAs] will cover substantially all trade, including 
energy, and aim at the highest possible degree of liberalisation 
(with the asymmetry in the pace of liberalisation appropriate to 
the partners’ economies)… They will create real perspective for 
enhanced movement of goods (this could include Agreements 
on Conformity of Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial 
Products and the recognition of equivalence achieved by 
partners related to sanitary and phytosanitary standards for 
agricultural and food products), capital and the supply of 
services… to be achieved in the long run (authors’ emphasis). 
The most recent description (dated February 2010) is provided by the 
Commission website on the ongoing negotiations with Ukraine, and reads 
as follows: 
The Association Agreement will include a free trade area 
between the two parties. In order to mark its exceptional and 
far-reaching ambitions, this free trade area has been called 
‘deep and comprehensive’. Traditionally, standard free trade 
agreements foresee mutual opening of markets for goods and 
services. The free trade area between the European Union and 
Ukraine goes much further. Ukrainian laws and standards will 
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be made compatible with those of the European Union in trade 
and trade-related areas (authors’ emphasis). 
The only certain conclusion to be drawn from all these vague descriptions 
is that the DCFTA does not open the perspective of EU membership even 
in the long-term. This is not very helpful since it leaves open many other 
questions. For instance, since membership is not a perspective, should the 
DCFTA partners be expected to adopt the whole acquis? The most 
reasonable answer is that they should not—all the more so because the 
accession process has always been accompanied by huge financial 
incentives during the decade needed to implement various EU regulatory 
standards. The experience of the Central European EU MS is however clear. 
Their negotiators all say that there is much in the acquis that would not 
have been justified without it having been being part of the accession 
package. It is frequently mentioned that various elements in the 
sanitary/phytosanitary and food safety acquis are extremely onerous when 
the whole of the agro-food sector has to become EU-compliant. Croatia and 
Turkey are currently repeating this experience. 
There are a host of additional questions. What is the difference between a 
‘simple’ FTA and a DCFTA, since both should cover “substantially all 
trade”? Does this condition simply repeat mechanically a condition that 
any FTA should fill under WTO rules, and hence echo the only clear 
condition on DCFTAs mentioned in the Commission’s texts, namely that 
the EU’s partner shall be a WTO member? Or does it mean more, for 
instance the elimination of all trade barriers in agriculture—a condition that 
Georgia is ready (and already close) to fulfil, but which the EU is unlikely 
to do? At the other end of the spectrum of concessions, to which extent 
does a DCFTA differ from an Accession agreement? How many “laws and 
standards” will be needed for a candidate’s laws to “be made compatible” 
and to satisfy the condition of “[going] much further”? What is the 
meaning of the term “compatible”? In short, the DCFTA notion floats in 
limbo somewhere between an FTA and an Accession agreement. Not a 
paragon of precision. 
Last but not least, the approach effectively taken by the Commission with 
some partners is in total contradiction with the above descriptions of 
DCFTAs. For instance, the second sentence of the Commission’s 
Communication on Eastern Partnership mentions topics (agreements on 
conformity of assessment and acceptance of industrial products and 
recognition of equivalence achieved by partners related to sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards for agricultural and food products) that could be 
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included in a long-term perspective (authors’ emphasis). Such a statement is 
clearly inconsistent with making these topics as preconditions for opening 
negotiations on DCFTA—as it is the case for Georgia. 
Beyond all these general questions, there are more many more questions 
specific to the partner to be resolved. For instance, the above quote from the 
Communication on Eastern Partnership mentions the asymmetry between 
the EU and the negotiating partner with an implicit assumption that the EU 
is more open than its negotiating Eastern partners. This assumption would 
have made some sense in the early 1990s when the EU was more open than 
most of the Central European countries (except for Czechoslovakia and 
Estonia). But this view is far from reflecting today’s reality. As shown by 
Table 1.2 based on the information provided by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), Georgia is already much more liberal and open than 
the EU on five key indicators related to protection at the borders. 
Table 1.2 Border protection in the EU and selected partners in 2009: Which is the 
most open? 
 
 a The first figure does not include the tariff equivalents of the many specific tariffs 
imposed by the EU on its agricultural imports. 
Source: WTO Trade Profiles (website). 
Table 1.2 deserves a couple of more precise points. First, Georgia does not 
even have anti-dumping and anti-subsidy regulations at all, while the EU is 
very active in these matters. Second, Georgia has no seasonal or specific 
tariff in the agricultural sector (since the recent elimination of those on the 
alcoholic beverages). In sharp contrast, the EU has many seasonal tariffs 
(particularly on fruits and vegetables which are products of great export 
Services
All goods Agriculture Industry Anti‐dumping Anti‐subsidy Safeguard under GATS
European Union 5.9 a 13.5 a 4.6 144 10 0 115 
Countries under accession negotiations 
Croatia 4.9 10.7 4.0 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0 126 
Turkey 9.7 42.9 4.8 110 1 9 77 
Macedonia 7.3 13.4 6.4 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0 115 
Countries with signed or ongoing DCFTA negotiations 
Korea 12.1 48.6 6.6 43 ‐‐ 0 98 
Ukraine 4.6 9.7 3.8 19 0 1 137 
Countries willing to open DCFTA negotiations 
Armenia 2.8 6.8 2.2 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0 106 
Georgia 1.3 7.7 0.3 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0 125 
Moldova 4.6 10.7 3.7 ‐‐ ‐‐ 1 147 
Applied tariffs (%) WTO notifications 
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interest for Georgia) and a third of the EU tariff lines in agriculture have 
specific (lump-sum) tariffs. Calculating the ad valorem equivalents of the EU 
specific tariffs multiply by two the EU average tariff in agriculture, which 
jumps to 20-25%. This figure is only a rough estimate since as soon as the 
world prices in agriculture decline, the ad valorem equivalents of the EU 
specific tariffs increase mechanically. 
Table 1.2 illustrates how much the Commission’s language and thinking on 
asymmetry has not yet realized the magnitude of the recent unilateral 
liberalizations among some of its neighbours, and most notably Georgia, 
and how it has an inaccurate perception of the EU’s level of openness. One 
could argue that Table 1.2 does not do justice to EU trade policy because it 
does not take into account the fact that the EU grants the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) to most of the countries listed in Table 1.2. But, 
the true question here is: What is the EU’s GSP worth? The answer depends 
on the trading partner—the EU GSP (as all GSP) is full of provisions that 
are sensitive to the economic conditions of the ‘beneficiary’. In the case of 
Georgia, Chapter 3 shows that the EU GSP provides very few, if any, 
benefits to Georgian exporters. 
1.3.2 A DCFTA partner: Is it like being an EU MS with no full market access to 
the EU markets, no EU aid and no say in the future EU acquis? 
By not defining DCFTA in a precise way, the Commission makes DCFTA 
negotiations an open-ended process, not result-oriented. This approach 
generates a cascade of costly consequences for the negotiating partners and 
for the EU. 
First, the current DCFTA negotiations provide no sense of fairness, 
transparency or predictability. To illustrate this point, Table 1.3 lists the 
topics (‘chapters’) under negotiation for accession to the EU and on 
DCFTA, and their timing (it would be interesting to have this information 
for Ukraine, but it is not publicly available). It shows no regular pattern in 
the timing of negotiations by partner—already a puzzling fact since the 
negotiating partners of the EU are not that different. Even more 
importantly, it shows an abyssal difference between the accession and 
DCFTA negotiations. In the case of the accession negotiations, the topics 
technical barriers to trade (TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures and competition policy are scheduled at the end of the 
negotiations (Turkey and Croatia) or are categorized as the most difficult 
ones (Macedonia). And these are the topics that are those chosen as the key 
preconditions for opening negotiations on DCFTA with Georgia. Such 
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different schedules can only fuel a sense erratic behaviour from the EU 
negotiators and generate a sense of unfairness. 
Second, the loose description of what is supposed to be a DCFTA leads to a 
serious problem if it happens that the DCFTA is very demanding on 
regulatory convergence—as is the case for Georgia (see Chapters 4 to 6). 
To sum up, the key problem is as follows. A partner of the EU negotiating a 
DCFTA faces a balance of costs and benefits which is radically different 
from the balance faced by the Central European countries during the late 
1990s and early 2000s. These countries were guaranteed to become EU MS. 
As a result, they could agree on bearing the high costs associated with the 
full adoption of the acquis for three reasons: 
• they would get full access to all the EU markets, 
• they would receive substantial aid from the EU for implementing the 
regulatory reforms, and 
• once EU MS, they were guaranteed full participation in future EU 
decision-making. 
Countries currently negotiating a DCFTA will get none of these benefits. A 
DCFTA partner is highly unlikely to get free access to all the EU 
agricultural markets—which is a serious source of bitterness for Turkey 
and the main reason of the current impasse with Ukraine. It will not receive 
the same amount of aid. Last but not least, being barred from becoming  an 
EU MS, DCFTA ‘beneficiaries’ will never get type (iii) benefits, which may 
be the most important ones because they shape the EU acquis in the long 
run. 
In short, DCFTA signatories could be described as if they were an EU MS, 
but one 
• without full market access, 
• without full EU aid and 
• without voting rights in the EU decision-making. 
This is clearly an unacceptable situation at a time when there is an 
increasing number of alternatives to an EU anchor. This is best illustrated 
by Turkey—with the shift from its enthusiasm for EU accession in the late-
1990s to her current disillusionment, a profound deterioration of the EU 
image in Turkey and finally Turkey’s search for a ‘third way’ outside a 
shrinking EU sphere of influence. 
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Table 1.3 Schedules of negotiations: Inconsistent among EU negotiating partners 
 
a The level of difficulty is as follows: 1. No major difficulties expected; 2. Further efforts needed; 3. 
Considerable efforts needed; 4. Very hard to adopt and 5. Totally incompatible with the acquis.  
Sources: EU Commission website (Turkey and Croatia), Wikipedia (Macedonia), Government of 
Georgia. 
 
 
Georgia
Croatia Turkey Macedonia 
1  Free Movement of Goods 2008/07 – 4 1 
2  Freedom of Movement For Workers 2008/06 – 2
3  Right of Establishment & Freedom To Provide Services 2007/07 – 2
4  Free Movement of Capital 2009/10 2008/12 2
5  Public Procurement 2008/12 – 3
6  Company Law 2007/06 2008/6 3
7  Intellectual Property Law 2007/03 2008/6 4 1 
8  Competition Policy 2010/06 – 4 1 
9  Financial Services 2007/06 – 2
10  Information Society & Media 2007/07 2008/12 3
11  Agriculture & Rural Development 2009/10 – 3
12  Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy 2009/10 2010/06 3 1 
13  Fisheries 2010/02 – 1
14  Transport Policy 2008/04 – 3
15  Energy 2008/04 – 3
16  Taxation 2009/10 2009/06 3
17  Economic & Monetary Policy 2006/12 – 1
18  Statistics 2007/06 2007/06 1
19  Social Policy & Employment 2008/06 – 3
20  Enterprise & Industrial Policy 2006/12 2007/03 1
21  Trans‐European Networks 2007/12 2007/21 1
22  Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments 2009/10 – 3
23  Judiciary & Fundamental Rights 2010/06 – 3
24  Justice, Freedom & Security 2009/10 – 3
25  Science & Research 2006/06 2006/06 1
26  Education & Culture 2006/12 – 1
27  Environment 2010/02 2009/12 5
28  Consumer & Health Protection 2007/10 2007/12 2 1 
29  Customs Union 2006/12 – 3
30  External Relations 2007/10 – 1
31  Foreign, Security & Defence Policy 2010/06 – 1
32  Financial Control 2007/06 2007/07 4
33  Financial & Budgetary Provisions 2007/12 – 1
34  Institutions
35  Other Issues
Chapters Negotiations on accession a
not relevant
not relevant
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Last but not least, not defining DCFTA in a precise way is clear evidence of 
double standards, compared to the approach that the EU MS imposed on 
themselves in the early years of the European integration process. A 
provision (Art. 8 of the Treaty of Rome) set up specific deadlines to most 
meet of the Treaty goals—from the strict annual tariff cuts in the 1960s to 
the more flexible timing for the more difficult issues (dismantling non-tariff 
barriers, introducing progressively new regulations in the 1970s, etc.). Since 
then, Arts 7c and 15 in the successive TEC versions and Art. 27 in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union fulfils the same role and 
read as follows: 
When drawing up its proposals with a view to achieving the 
objectives set out in Article 26, the Commission shall take into 
account the extent of the effort that certain economies showing 
differences in development will have to sustain for the 
establishment of the internal market and it may propose 
appropriate provisions. 
If these provisions take the form of derogations, they must be of a 
temporary nature and must cause the least possible disturbance to 
the functioning of the internal market. 
It is surprising, to say the least, that the Commission chooses not to apply 
the benefit of such a basic and sensible provision to countries eager to be 
closer to the EU. 
The same type of argument could be made by referring to the key EU legal 
principle of proportionality. There is no proportionality in the current 
DCFTA negotiations if de facto the EU partners are required to adopt large 
blocks of the acquis if not all of it in internal as well as external market 
areas.  
1.4 A ‘positive’ approach to the DCFTAs: Robust, fair, 
predictable and beneficial 
DCFTA should be defined in a positive way—by what the EU and its 
partner are trying to achieve in common. Neighbour countries are turning 
to the EU to get an additional boost to their growth and to lock in the 
unilateral reforms that will contribute to this. They are not primarily 
interested in the whole acquis—they are not supposed to become EU MS—
but they are interested in the acquis that will boost their growth. 
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1.4.1 The pro-growth DCFTA: An integrated sequence of successive sets of 
commitments boosting the EU partner’s growth 
In such a context, a positive approach to the DCFTA would conceive of the 
DCFTA as a process of absorbing the EU acquis into an integrated sequence 
of successive sets of commitments, based on a breakdown of the EU acquis 
into sets of regulations (in what follows, the term ‘regulations’ with a small 
‘r’ is used as a synonym for the acquis). 
• Only the few EU regulations considered with high confidence as 
critical for boosting the growth of the EU partner should be part of 
the first set of commitments in the DCFTA process. 
• The remaining EU regulations should be introduced progressively in 
subsequent stages as and when the economy of the EU partner is 
converging to the level of EU economic development. 
Both sets of rules should be jointly defined by the EU and its partners—not 
unilaterally by the Commission. This is because each partner is different—
particularly in its capacity to implement the commitments it agreed on—
and because there is substantial room of manoeuvre—even for the EU 
regulations pertaining to the first set, such as dismantling all the key trade 
barriers in goods (tariffs, quotas, etc.). The need to have a negotiated list of 
regulations to be transposed by the EU partner flows from the fact that it is 
impossible for the Commission alone to identify which elements in the 
acquis would offer net benefits for the partner versus those that would 
involve excessive costs. Such a work requires the cooperation of the two 
negotiating sides since it should rely on the principle of ‘mutual evaluation’ 
that the EU is routinely implementing internally under the Services 
Directive—a part of the EU acquis that the Commission seems to have 
chosen to ignore. 
1.4.2 The link between the successive sets of commitments: An economic 
definition of the transition periods 
In order to integrate the successive sets of commitments, the transition 
periods between two sets need to be agreed. Clearly, the first set of EU 
unequivocally pro-growth regulations is the most urgent to negotiate and 
implement. The logic of the above-quoted TFEU Art. 27 would suggest a 
minimal amount of derogations and minimal derogatory schedules. 
Transition periods are generally fixed in terms of number of years (five to 
seven years often being the longest derogatory periods). Such a definition 
does not make economic sense if only because countries like Georgia or 
Ukraine will still have a very low GDP per capita compared to the EU MS’ 
GDP per capita within such a short period of time, as shown by Table 1.4. 
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A much better indicator for defining transition periods is the GDP per 
capita of the negotiating partner. Georgia would be asked to take on board 
the successive sets of commitments as and when its GDP per capita will 
reach agreed thresholds. The transposition of the acquis imposes mostly 
fixed costs. As a result, if the EU acquis would amount to 5% of Georgia’s 
GDP in 2010, it will cost less than 2% in 2030 (at a 5% annual growth rate) 
or in 2020 (at a 10% annual growth rate) as shown by Table 1.4. 
Table 1.4 Growth rates and GDP per capita in Euros 
 
a The EU is supposed to grow at an annual average growth rate of 2%. 
 
Such an approach ensures that both DCFTA signatories have an interest in 
high growth rates. It ensures that the transposition of the EU acquis is 
always pro-growth—a crucial benefit for the EU partner. The EU has also a 
strong interest in such an approach. Rushing in transposing the EU acquis 
into the laws of unprepared partners has often been a source of deep 
disillusions in the past. In sharp contrast, the GDP per capita criterion is: 
• Robust in fixing commitments in the future: no EU partner would be 
willing to slow down its growth just to not fulfil agreed 
commitments—all the more so if these commitments are supportive 
of sustainable reforms and of growth. 
• Predictable: everybody will know in advance when the EU partner’s 
GDP per capita will be close to reach the targeted level, hence they 
could start to prepare the transposition of the coming set of 
commitments; and 
• Fair: all the DCFTA candidates will be subject to similar thresholds. 
In passing, it is useful to note that this approach echoes the two first 
successful decades of the implementation of the Treaty of Rome. 
Years EU
a 2% 5% 7% 10% 
2010 32878 2520 2520 2520 2520 
2020 40078 3072 4105 4957 6536 
2025 44249 3392 5239 6953 10527
2030 48855 3745 6686 9752 16953
2035 53940 4134 8534 13677 27303
2040 59554 4565 10891 19183 43972
Georgia's growth rate
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2. THE FORGOTTEN PRECONDITION: 
VALUING EU NEIGHBOURS 
Summary 
1. In its current discussions with Georgia, the Commission is focusing heavily on 
regulatory matters. It is thus important to have a fresh look at the effective 
regulatory quality of Georgia compared to the EU member states and the other EU 
Eastern neighbours. This fresh look is provided by four sets of measures of 
regulatory quality: 
• Ease of doing business (from the International Finance Corporation), 
• Transition path (from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development), 
• Foreign direct investment performances (from the World Bank) and 
• Corruption index (from Transparency International). 
2. All these measures converge to show that Georgia fares well compared to other 
EU countries, including to the seven ‘cohorts’ of EU member states (member states 
aggregated by their time of accession). This result reflects the depth of Georgia’s 
unilateral reforms, which rely on three pillars: 
• Almost no tariffs in manufacturing and very moderate tariffs in agriculture, 
• No barriers to foreign direct investment into the whole Georgian economy and 
• A full recognition of the technical norms used by OECD (and NIS) countries, a 
feature that makes Georgia a much stronger enforcer of the EU ‘mutual 
recognition’ principle than the EU itself. 
3. All these features make Georgia the best candidate for a DCFTA model—an 
opportunity that the Commission is wasting with its preconditions, as shown in 
the following chapters. 
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Since the current discussions between Georgia and the Commission deal 
entirely with regulatory issues, this chapter compares, on the basis of the 
latest available information, the regulatory quality of the EU MS, Georgia 
and a few other selected neighbours. It shows that the current situation is 
very different from the situation two decades ago. The Financial Crisis has 
revealed serious flaws in the EU’s regulatory framework, notably for 
financial markets. Public opinion in the EU is increasingly questioning the 
European integration process in its present form, and the EU’s neighbours 
are not buying the ‘EU model’ as easily as they once did. Moreover, some 
EU neighbours have considerably improved their own governance to the 
point of showing better regulatory performances than some EU MS (and 
not necessarily the smallest or the most recent ones)—a point that the 
Commission completely ignores in its approach to discussions with 
Georgia. 
The current Commission’s approach on the transposition of the EU acquis 
into the partner’s legal regime relies on two basic (and false) assumptions: 
• that regulatory quality, which is the targeted objective, depends 
exclusively on adopting EU regulations (but these are only one factor 
for achieving regulatory quality); and 
• that ‘one size fits all’ in regulatory matters (and denies the possibility 
that the targeted objective could be achieved by different regulations 
in different countries). 
This chapter provides evidence that these two propositions are not 
supported by the available measures of regulatory quality presented in 
Tables 2.1 to 2.4, reinforcing results already available elsewhere [Messerlin, 
2008]. Of course, all these measures presented below have limits—it is very 
hard to measure regulatory quality. Nevertheless, they are based on 
indicators that capture monetary, time or workload costs in a very precise 
way and which often converge and are supported by anecdotal evidence. 
Rejecting such a body of evidence without providing better alternative 
measures of regulatory quality is simply not an acceptable argument. 
2.1 Focusing on the ‘ease of doing business’ 
Growth requires that doing business is made easy, and a DCFTA should be 
very careful to avoid making business more difficult. Table 2.1 presents the 
ranking of countries in terms of regulatory quality in 2010 provided by the 
International Finance Corporation’s “Doing Business” database [IFC, 2010]. 
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It shows only the global indicator (G) of Ease of Doing Business and the 
nine sub-indicators (S1 to S9) on which the global indicator G is based (it 
does not show the 36 basic indicators used to calculate the nine sub-
indicators). 
Table 2.1 ‘Ease of doing business ‘in selected countries, 2010 
 
Source: IFC (2010). Cohorts of EU MS are defined by the year of accession. The rank for each EU cohort is the 
unweighted average of the EU MS pertaining to the same cohort. 
 
As in all the following tables, Table 2.1 splits the EU in seven ‘cohorts’ 
defined by the date of accession of their respective EU MS in order to get a 
sense of the regulatory quality associated with adoption of the acquis. More 
precisely, the 10 Central European countries that joined the EU in 2004 
have been divided into two groups: the three Baltic EU MS (EU-2004b) and 
the seven other Central European EU MS (EU-2004a). 
Table 2.1 provides a striking first result. Non-EU countries can have a 
(much) better rank than some EU cohorts. The best illustration is Georgia, 
which comes just behind the leading cohort EU-1973 for the global 
indicator (indicator G) and even ahead of this leading EU cohort for a 
majority of the basic sub-indicators (S1 to S5). Comparing the performances 
of Georgia and Ukraine underscores how much the Commission’s policy is 
erratic: it did open DCFTA negotiations with Ukraine without 
Ease of 
doing 
Busines
Starting a 
Business
Dealing
with Cons‐ 
truction 
Permits
Registering
Property 
Getting 
Credit 
Protecting 
Investors
Paying 
Taxes 
Trading 
Across 
Borders 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Closing a 
Business 
G S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9
EU cohorts
EU‐1958 38 59 112 65 46 72 92 83 48 105
EU‐1973 6 18 54 26 28 70 44 17 27 63 
EU‐1980s 63 118 21 43 11 14 12 14 30 7 
EU‐1995 20 65 102 77 11 44 118 78 71 93 
EU‐2004a 50 67 87 58 49 80 99 60 69 45 
EU‐2004b 21 59 53 109 60 79 64 31 37 29 
EU‐2007 51 44 70 79 75 97 73 55 55 30 
Countries under accession negotiations
Croatia 84 56 132 110 65 132 42 98 47 89 
Turkey 65 63 137 38 72 59 75 76 26 115
Macedonia 38 5 136 69 46 20 33 66 65 116
Countries under DCFTA negotiations
Ukraine 145 118 179 164 32 109 181 139 43 150
Countries willing to open DCFTA negotiations 
Armenia 48 22 78 5 46 93 159 82 63 54 
Georgia 12 8 7 2 15 20 61 35 41 105
Moldova 90 94 159 18 89 109 106 141 20 92 
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preconditions, whereas this country is the worst-performing state by 
almost all measures, while for Georgia it dictated a huge battery of 
preconditions. 
It is then interesting to get a sense of the evolution of these indicators over 
time. For the sake of conciseness, Figure 2.1 presents only the evolution of 
the global indicator G over the last seven years. It reveals the rapid ascent 
of Georgia compared to the various EU cohorts between 2004 and 2006, 
with a slower but continuous improvement since 2007 until today.  
Figure 2.1 The global indicator “Ease of Doing Business” in selected countries, 
2004-2010 
 
Source: IFC (2010). Cohorts of EU MS are defined by the year of accession. The rank for each 
EU cohort is the unweighted average of the EU MS pertaining to the cohort.  
Figure 2.1 provides a crucial lesson on the regulatory quality of the EU MS 
themselves: the acquis is far from the dominant determinant of regulatory 
quality. This lesson relies on two observations: 
• There are huge differences in terms of regulatory quality among the 
EU MS themselves, and these differences tend to be very stable over 
time (with a couple of exceptions). 
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• The founding EU MS which by definition have had the longest 
exposure to the acquis are not leaders in terms of regulatory quality; 
some recent EU MS have been able to catch up very quickly despite 
the fact that they have been exposed to the acquis a much shorter 
period of time, as best illustrated by the Baltics (EU 2004b). 
These observations suggest that adopting the acquis is not a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for achieving regulatory quality. They also challenge 
the conventional wisdom in two fundamental ways: They call into question 
the way in which the EU builds its acquis. And they undermine the 
assumption that a massive adoption of the acquis by EU neighbours 
delivers regulatory quality. They also suggest that two often-neglected 
aspects play a crucial role: the appropriate choice of the parts of the acquis 
to be transposed by the negotiating partner, and a thorough 
implementation of this acquis by the partner. In short, the quality in 
domestic implementation counts more than the quantity of imported 
regulations. 
Table 2.2 Transition scores in selected countries, 2010 
 
a Indicators are scaled from 0 (lowest score) to 4+ (highest score). 
Source: EBRD 2010.  
2.2 Focusing on the transition path 
A DCFTA should primarily aim at being useful for the EU neighbours. As a 
result, any negotiations should recognize the strengths and the weaknesses 
of the transition path of the EU neighbours. 
  Infrastruc. 
Lg‐scale 
privati‐ 
sation
Sm‐scale 
privati‐ 
sation
Enterprise 
restruc‐ 
turing
Price libera‐
lisation 
Trade & 
forex 
system
Competition 
Policy 
Banking 
reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisat'n 
Securities & 
non‐bank 
   financial
   institutions
Overall 
reform 
EU cohorts 
EU‐2004a 76 3.7 4.3 3.5 4.2 4.3 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.4 
EU‐2004b 75 3.9 4.3 3.2 4.3 4.3 3.4 3.8 3.3 3.1 
EU‐2007 73 3.8 3.8 2.7 4.3 4.3 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.2 
Countries under accession negotiations
Croatia 70 3.3 4.3 3.0 4.0 4.3 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 
Turkey 70 3.3 4.0 2.7 4.0 4.3 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.7 
Macedonia 70 3.3 4.0 2.7 4.3 4.3 2.3 3.0 2.7 2.7 
Countries under DCFTA negotiations
Ukraine 65 3.0 4.0 2.3 4.0 4.0 2.3 3.0 2.7 2.3 
Countries willing to open DCFTA negotiations 
Armenia 75 3.7 4.0 2.3 4.3 4.3 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.7 
Georgia 75 4.0 4.0 2.3 4.3 4.3 2.0 2.7 1.7 2.7 
Moldova 65 3.0 4.0 2.0 4.0 4.3 2.3 3.0 2.0 2.3 
Enterprises Markets and trade Financial institutions 
Private 
sector 
share of 
GDP a
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Table 2.2 summarizes the information on the transition paths of the Central 
European EU MS and of the EU neighbours based on the EBRD transition 
indicators, which are divided in four main items: enterprises, markets and 
trade, financial institutions and infrastructure. 
Table 2.2 scores should be interpreted with a sense of time. Key reforms in 
Georgia have been adopted in 2004-06 (see Figure 2.1 above). Hence, the 
scores achieved by Georgia rely on reforms put in place six to seven years 
ago at most, while the scores in the Central European EU MS rely on 
reforms initiated in the early- and mid-1990s. In order to take into account 
these time lags, it is useful to know when the Central European EU MS 
achieved a score equivalent to those recorded by Georgia. If one takes into 
account this time dimension, Georgia exhibits equivalent performances to 
the EU-2004a and EU-2004b (and 5 to 6 years faster than the EU-2007) for 
enterprise restructuring and competition policy—the only two scores for 
which Georgia has not yet reached or surpassed the EU MS scores if one 
leaves aside the financial sectors, which are hard to compare after the 2008 
crisis. 
Finally, Table 2.2 shows that the main domain where Georgia is lagging 
behind is overall infrastructure reform (telecommunications, railways, 
electric power, roads and water). If the DCFTA is conceived as a boost for 
growth, this is the sector that should be at the heart of the negotiations 
between the EU and Georgia. As underscored in Chapters 3 to 6, the 
preconditions imposed in the dire circumstances of Spring 2009 are very far 
from focusing on the infrastructure sectors that are the most critical for 
Georgia’s future growth. 
2.3 Focusing on foreign direct investment performances 
A crucial factor for promoting growth is foreign direct investment (FDI)—
hence the key role of the regulations allowing foreign companies to 
establish or acquire local firms. Table 2.3 provides indicators from the 
World Bank tracking restrictions on foreign equity ownership in 11 
aggregated sectors (based on 33 sub-sectors). It clearly leads to the same 
kind of conclusions as the previous tables. In particular, it shows that EU 
MS—particularly the oldest ones—tend to have restrictive regulations in 
certain sectors (light manufacturing, electricity, transport and media). By 
contrast, Georgia emerges as a country with no restrictions in any sector. 
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Table 2.3 Restrictions on foreign direct investment in selected countries, 2010 
 
Note: The figure “100” means no restrictions on foreign direct investment. 
Source: World Bank, Investing across Borders, 2010 (website).  
 
Here again, the main lesson is that the DCFTA should at any cost avoid 
introducing, directly or indirectly, restrictions on Georgian regulations on 
foreign direct investment since FDI is so crucial for Georgia’s growth, in 
particular for improving its infrastructure. Interestingly, this point should 
be of utmost importance for the EU development and aid communities. 
2.4 Focusing on corruption 
Corruption is a sure sign of badly regulated markets combined with in 
effective police and judicial systems. The first element (malfunctioning of 
markets) can be addressed relatively quickly if there is political will for 
regulatory reforms. Improving police and justice is much more difficult and 
requires more time. With these two aspects in mind, it seems interesting to 
have a look at the corruption perception index developed by Transparency 
International. Table 2.4 and Figure 2.2 provide the annual ranks during the 
nine last years as well as the change over the whole period. 
Table 2.4 shows that two contrasting evolutions. On the one hand, only two 
countries show a strong decrease in the ranking of their corruption index: 
Macedonia and Georgia. On the other hand, most of the selected 
countries—including EU MS—exhibit worrisome increases in the ranking. 
Some increases are continuous (for instance, the EU-1958) while others are 
brutal and sharp (for instance, the EU-1980s). As a result of its own 
improvement and of the deterioration of the situation in many EU MS, 
Georgia, which showed the highest level of corruption in 2004, shows now 
Mining, oil 
and gas     
Agriculture 
and forestry   
Light manufac‐
turing     
Telecom      Electricity      Banking      Insurance      Transport      Media     
Construction, 
tourism, retail 
    
Health care, 
waste mana‐
gement
EU cohorts
EU‐1958 100 100 80 100 100 100 100 60 20 100 100
EU‐1973 100 100 83 100 100 100 100 80 100 100 100
EU‐1980s 100 100 100 100 50 100 100 45 50 100 100
EU‐1995 100 100 100 100 71 100 100 80 75 100 100
EU‐2004a 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 73 92 100 100
EU‐2004b ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
EU‐2007 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 80 100 100 100
Countries under accession negotiations
Croatia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 69 100 100 100
Turkey 100 100 100 100 79 100 100 69 63 100 100
Macedonia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 80 100 100 100
Countries under DCFTA negotiations
Ukraine 100 100 83 100 100 100 100 80 15 100 100
Countries willing to open DCFTA negotiations
Armenia 75 50 100 100 100 100 100 56 100 100 100
Georgia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Moldova 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 100 100
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a lower ranking of perceived corruption than the EU-2007 (and than Greece 
and Italy, if one looks at individual EU MS). Figure 2.2 illustrates this 
dramatic change in Georgia’s relative position. 
Table 2.4 Corruption indicators, selected countries, 2010 
 
a  2003 serves as the base year for Armenia and Macedonia. 
Source: Transparency International [2010].  
Figure 2.2 The evolution of the level of corruption in selected countries, 2002-10 
 
Data source: Table 2.4. 
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010/
2002a 
EU cohorts 
EU‐1958 18 18 20 20 20 19 21 23 25 36.1 
EU‐1973 12 11 10 11 11 10 11 11 12 0.0 
EU‐1980s 30 33 33 32 34 36 39 46 47 57.3 
EU‐1995 7 7 7 6 6 7 6 8 8 9.5 
EU‐2004a 42 46 47 45 44 43 43 43 43 2.9 
EU‐2004b 39 44 44 41 40 43 46 45 44 12.0 
EU‐2007 61 69 71 70 71 67 71 71 71 16.4 
Countries under accession negotiations
Croatia 51 59 67 70 69 64 62 66 62 21.6 
Turkey 64 77 77 65 60 64 58 61 56 ‐12.5
Macedonia ‐‐ 106 97 103 105 84 72 71 62 ‐41.5
Countries under DCFTA negotiations
Ukraine 85 106 122 107 99 118 134 146 134 57.6 
Countries willing to open DCFTA negotiations 
Armenia ‐‐ 78 82 88 93 99 109 120 123 57.7 
Georgia 85 124 133 130 99 79 67 66 68 ‐20.0
Moldova 93 100 114 88 79 111 109 89 105 12.9 
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The lesson to be drawn from these indicators on corruption is that the EU-
Georgia DCFTA should avoid at any cost creating the complex web of 
regulations that would fuel the return of corruption. The fight against 
corruption is one of the most difficult fights that any government can get 
into, and any relapse in these matters makes things much worse—hence the 
extreme sensitivity of the Georgian authorities to this issue. 
That said, it is hard to explain the increase in the level of corruption in the 
EU MS without taking into account—as one factor—the increased number 
and complexity in terms of content of the EU regulations. For instance, the 
EU’s tendency to offer tariff quotas for agricultural products in FTA 
negotiations, as currently in the case of Ukraine, is a clear example of 
inciting corruption in the distribution of the quotas. This should also be a 
point of utmost importance for the EU development and aid communities, 
which have fully realized how crucial for growth and development are the 
best practices of good governance. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
A better understanding of the effective performances of the EU and its 
Eastern neighbours in terms of regulatory quality is itself a critical 
precondition for defining realistic goals for the DCFTA process. 
Negotiating a DCFTA should be the opportunity to list and address the 
remaining major weaknesses of the EU’s neighbours rather than to impose 
a straight jacket of new and pre-defined (and often artificial, as shown in 
the following chapters) constraints on the partners. In this way, the DCFTA 
would be a much better instrument of development policy for the EU 
neighbours—as well as a much better instrument of foreign policy for the 
EU. 
Georgia in particular is seen under multiple indicators to be achieving 
results comparable to various groups of EU MS without so far applying the 
EU acquis. Yet it is still subject to pre-conditions that oblige it to implement 
regulations that cost-benefit analysis would not justify—as the next 
chapters show. 
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PART II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR KEY 
PRECONDITIONS IMPOSED BY 
THE COMMISSION ON GEORGIA 
Part II focuses on the key points of the current discussions between the 
Commission and Georgia. 
Chapter 3 describes the 11 preconditions of which four are considered as 
key by the Commission, despite the fact that they consist of imposing the 
most difficult and complex parts of the acquis on a country three times 
poorer than Bulgaria. It also tries to explain what could have been the 
motives for such a damaging choice. 
The other chapters analyze the preconditions in technical barriers to trade 
(Chapter 4), in sanitary and phytosanitary measures (Chapter 5) and in 
competition policy and intellectual property rights (Chapter 6). The 
chapters assess the costs imposed by these pre-conditions—not only the 
administrative costs, but more importantly the costs on Georgian producers 
and consumers. They also make proposals for shaping a pro-growth 
DCFTA. 
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3. THE FOUR KEY PRECONDITIONS:  
WHY SUCH A DAMAGING CHOICE? 
Summary 
1. Out of the 11 areas on which the Commission focuses its ‘recommendations’ (i.e. 
preconditions), the most closely trade-related ones would have been the logical 
choice for preconditions (if any) for opening DCFTA negotiations, but these were 
not chosen. It is worth noting that these most clearly trade-related preconditions 
would have required a lot of effort from the EU a lot of effort, but none from 
Georgia because: 
• In agriculture, Georgia has moderate, ad valorem and non-seasonal tariffs, 
whereas the EU has high tariffs, many of which are specific and/or seasonal.  
• In manufacturing, Georgia has almost no tariffs, no anti-dumping and no 
countervailing procedures, whereas the EU grants to Georgia a largely 
worthless GSP+ regime and is a regular user of anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures. 
2. Instead, the Commission decided to require a massive transposition of the EU 
acquis into Georgian law in four regulatory areas: technical barriers to trade, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, competition policy and intellectual property 
rights. As the EU acquis in these areas is well known for its complexity, its 
transposition will be a huge burden on Georgia’s growth. This raises the question 
of why the Commission has made such a choice. Three reasons are examined in 
more depth: 
• the Commission’s insistence on controlling tightly the timing of the 
negotiations, 
• the Commission’s determination to impose an ‘unequal treaty’ and 
• the Commission’s insistence on following the recommendations of the 
feasibility study. However, a close examination of this study shows that it 
rests on outdated data, and that updated data would have provided the 
opposite recommendations—favouring a simple FTA over a DCFTA. 
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3. The Commission’s preconditions have been presented in two texts: the 2009 
Matrix and the 2010 Document. The study shows that the 2010 Document is a 
breach of the 2009 Matrix and is of lower legal status. As a result, the study 
considers that the only legitimate preconditions to be met by Georgia are those 
included in the 2009 Matrix. Its proposals in the following chapters are based on 
this conclusion. 
 
Chapter 2 showed Georgia as one of the steadiest reformers in the EU 
Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, with impressive performances from 
the reforms undertaken—often better than those achieved today by a 
variety of old and new EU MS. That makes Georgia the best trading partner 
that the EU could dream of for building a ‘DCFTA model’ capable of: i) 
boosting growth of the EU’s neighbours and ii) establishing the EU’s 
reputation as an attractive anchor at a time where the EU is facing 
increasingly credible challengers for such a role. 
With this background in mind, this chapter presents an overview of the 
preconditions imposed by the Commission on Georgia. It is organized as 
follows. Section 1 describes the impressive list of 11 preconditions included 
in the Commission’s Matrix presented in March 2009 (the ‘2009 Matrix’). 
Section 2 presents briefly the four preconditions that are imposed by the 
Commission for launching the DCFTA negotiations. Section 3 discusses the 
various possible motives on the part of the Commission for imposing such 
a choice. Section 4 examines the feasibility study on an EU-Georgia 
DCFTA. It shows that that this study rests on outdated data, and that 
updated data would have provided opposite recommendations—favouring 
a simple FTA over a DCFTA. 
3.1 The Commission’s March 2009 Matrix of preconditions 
In its 2009 Matrix, the Commission identified 11 issues as preconditions 4 to 
the launching of DCFTA negotiations: 
1. Overall coordination negotiating mechanism 
2. Tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
3. Technical barriers to trade (TBTs) 
                                                     
4 The Commission’s Matrix and 2010 Document use the term “recommendation”, 
not precondition. However, the imperative tone and the detailed content leave no 
room for doubt that these recommendations are preconditions. 
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4. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures  
5. Trade facilitation and customs administration 
6. Rules of origin 
7. Services and investment 
8. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
9. Public procurement 
10. Competition 
11. Sustainable development (social and labour issues; environment). 
The list is impressive. One wonders what additional concessions Georgia 
could conceivably grant to the EU during the DCFTA negotiations per se, 
having already met these preconditions with its accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Georgia has so few and low border barriers in 
trade and free foreign direct investment. Moreover, these preconditions 
have two features: 
• They are totally asymmetrical: there is no precondition for the EU, 
such as eliminating EU tariffs, which are (much) higher than the 
Georgian tariffs. 
• They are unprecedented in depth: they consist of a complete 
alignment of Georgian law to a large, very complex, part of the EU 
acquis (including some regulations that EU MS only started to 
implement in January 2010), despite the fact that Georgia never asked 
to join the EU. 
The chapter leaves aside these important features. And, for the sake of the 
following discussion, it also accepts the principle—never justified by the 
Commission—that Georgia should meet preconditions before negotiating a 
DCFTA, whereas no such preconditions have been imposed on other EU 
neighbours. 
Taking the above list of preconditions as granted, the logic would have 
been to choose those which are the most ‘trade-related’ since after all, a 
DCFTA is first and foremost a free trade agreement. These topics are 
unquestionably the points 2 (tariffs and NTBs) 5 (trade facilitation) and 6 
(rules of origin). This choice would have also been consistent with the EU’s 
own history, a key point if the EU wants to establish its reputation as a fair 
anchor: after the dismantlement of the intra-EEC tariffs in the 1960s, NTBs, 
trade facilitation and rules of origin were the bread and butter of the intra-
EEC integration process during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
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3.2 The Commission’s four preconditions for launching DCFTA 
negotiations 
As stated above, the Commission decided unilaterally to choose a totally 
different set of topics. It decided to impose as key preconditions—meaning 
those that it intends to use to determine whether Georgia is ready for 
DCFTA negotiations or not—the transposition of the EU acquis in technical 
barriers to trade (TBTs, topic 3), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS 
measures, topic 4), intellectual property rights (IPRs, topic 8), and 
competition policy (topic 10) into Georgian law. It is worth noting that this 
choice is totally at odds with the EU’s own history: these four topics have 
been at the core of the EU Internal Market only at a late stage, roughly from 
the mid-1980s to today (SPS measures and TBTs are still topics raising a lot 
of issues within the EU). 
Table 3.1 The structure of the 2009 Matrix 
 
Source: Interviews. The Strategy Papers of the Government of Georgia. 
 
It is important to underscore the very complicated structure and abstruse 
language of the 2009 Matrix illustrated in Table 3.1. Column A describes 
what needs to be done before the start of the DCFTA negotiations and 
column B what needs to be done between the beginning of the negotiations 
and their end. One wonders why these two columns could have not 
received a clearer title. One explanation could be the frequent lack of clarity 
Georgia’s 
preparedness for 
DCFTA negotiations 
Georgia’s 
preparedness to 
implement and 
sustain the future 
DCFTA 
A B
“Key  priorities”:  “issues  where  Georgia 
to show progress to enable the Commission
to conclude that it is sufficiently advanced in
its preparation for the negotiating process of
a DCFTA with the EU”
1 3
“Additional recommendations”:  “additional 
actions aiming at facilitating future 
negotiations of a DCFTA with the EU” 2 4
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of EU official texts. An alternative explanation could be that the 
Commission did not want such a clarity because it would make more 
visible the breach of the initial ‘contract’ when shifting elements from 
Column B to Column A (as was done in the 2010 Document, see below). 
Whatever the reason, the distinction between key priorities and additional 
requirements combined with an often-repetitive language add many 
additional possibilities of blurring the borders among the four cells. 
The Commission’s choice is astonishing, to say the least, because it raises 
three huge problems which are examined in detail in Chapters 4 to 6. 
• This choice is not development friendly. It imposes the transposition 
of a massive share of the most complex parts of the EU acquis on 
Georgia, that even rich EU MS (with a GDP per capita up to 15 times 
higher than Georgia’s and with more than 20 years of experience in 
the EU acquis) have still difficulties to implement. As documented in 
Chapters 4 to 6, this choice inflicts unnecessary high costs on the 
fragile Georgian economy. But, their highest cost would be to divert 
Georgia’s efforts away from growth and development concerns. 
• This choice is an economic mistake. The Commission’s choice will not 
bring any notable benefit to EU firms, and it may indeed favour firms 
from third countries, particularly from the emerging economies. This 
result—surprising at a first glance but explained in detail in Chapters 
4 to 6—flows largely from the fact that the Commission has 
miscalculated the consequences of the three crucial Georgian 
unilateral reforms—almost no tariffs in industrial products, free 
foreign investment and unconditional mutual recognition of all the 
technical norms of the OECD countries. 
• This choice is highly damaging for the EU’s world reputation since it 
reveals an insensitivity on the part of the EU to the demands of its 
neighbours. This is all the more the case because the Commission 
imposes the transposition of the EU acquis in a compelling tone quite 
inappropriate in a negotiating context, and because it does not 
hesitate to impose detailed administrative structures and to insist on 
increasing public budgetary expenses—as if little has been learnt in 
the EU about the costs of excessive public expenses. 
3.3 The status of the 2010 Document 
The burden of this choice on Georgia has been made much heavier by a 
recent Commission document dated December 2010 (hereafter the 2010 
Document) for the two following reasons: 
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• The Document shifts some of the preconditions that the 2009 Matrix 
presents as to be met after the opening of the negotiations into the list 
of preconditions to be met before the launching of these negotiations. 
• It states the preconditions in a fuzzy, open-ended language, such as 
“a credible and adequately funded programme”, “initial progress 
should be made”, “carries out this implementation effectively and 
properly”, etc. Such open-ended language gives no clue as to when 
such preconditions are satisfied, or not—and hence gives the 
Commission absolute power to decide whether the preconditions are 
met or not. 
In short, the risk of ‘moving targets’, which was present since the beginning 
of the discussions between Georgia and the Commission (as shown in the 
previous section), has surfaced in the 2010 Document which, in many 
respects, is breaching the 2009 Matrix. 
The following list gives the most important additional requirements 
included in the 2010 Document that are outside the scope of the four key 
2009 Matrix preconditions (the additional requirements specific to the key 
preconditions are documented in the appropriate chapters): 
• Requirements to impose a much tightened negotiating mechanism 
(institutions in charge, mechanisms of coordination, number and 
quality of staff available, etc.). These requirements contrast sharply 
with the absence of information and transparency of how the 
Commission’s negotiating machinery works. This is all the more 
important in the four key preconditions because DG TRADE is not 
the leading Commission service in any of them: DG COMP is the 
leading service for competition policy, DG ENTR for TBTs and IPRs, 
DG AGRI and DG SANCO for SPS measures. Moreover, these four 
areas have a strong EU MS component in terms of both competences 
and implementation. Indeed, the terms that the 2009 Matrix and the 
2010 Document use for stating some preconditions (for instance, on 
competition policy) are so open to misinterpretations that one 
wonders whether the competent Commission services have been 
sufficiently consulted. 
• Requirements to increase the expenses (investments and staff) in the 
2011 Georgian State budget on the ground that the current funding 
for the institutions imposed by the DCFTA preconditions are 
insufficient. These requirements are open-ended since they are not 
TRADE POLICY TOWARDS ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURS: THE CASE OF EU GEORGIA | 45 
accompanied by any justification of how insufficient the expenses 
scheduled for 2011 are, and by any indication on what would be the 
‘adequate’ level of expenses. It is also hard not to make a comparison 
between these requirements and the endless exhortations by the 
Commission to trim down public expenditures in the EU. 
• Requirements concerning Georgia’s plan for the overall Civil Service 
reform on the ground that these plans are “largely divergent from the 
EU standards”, without describing the EU standards in question (if 
there are any), the reasons for which they are preferable and the 
precise cases of divergence. Last but not least, this reform is outside 
the scope of a possible DCFTA, and it is not even within the scope of 
the acquis. 
• Introduction of a twelfth item in the above list concerning a “dispute 
settlement”, with no detail on its possible goal(s), scope of issues, 
composition, etc. Moreover, it is hard to see the logic of mentioning a 
dispute settlement for an agreement the negotiations of which have 
not even started. 
• Repeated requirements to “ensure sufficient involvement of all the 
relevant stakeholders”, an expression that suggests a wide range of 
organizations (businesses, NGOs, etc.). These requirements deserve 
three remarks. First, the fact that the Commission has never made 
public its 2009 Matrix or its 2010 Document suggests that it has not 
followed this rule on its own side. Second, as stressed above, 
consumers are mentioned only once. Last but not least, in the 
precondition on IPRs, the 2009 Matrix does not mention all 
stakeholders, but only “right holders”—suggesting that the concerns 
of the Commission are the commercial interests of EU (and non-EU) 
firms with IPR interests rather than the Georgian consumers.  
It is not acceptable that a text with a much lower legal status (a simple 
letter) introduces so many changes in a text adopted unilaterally by the 
Commission a year before. As a result, while the rest of this study will 
document the many breaches introduced by the 2010 Document, it will 
consider the 2009 Matrix as the only legitimate text. That means that the 
study is assessing whether Georgia has met the preconditions on the 
relevant subsets of preconditions in the Matrix, and that it will make 
proposals with respect to the 2009 Matrix. 
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3.4 What are the possible motivations behind the Commission’s 
damaging choice? 
The Commission’s choice raises a question that can no longer be ducked: 
what could be the motive(s) behind its choice—assuming that it really 
wants to negotiate a DCFTA with Georgia (a given assumption in this 
study, despite the strong evidence to the contrary). This section examines 
three possible general motivations. 
3.4.1 Driven by vision or by routine? 
The first motive to examine is whether the Commission is moved by the 
vision to work for the best interests of the Georgian consumers. A simple 
exercise on the 2009 Matrix and the 2010 Document gives an icy answer: the 
term “consumers” (which the literature on economic welfare considers as 
the critical economic operator) is mentioned only once in the two texts, 
whereas the terms “producers”, “farmers”, “right-holders” (in the IPR area) 
are mentioned several times in each text. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a more convincing motive is the routine 
assumption that the EU regulations are the best of the world. Indeed, a 
striking feature of the 2009 Matrix and the Document is that they do not 
leave room for tailor-made options. Both the 2009 Matrix and the 2010 
Document produce an one-size-fits-all list of measures that Georgia is 
asked to adopt because the EU MS have adopted them during the last 50 
years. They show not even a serious effort to use the rich experience 
embodied in recent EU law and practices, and their capacity to provide 
innovative solutions that would be costless for Georgia.  
3.4.2 Controlling tightly the timing of the negotiations? 
Another motive could be related to negotiating concerns. The four 
preconditions may be a tactical manoeuvre of the Commission for tightly 
controlling the timing of the DCFTA negotiations. One possible reason for 
such a motive is Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The Commission may want to start the negotiations on the DCFTA 
only after Russia’s WTO accession in order to put pressure on Georgia’s 
position in the WTO. But this is speculation, and since it is not an argument 
heard publicly, we pursue it no further.  
However the time control (or delay) motive is reinforced by the fact that, 
while Georgia has been in the course of implementing the initial list of 
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preconditions included in the 2009 Matrix, the 2010 Document has 
introduced many additional and loosely worded preconditions, making the 
whole process of preparing for DCFTA negotiations a ‘moving target’ 
exercise. 
The 2009 Matrix and the 2010 Document deserve a final comment. They 
contain many references to an “EU model” or “standard” without 
specifying what this model or standard consists of. This claim does not fit 
the reality, in particular when institutional issues are at stake. The chapter 
on competition policy presents the wide diversity among EU MS 
competition authorities. The same could be done for the institutions in 
charge of TBTs, SPS measures or IPRs. 
This permanent reference to the EU model is a very awkward and 
worrisome feature. It is awkward because it tends to suggest that Georgia 
would become a kind of ‘clone Member State’, while any prospect of EU 
accession is ruled out. And it is worrisome from the EU constitutional 
perspective. It shows the Commission setting abstract standards in areas 
where the Treaty and the practice give to the Commission a secondary role 
compared to the role of the EU MS. 
3.4.3 Twisting arms: Unequal preconditions? 
The other rationale behind the choice of the key preconditions related to 
negotiating tactics goes much beyond economics since it boils down to a 
pure rapport de force. The Commission uses the fact that Georgia was a 
demandeur of a FTA, and a very small one, as grounds for imposing severe 
constraints on Georgia, and none on the EU. 
By contrast, the alternative choice of trade-focused conditions (NTBs, trade 
facilitation and rules of origin), which has been mentioned above as the 
most logical one in an FTA context, would have imposed preconditions on 
the EU more than on Georgia. In particular, such a choice would have 
required that the EU would open its markets to Georgia to the same extent 
that, following its WTO commitments, Georgia has already opened its 
markets to the EU—in other words that the EU should go much further 
than granting the GSP+ status (for detail, see section 4). 
The current Commission’s approach based on ‘unequal preconditions’—no 
concession from the EU, deep concessions for Georgia—are not a good 
omen for the final treaty. They could easily drift into an unequal treaty, or a 
failure to agree on a DCFTA, or a failure to implement it. 
Perhaps the Commission has made this choice in the belief that the 
potential costs for the EU of such bullying tactics are small because Georgia 
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is small. If this is the case, it misses the key foreign policy dimension, that 
is, the reputational damage of these negotiations for the EU’s foreign 
policy.5 The EU badly needs a success story for its Eastern Partnership, 
which so far has been unable to deliver any substantial outcome. In this 
respect, the political gains of a success are much larger than the size of the 
Georgian economy. They are especially important for the EU in the current 
multi-polar world with emerging challengers to the EU even in its 
neighbourhood. 
3.5 The feasibility study: Based on outdated information 
As stated in the introduction, the option of an FTA (not a DCFTA) was 
included in the 2006 European Neighbourhood Action Plan (ENP) pending 
the results of a feasibility study. This study [CASE, 2008] was released a 
few months before the Commission’s fact-finding mission, and hence it 
may have influenced this mission and its aftermath. This explanation is all 
the more plausible because the feasibility study’s key conclusions are as 
follows: 
• a simple FTA would not provide notable benefits to Georgia; 
• a trade agreement beneficial to Georgia should be “deep and 
comprehensive”, a conclusion that happens to be in line with the pre-
existing Commission decision to impose DCFTAs on its Eastern 
neighbours (see chapter 1) and 
• the study interprets a DCFTA as the need for Georgia to fully adopt 
the EU acquis, in particular in TBTs, SPS measures and competition 
policy. 
To reach these conclusions, the study relies on computable general-
equilibrium (CGE) calculations, which show that the benefits from a simple 
FTA are significantly smaller than those from a DCFTA. 
These conclusions raise a basic question, however: to what extent are they 
robust? What follows shows that the results of the CGE calculations rely 
entirely on the magnitude of two basic indicators: the level of the EU tariffs 
applied on imports from Georgia and the level of the Georgian border and 
standard costs (the feasibility study uses this expression as a generic term 
                                                     
5 Unfortunately, this would not be the first time, as best illustrated by the 
reputation left by the yet unfinished negotiations with the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries. 
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for TBTs and SPS measures). The CGE results are thus robust to the extent 
that the values of these two indicators in the CGE calculations reflect 
correctly the situation of the Georgian economy. 
Our analysis shows that this is not the case. The data used for these two 
indicators in the CGE calculations are too old to take into account the 
consequences of the dramatic Georgian reforms. Using up-to-date data 
suggests a totally opposite result to the one provided by the feasibility 
study: a simple FTA with the EU opening its markets would be more 
beneficial than a DCFTA. 
3.5.1 Basic indicator 1: The level of the EU tariffs 
First, the CGE calculations assume that the EU tariffs are close to zero 
because of the GSP+ status granted by the EU to Georgia. It is true that the 
EU tariffs on imports under the GSP+ regime are nil. But, it remains a 
problem: do Georgian exporters use the EU GSP+ regime? 
The feasibility study assumes that they do, but does so on the basis of old 
data showing that 52% (in 2000) to 67% (in 2003) of Georgian exports to the 
EU markets are made under the EU GSP+ [CASE, 2008, p. 34]. The problem 
is that both figures date from years before the 2006 dramatic Georgian 
trade reform. 
In sharp contrast, the most recent figure on the share of Georgian products 
exported to the EU under the EU GSP+ regime is roughly 25% of total 
Georgian exports to the EU in 2010 (down from 40% on average in 2008 and 
2009). In other words, the bulk of the Georgian exports pay regular EU 
tariffs. These tariffs are not negligible, particularly for the farm and food 
products which are plagued by specific and seasonal tariffs, crucial 
especially in the fruit sector. The key consequence is that underestimating 
the EU tariffs applied on Georgian exports mechanically generates an 
underestimated value of a simple FTA for Georgia. 
The current small and declining share of Georgian exports under the EU 
GSP+ needs to be explained. The reason is that the EU GSP+ has serious 
intrinsic limits, which are amplified by the Georgian trade reforms. The 
intrinsic limits are three-fold: 
• First, the EU GSP+ has a concentration clause stating that, for a 
country to be eligible, the top five categories of its exports to the EU 
shall represent at least 75% of the country’s total exports to the EU. 
Hence, as soon as a ‘beneficiary’ of the EU GSP+ starts to diversify, it 
stops to qualify for the EU GSP+. 
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• Second, the EU GSP+ regime is granted for only three years (until 31 
December 2011). Such a time-limited market access is of little interest 
for exporters that produce in a largely open economy like Georgia 
and that need conditions that induce them to make long-term 
production plans. 
• Lastly, the EU GSP+ regime imposes rules of origin that can be 
stricter than those imposed by the other large markets for Georgian 
exports (e.g. the CIS countries of the former Soviet Union6). 
These features make the EU GSP+ regime unattractive for Georgian 
exporters in a systemic way. 
But the deep trade reforms undertaken by Georgia considerably amplify 
this unattractiveness for the following reason. Economic analysis shows not 
only that import liberalization increases the exported quantities, but also 
that it creates very strong incentives to diversify the product and 
geographical pattern of the country’s exports. In other words, the EU GSP+ 
concentration and time-limit clauses have a negative impact on Georgia’s 
reform efforts that should lead to a diversification of its exports. And in fact 
they make the GSP+ regime so much less attractive that Georgian exporters 
prefer to pay ‘regular’ (most-favoured nation) applied tariffs, and hence the 
low share of Georgian goods exported under the EU GSP+.7 
Updated information thus makes Georgian exporters likely to benefit more 
from a simple FTA since they continue to face significant tariffs when 
entering the EU market. The EU would not gain much simply because EU 
exporters already have free access to Georgian markets in accordance with 
Georgia’s WTO commitments. 
                                                     
6 The Commonwealth of Independent States comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
7 The following information gives a sense of the changes in Georgian protection 
and exports between 2005 and 2009. In 2005, the average tariff on industrial 
products was 6.2% (compared to 0.2% in 2009) and only 26.3% (compared to 85.8% 
in 2009) were duty-free [WTO, 2009, pp. 39-40]). In 2005, almost half (47.1%) of 
Georgian exports were with the CIS zone and 25% with the EC. In 2009, the figures 
are respectively 36.2 and 22.3%, with, the growing market for Georgian exports 
being the Americas (22.3% in 2009) [WTO, 2009, TPR, p. 91]. 
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3.5.2 Basic indicator 2: The level of Georgian border and standard costs 
The second basic indicator on which the CGE calculations of the feasibility 
study rely is the magnitude of the border and standard costs (that is, TBTs 
and SPS-type barriers). The study bases its calculations on estimates of the 
border and standard costs in Georgia compared to those in Ukraine. These 
estimates use the six components of the IFC Doing Business sub-indicator 
“Trading across borders” for two years (IFC, 2004 and 2006). On this basis, 
the feasibility study estimates that Georgian border and standard costs are 
30% higher than the corresponding Ukrainian costs. 
Again, this information provides an obsolete picture of the Georgian 
economy because it does not take into account the consequences of its 
reforms. Table 3.2 provides the most recent information on the six costs 
components (labelled A to F) of the Doing Business indicator that are used 
by the feasibility study. It shows the Georgian performances relative to (as 
indexes of) those of the various cohorts of EU MS and of six other selected 
countries in order to give a wider perspective than the feasibility study. 
In 2005, the Georgian costs compared to those of Ukraine range from 105 
(component F) to 188 (component D), with an unweighted average of 144. 
In other words, Georgian costs were 44% (144 minus 100) higher than those 
of Ukraine on average. In 2007, the Georgian costs relative to Ukraine’s 
range from 36 (component E) to 133 (component A) with an unweighted 
average of 80, meaning that Georgia’s costs were lower than Ukraine’s 
costs by 20% (80 minus 100) on average. In 2009, the Georgian relative costs 
range from 32 (component B) to 85 (component C) with an unweighted 
average of 59, meaning that Georgia’s costs were lower than Ukraine’s 
costs by 41% (59 minus 100) on average. 
As a result, the CGE calculations based on the same indicator but for the 
most recent years would again suggest an opposite result than the one 
suggested by the feasibility study, that is, no or few gains to be expected 
from a DCFTA, since Georgia has already cut its ‘border and standards’ 
costs for imports. 
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Table 3.2 Georgia’s border and standard costs compared to selected countries,a 
2005-10 
a The figures are the ratios of the Georgian performances over the performances of the selected trading partners 
for the operations A to F. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data from IFC, Doing Business (website) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
A. Documents to export (number) D. Documents to import (number)
EU‐1958 206 193 193 227 113 113 278 152 152 187 107 107
EU‐1973 210 200 200 200 100 100 417 194 194 194 111 111
EU‐1980s 185 164 164 164 82 82 246 115 115 115 66 68
EU‐1995 250 222 222 222 111 111 367 171 171 171 98 98
EU‐2004a 177 157 157 158 79 79 221 103 103 105 60 60
EU‐2004b 210 187 187 187 93 93 308 144 136 136 78 78
EU‐2007 129 137 160 160 80 80 125 93 108 108 62 62
Croatia 129 114 114 114 57 57 188 88 88 88 50 50
Macedonia 129 114 114 133 67 67 214 100 100 117 67 67
Turkey 113 100 114 114 57 57 115 54 88 88 50 50
Ukraine 150 133 133 133 67 67 188 88 88 88 50 50
Armenia 150 133 133 133 80 133 250 117 88 88 57 67
Moldova 150 133 133 133 67 67 214 100 100 100 57 57
B. Time to export (days) E. Time to import (days)
EU‐1958 572 148 148 152 127 127 540 169 169 171 159 159
EU‐1973 767 182 182 182 151 162 649 191 191 191 177 195
EU‐1980s 390 89 89 89 75 75 339 95 95 95 90 90
EU‐1995 675 150 150 157 131 131 698 188 194 194 181 181
EU‐2004a 294 65 65 82 69 71 252 68 68 102 95 100
EU‐2004b 704 156 151 151 126 133 649 175 175 175 162 169
EU‐2007 204 73 76 76 63 63 197 82 87 87 81 81
Croatia 208 46 55 60 50 50 289 78 88 88 81 81
Macedonia 318 71 71 80 83 83 347 93 93 108 118 118
Turkey 270 60 86 86 71 71 208 56 93 93 87 87
Ukraine 174 39 39 39 32 32 133 36 36 39 36 36
Armenia 159 35 40 40 59 77 141 38 58 58 65 72
Moldova 169 38 38 38 31 31 149 40 40 40 37 37
C. Cost to exports (US$ per container) F. Cost to imports (US$ per container)
EU‐1958 159 124 124 124 113 118 153 118 118 113 106 111
EU‐1973 212 158 158 148 136 146 202 145 145 133 129 140
EU‐1980s 210 162 162 148 133 139 147 122 122 120 109 115
EU‐1995 279 232 230 198 175 183 266 221 221 176 159 167
EU‐2004a 174 144 144 132 121 137 167 139 139 120 112 126
EU‐2004b 220 183 204 193 177 186 188 156 167 162 151 160
EU‐2007 124 114 110 97 91 95 131 115 108 95 91 95
Croatia 131 109 109 108 99 104 131 109 109 117 110 115
Macedonia 139 115 115 105 88 97 139 115 115 101 88 95
Turkey 306 254 151 147 128 134 214 178 129 126 118 124
Ukraine 114 95 95 88 81 85 105 87 87 80 74 83
Armenia 98 82 112 79 73 80 84 69 89 63 60 64
Moldova 111 92 92 78 72 75 98 81 81 68 64 67
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This new result is all the more plausible because Table 3.2 shows that 
Georgia’s performance in terms of border and standard costs is also faring 
increasingly better than the performance of many EU MS cohorts. In other 
words, even if one leaves aside Ukraine, these performances raise doubts 
on the benefits that Georgia could derive from transposing the EU acquis, as 
captured by this indicator. An analysis of the data in absolute terms (not in 
relative terms as shown in Table 3.2) shows that the improvement of the 
relative performance of Georgia is due to both an absolute improvement of 
Georgia’s performance and a deterioration of the absolute performance of 
various EU MS, most notably in terms of the number of necessary 
documents and the time required to export and import—precisely the two 
indicators that are most directly impacted by the EU’s complex procedures. 
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4. PRECONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE 
COMMISSION ON TBTS 
Summary 
1. If applied as currently formulated, the full set of the 2009 Matrix preconditions 
would have three negative impacts: 
• They would distort Georgian industry: they would induce Georgian 
producers to canton themselves in the two-thirds of the universe of products 
that is not covered by the EU acquis on technical barriers to trade (TBTs) in 
order to avoid the tax on production imposed by the transposition.  
• They would slow down the pace of Georgia’s industrialization in the 
products under the EU TBT acquis by making their sale more expensive in 
the Georgian markets. 
• They would favour trade flows between Georgia and non-EU countries to 
the detriment of those between Georgia and the EU. 
2. DCFTA negotiations should start without further delay since Georgia fulfils the 
relevant subset of preconditions. They should address the above problems by 
including: 
1. Provisions that would: Facilitate the implementation of EU norms by export-
oriented Georgian firms; such a provision would allow Georgia to have 
recourse, as far as possible, to the national accreditation and certification 
bodies of an EU Member State if Georgia considers that it is not 
economically meaningful to have a national accreditation and certification 
bodies or to provide certain accreditation and certification services. 
2. Exempt Georgian firms from the obligation to use EU norms when selling in 
Georgian markets; such a provision would also reschedule the timing of the 
transposition of the six New Approach Directives that Georgia has agreed to 
introduce into its legislation. 
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3. Release Georgia from any obligation to transpose the other New Approach 
Directives in this first set of commitments, except if Georgia decides 
otherwise. 
4. Possibly define transition periods to be based on an objective measure of the 
catching up of the Georgian economy, such as its GDP per capita. 
3. In accordance with its unilateral path of reforms, Georgia should keep its own 
policy of unconditional mutual recognition, which is more in line with the spirit of 
the EU case law (Cassis de Dijon case) than the EU current acquis. 
 
There is a large consensus—including among Commission officials—that 
the EU acquis in TBTs is the most complex element of the acquis, if one 
leaves aside the even more complex acquis in SPS measures. In a nutshell, 
the EU acquis in TBT consists of four main elements: 
• The Old Approach Directives aim at harmonizing the technical norms 
in a few sectors (agro-food, cars, chemicals, pharmaceuticals). 
• The New Approach Directives aim at harmonizing only the “essential 
requirements” in other sectors; the producers are free to choose the 
technical norms as long as they meet these essential requirements. 
• The New Legislative Framework regulates the wide set of activities 
ranging from certification to market surveillance. 
• The General Product Safety (hereafter GPS) Directive focuses on 
consumers’ rights while the Old and New Approach focus on 
producers’ obligations. 
4.1 Georgia: Ahead of the EU MS in enforcing the EU’s mutual 
recognition principle 
At the outset, it is important to underscore that the current discussions 
between the Commission and Georgia focuses on the producers’ side 
(except the GPS Directive, which does not raise similar substantive issues). 
This is because the consumers’ side is dominated by a key unilateral reform 
of Georgia: in 2006, Georgia recognized unilaterally all the technical norms 
in use in the OECD countries (as well as in the EU MS not members of the 
OECD) provided that there is the appropriate marking on the goods (for 
instance, the CE marking in the case of goods produced under EU norms).8 
                                                     
8 This legislation applies also to the producers: a Georgian producer can produce in 
accordance with US, EU, Canadian, etc. norms (and CIS norms). 
56 | PRECONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE COMMISSION ON TBTS 
 
Ironically, this decision has made Georgia the best pupil in the world for 
the European Court of Justice, since it is implementing the mutual 
recognition principle in the fullest and most unconditional form. 
Established in 1979 by the famous Cassis de Dijon ruling of the Court, this 
principle states that goods lawfully produced in one country cannot be 
banned from sale on the territory of another country, even if they are 
produced with different technical or quality specifications. This principle is 
the basis of the EU New Approach and New Legislative Framework. But, it 
is crucial to realize that the EU New Approach and New Legislative 
Framework exist in their current very complicated forms only because EU 
MS were (still are) reluctant to mutually recognize ‘unconditionally’ the 
technical norms of the other EU MS [Messerlin, 2011]—that is, to do among 
themselves what Georgia has done with all the OECD countries. 
The unconditional mutual recognition of OECD norms enables Georgian 
consumers to have the largest possible range of products to choose from, 
since no product could be banned from entering Georgian markets (or to be 
produced in Georgia) for reasons due to the ‘nationality’ of the technical 
norms of any OECD country used. It has another essential consequence: it 
protects the Georgian consumers (but not the producers) against any direct 
negative impact from the transposition of the EU TBT acquis into Georgian 
law. 
4.2 The Commission’s preconditions on TBTs: An overview 
Table 4.1 summarizes the Commission’s requirements (cells 1 and 2 of 
column A in Table 3.1) as they are listed in the 2009 Matrix and in the 2010 
Document. It also lists the actions taken by Georgia (middle column). 
Table 4.1 allows us to appreciate the hazards created by the 2010 
Document. These hazards flow from three main sources: 
• Point 1 of the 2010 Document requires the adoption and 
implementation of technical regulations for two specific products 
(lifts and cable cars) as a precondition that the 2009 Matrix lists in the 
preconditions to be fulfilled after the start of the DCFTA negotiations 
(column B in the Table 3.1). This shift imposes administrative costs on 
Georgia much faster than expected. It should be added that the 
Commission has chosen two products (lifts and cable cars) that are 
not produced at all in Georgia. Interpreting such a surprising choice 
is difficult. 
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• The rest of the 2010 Document insists on requirements on 
standardization, accreditation, metrology, market surveillance and 
conformity assessment. All these requirements are drawn from the 
EU New Legislative Framework that has taken eight years to be 
designed and adopted. The Framework is enforced by the EU MS 
only since 2010. It is particularly constraining because it is a reaction 
to the fear that some EU MS were loose enforcers of the EU TBT 
acquis in these areas [Commission SEC(2007) 173].9 In short, Georgia 
is required to do in a couple of years what some EU MS have not 
been able to do in more than 20 years. 
• The language is not only compelling. More worrying still, it is totally 
open-ended. What is the meaning of a “solid” institutional reform, 
“sufficient” legal metrology resources, “tangible” progress towards 
an identified market surveillance mechanism, etc.? When is solid 
solid, sufficient sufficient and tangible tangible? 
• All these requirements are quite unprecedented. The most recent FTA 
often qualified as ‘deep and comprehensive’ by the Commission’s 
officials—the EU-Korea FTA—does not include such an agenda. It 
would be interesting to hear why such a harmonization is not 
required in a trade agreement with a large, fully industrialized and 
very competitive economy such as Korea, whereas it should be a 
precondition for negotiating a similar agreement with a small, lower-
middle income country having a very limited industrial sector, such 
as Georgia. 
  
                                                     
9 The document Commission SEC(2007) 173 is the Commission’s impact 
assessment of how the EU accreditation and market surveillance worked in the 
2000s. This assessment deserves two remarks. First, it argues that some EU MS are 
guilty of ‘regulatory dumping’ (weak enforcement of the EU TBT acquis). Second, it 
provides no convincing proof of this [Messerlin, 2011]. Indeed, the latest document 
on the state of the implementation of the New Legislative Framework shows that 
implementing the EU TBT acquis is still far from completion [Commission, 2010]. 
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Table 4.1. Summary of the preconditions in the TBT area 
Commission’s 
March 2009 Matrix 
Actions taken by 
Georgia 
Commission’s 
 December 2010 Document 
Key priority 1 
Adopt and start 
implementing a 
governmental 
programme of 
adoption of technical 
regulations in line with 
the EU acquis in the 
priority industrial 
sectors. 
1. Georgia agreed on a 
Programme with the 
Commission, adopted it, and 
has already started its 
implementation. 
2. Georgia agreed a Strategy 
with the Commission, 
adopted it, and has already 
started its implementation.a  
3. In accordance to the 
Programme, a first draft of 
the Code on Safety and Free 
Movement of Products is 
prepared.  
1. Georgia should draft and adopt 
vertical/sectoral technical 
regulations for two sectors: 
cableways and lifts. 
2. Georgia should draft and adopt 
the legislation transposing fully 
the General Product Safety 
Directive. 
3. The new Code on Safety and 
Free Movement of Products 
should be drafted, adopted and 
enter into force. 
Key priority 2 
Achieve progress in 
the establishment of a 
domestic institutional 
system in the area of 
TBT, standardization, 
accreditation, 
metrology, conformity 
assessment and market 
surveillance. Create if 
needed and strengthen 
the institutions in 
charge of these 
respective issues. 
1. Georgia has adopted a 
Strategy in the area of TBT, 
standardization, 
accreditation, conformity 
assessment and metrology 
envisages with the 
strengthening of the relevant 
domestic institutions. 
2. The Technical and 
Construction Inspection 
Agency for market 
surveillance has been 
established. 
3. Seminars and trainings are 
carried out on TBT issues for 
the relevant institutions in 
coordination with donors on 
a regular basis. 
Comprehensive institutions 
building was requested with 
this purpose. 
1. The ongoing gap assessment in 
the areas of standardization, 
accreditation and metrology 
should be accomplished and 
initial progress in its follow-up 
achieved. 
2. A market surveillance 
authority should be designed for 
each specific product and 
preparation and first steps in the 
implementation of a credible and 
adequately funded programme to 
establish an effective market 
surveillance mechanism.   
 
3. Georgia should specify in more 
detail its plans for the 
establishment of an adequate 
domestic system of certification 
bodies able to issue 
internationally recognized 
certificates and start to implement 
these plans. 
a The preparation of a Strategy was not a precondition of starting DCFTA negotiations and was 
requested by the Commission only for the implementation stage of DCFTA. However, Georgia decided 
that this issue is very important and addressed it as a matter of urgency. 
Sources: Interviews and the Strategy Papers of the Government of Georgia.  
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4.3 A sense of the huge regulatory burden imposed by the 
transposition 
It is crucial to realize the tasks and burden entailed in transposing the New 
Approach Directives into Georgian law. In the context of the 2009 Matrix, it 
was agreed by Georgia and the Commission that Georgia would transpose 
into Georgian laws 6 out of the 21 New Approach Directives within the 
next 36 months (2010-2012). This first wave of transposition will be 
followed by four other waves according to a schedule not yet defined. As 
already mentioned, these initial preconditions have been unilaterally 
modified by the 2010 Document which made the implementation of the EU 
TBT acquis in two products that Georgia does not produce (cable cars and 
lifts) a precondition for launching the DCFTA negotiations. 
Table 4.2 provides a sense of the regulatory burden imposed on Georgia by 
the first wave of the six directives to be transposed within the next 36 
months. 
Table 4.2 deserves four remarks: 
• The New Approach Directives are not limited to their texts. They also 
often refer to other directives and to application texts. Table 4.1 does 
not take into account such connections, and hence presents a minimal 
account of the burden imposed on Georgian firms.  
• Table 4.1 shows that when directives are updated texts (such as 
88/404 and 2009/105 for the Simple Pressure Vessels), the new 
version is much longer than the initial one. For instance, the 2009 
version of the Simple Pressure Vessels Directive has roughly 25% 
more words than its 1988 version. In other words, the burden 
imposed on Georgian firms is likely to increase over time when the 
existing directives will be updated—a mechanism in which Georgia 
will have no say since it will not be an EU MS. 
• These directives refer to a large number of precise norms. The total 
number of norms of these six directives alone is almost 500. This is a 
huge number for a small country which, by its sheer size, has a 
relatively limited number of engineers. 
• Last but not least, a crucial feature of these directives is to impose 
norms that are specific to the EU (‘EN’ norms). This is best illustrated 
by the Directive on Pressure Equipment which is also the directive 
with the largest number of norms. The only exception is the Directive 
on Recreational Crafts which has a majority of international (ISO) 
norms.  
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Table 4.2. Transposing the New Approach Directives into Georgian law:  
The first wave 
 
Source: Government of Georgia, Strategy on TBT [2010].  
 
As a result, the administrative costs of implementing these new norms are 
likely to be huge, as best illustrated by the many governmental and non-
governmental bodies to be involved. Years will be needed for a full and 
smooth implementation, as has been shown by many Central European EU 
MS—all the more because technical assistance promised by the EU to 
Group 3
Cableway 
installations 
designed to 
carry persons
Lifts
New hot‐water 
boilers fired 
with liquid or 
gaseous fluids
Pressure 
equipment
Simple pressure 
vessels
Recreational 
craft
New Approach Directive involved 2000/9 95/16 92/42 97/23 87/404 94/25
Number of pages 28 35 15 57 18 14
Total number of norms 25 22 ‐‐ 256 7 34
Number of ISO norms 0 0 ‐‐ 32 0 34
Other Directive involved 93/68 93/68 2003/44
Number of pages 23 23 18
Total number of norms 7 7 41
Number of ISO norms 3 3 33
Other Directive involved 2004/8 90/488
Number of pages 11 1
Total number of norms ‐‐ 8
Number of ISO norms ‐‐ 0
Other Directive involved 2009/105
Number of pages 18
Total number of norms 23
Number of ISO norms ‐‐
Responsible institutions
Min. Economic Development x x x x x x
Min.Regional Dev & Infrastructure x x
Governmental Bodies Involved
Min. Energy x
Min. Environment x x
Dep. Tourism x
Technical Const. Insp. Agency x x x x x x
NCA x x x x x
NASTRM x x x x x
United Transport Administration x
Tbilissi Municipality x
Batumi Municipality x
Kutaisi Municipality x
Non‐Governmental Bodies Involved
GTU x x x x x x
Importers x x x x x x
Users x x x x x x
Bagirgza x
Resources
Budget Min. ED x x x x x x
Budget Min. RDI x
Technical Assistance x x x x x x
Group 1 Group 2
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Georgia is minimal: it is limited to capacity-building and training of 
Georgian institutions, with the usual severe constraints imposed by the 
very bureaucratic EU funding procedures.  
Finally, Table 4.2 gives a sense of the additional costs imposed by the 2010 
Document requiring implementation of the EU acquis in TBT for cable cars 
and lifts by 2011. These two products may be those with only one directive 
(each) and a limited number of norms. But they are also those with no ISO 
norms: this means that Georgian producers may have to use at least two 
sets of norms—one for the Georgian and EU markets, and one for the other 
markets. Last but not least, there is no Georgian producer for these two 
products—once again raising the fundamental question of why should 
Georgia transpose rules that are not needed. 
4.4 Georgia is not a Central European country 
It would be wrong to believe that the transposition of New Approach 
Directives simply creates administrative costs for the public authorities, 
which are estimated in Box 4.1. It also imposes fixed costs on Georgian 
producers which would have to hire additional workers’ time and skills in 
order to define the technical norms that will meet the essential 
requirements imposed by the Directives. 
 
Box 4.1. Estimated administrative costs of the transposition of the EU acquis in 
the TBT area 
Since Georgian consumers are ‘shielded’ by the Georgian unconditional mutual 
recognition of the OECD norms, implementing the EU TBT acquis should not 
impose too heavy costs on Georgian consumers who could always turn to goods 
produced under non-EU norms (for instance, US norms). 
Calculating the administrative costs relies on a rough estimate of the staff to be 
hired. The Czech TBT institutions employ roughly 1,000 staff members for the 
certification aspects and 50 internal and 500 external staff members for the 
accreditation aspects. The Czech population is more than twice the Georgian 
population, whereas its value added in manufacturing is 30 times larger. That 
suggests that the staff required for implementing the EU TBT acquis in Georgia 
would range from 50 to 500. The exact figure will depend on how much the 
Commission insists on covering all the goods (in addition to cable cars and lifts) 
and to which extent the tasks to be done are down-sizable (that is, impose fixed 
vs. variable costs). Of course, there are also costs in terms of buildings and 
equipment. 
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Such costs are notable but they do not seem huge at a first glance. However, they 
have to be assessed in terms of opportunity costs—that is, what Georgia loses 
when it is forced to spend public money on TBTs rather than on more pressing 
investments for boosting growth (such as infrastructure). It would be certainly a 
better—more pro-growth—use of Georgian public money to hire 50 to 500 nurses, 
doctors, agricultural instructors, infrastructure-related staff, etc. 
Data source: Jandieri (2011). 
 
The supporters of the transposition of the EU TBT acquis into Georgian law 
argue that these initial fixed costs imposed on Georgian producers 
adopting the EU norms will be more than counterbalanced by the benefits 
of better access to the large EU markets. 
Such an argument made sense in the case of the Central European EU MS, 
which are close to the huge mass of the Western EU MS’ economies. Table 
1.1 (chapter 1) shows that the 15 initial EU MS represent 92% of the EU 27 
GDP, with 20% for the largest EU MS (Germany) alone. The well 
documented ‘tyranny of geography’—the distance between two countries 
is a major determinant of their intensity to trade—suggests then that the 
‘natural’ choice for the Central European EU MS was to send a large share 
of their exports to the Western EU MS, in particular to Germany which 
happens to be, in addition, the EU MS closest to them. Transposing the EU 
technical norms into their own legislation seemed thus the right thing to do 
for the Central European EU MS. 
This argument is far from applying to Georgia which faces a very different 
‘tyranny of geography’ as illustrated by the following data. In 1995 (at the 
beginning of their accession process), exports of the Central European EU 
MS to the EU (then limited to 15 EU MS) amounted to roughly 58% of their 
total exports. In sharp contrast, the share of Georgian exports to the EU 
(with 27 EU MS) in its total exports to the world has continuously declined 
from a peak of 25-26% in 2005-2006, to less than 19% for the first nine 
months of 2010 (back to the 2002 level). 
In such a context, the benefits of the transposition should be expected to be 
much more limited for Georgia than for the Central European EU MS. 
Georgian exporters are induced to keep strong trade flows with their close 
CIS and Asian markets because the attraction of these markets can only 
grow for the following reasons: 
TRADE POLICY TOWARDS ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURS: THE CASE OF EU GEORGIA | 63 
• Even if the CIS and Asian markets are still smaller in absolute size 
than the EU markets, they are huge enough to absorb the limited 
Georgian export capacities. 
• The CIS and Asian markets exhibit a much higher growth rate than 
the EU markets, and they have much higher potential in the very long 
run than the EU markets (India’s population is three times the EU 
population). 
• Georgian consumers are likely to be more similar in their demands to 
those in the CIS and Asian markets than in Europe because their 
levels of income per capita are closer. 
In short, these markets have an almost infinite capacity to absorb Georgian 
exports and to boost Georgian growth—now and for a very long time. 
Arguing that the EU is the largest and most prosperous market for 
Georgian producers misses a crucial point: most Georgian producers do not 
need such a large market simply because they are so much constrained by 
the size of the Georgian economy. 
Meanwhile, the costs of the transposition should be expected to be much 
higher for Georgia than for the Central European EU MS. This is because 
the CIS and Asian markets require generally the use of non-EU technical 
norms. As a result, Georgian exporters will be torn between different sets of 
technical norms, the EU ones needed for the Georgian and EU markets and 
the non-EU ones needed for all the other markets—except when products 
are under ISO (international) norms. Producing goods with different norms 
(EU, CIS, etc.) is unlikely to be affordable for many Georgian producers, 
often too small to run different lines of production of the same product but 
with different norms. This dilemma would require a dramatic decision 
from the Georgian exporters on which markets to send their exports—the 
EU markets or the CIS and Asian markets, and whether to remain present 
in the Georgian markets, or not. 
4.5 The preconditions would hinder Georgia’s industrialization 
and trade flows with the EU 
The fixed costs imposed by the transposition of the EU acquis in TBTs are 
equivalent to a tax on Georgian production of exports and domestic 
production. This tax is legitimate when it is imposed on Georgian exports 
to the EU: there is no reason to exclude Georgian exporters to the EU 
markets from the conformity to the EU TBT acquis which is imposed on all 
the EU firms and exporters to the EU. 
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What is questionable is that the 2009 Matrix imposes the EU TBT acquis on 
Georgian producers selling on Georgian markets. This represents a 
considerable extension of the ‘tax base’ that would hinder the 
industrialization process that Georgia needs so desperately for boosting her 
growth. 
Figure 4.1. The economy-wide impact of the transposition of the EU TBT acquis 
 
In order to fully understand the many negative consequences of this 
extension of the tax base, Figure 4.1 sketches the alternatives faced by a 
Georgian entrepreneur eager to start or develop a business. The main 
feature of the Georgian reforms—very similar tariffs and regulations for all 
goods—is to have created a level-playing field among products. As a result, 
when choosing the goods to be produced, Georgian entrepreneurs need 
only to assess whether they have some comparative advantage in 
producing the goods in question. They are not induced to choose products 
Products which will 
not be covered by 
the transposition of 
the EU New 
Approach Directives
Products which will be 
covered by the 
transposition of the EU 
New Approach 
Directives
The EU acquis  makes 
these products more 
costly to produce than 
those not covered by 
these Directives
Export‐oriented 
Georgian firms
Domestic‐centered 
Georgian firms
 The Georgian reforms have created a level playing field with no discrimination against 
or in favor of some products.  As a result, Georgian producers have the maximal degree 
of freedom to choose the goods they will produce in accordance with their perceived 
comparative advantages of Georgia.
The universe of all the industrial products
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because of some fiscal or regulatory reasons. Such a freedom of choice is 
critical when an economy is starting to industrialize almost from scratch, as 
is the case in Georgia, because it enlarges as much as possible the range of 
possibilities and opportunities. 
The 2009 Matrix substantially constrains this freedom of choice because it 
splits the whole universe of products that a Georgian firm could produce 
into two very different groups as illustrated in Figure 4.1: those subjected to 
the New Approach Directives and those not subjected to them. The fact 
that the EU TBT acquis is equivalent to a tax will induce Georgian 
producers to be predisposed towards products not under EU norms. It is 
estimated that the New Approach Directives cover 30 to 42% of the EU 
imports and exports, respectively [Messerlin, 2011]. In other word, the 
transposition of the EU acquis acts as a disincentive for Georgian firms to 
produce one-third of the possible goods in a modern economy. 
Let us now focus on the Georgian producers who will still consider 
producing goods under the EU TBT acquis—let us call them ‘widgets’. 
Under the 2009 Matrix preconditions, these firms will have to produce 
under the CE marking not only when selling widgets in the EU markets 
(once again, a perfectly legitimate constraint) but also when selling widgets 
in the Georgian market. 
As a result, the 2009 Matrix splits Georgian firms into two subsets: those 
that feel capable of adopting an export-oriented strategy and those—likely 
to be much more numerous if one takes into account the tyranny of 
geography, the differences in size, income and technological level—that 
target the Georgian market as their main target (and possibly non-EU 
markets). Let us called such firms ‘domestic-centred’ firms. 
Focusing first on the domestic-centred Georgian firms, the implicit tax 
imposed by the Matrix would force them to charge higher prices in order to 
pay the fixed costs imposed by the 2009 Matrix. This price increase would 
result in less demand for their output, and the smaller Georgian production 
would force Georgian consumers to turn to other sources of supply. There 
are then three major possible scenarios. 
• Scenario 1. The domestic-centred Georgian producer cuts its activity (and 
possibly disappears). The Georgian consumers would then need to 
satisfy their demand with imported products. As they are relatively 
poor, they are unlikely to choose products imported from the EU, 
which tend to be too expensive. In sum, Georgian production is 
reduced, imports from non-EU countries grow (much) more than 
imports from the EU (and possibly Georgian exports to non-EU 
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countries grow if the Georgian producers divert their domestic sales 
to non-EU markets). 
• Scenario 2. The domestic-centred Georgian firm wants to keep domestic 
sales. The main option is to shift its plant to a neighbouring country 
that has not signed a DCFTA with the EU and to export to Georgia 
products under non-EU (less expensive) norms. In short, Georgian 
production disappears while Georgian imports from non-EU 
countries grow, with the main beneficiaries of the DCFTA being 
countries having no DCFTA with the EU. 
• Scenario 3. The Georgian producer tries to attract a foreign investor (owner) 
in order to survive in Georgia. Paradoxically, this decision may well 
be more beneficial to non-EU firms than to EU firms. This is due to 
the quasi-absence of Georgian industrial tariffs on imports from the 
rest of the world and to Georgia’s mutual recognition of all the OECD 
norms. In such a context, efficient Japanese, Korean or Chinese firms 
producing widgets that they already export to the EU or that they 
produce in the EU—in short, widgets produced in accordance with 
EU norms—will be able to produce these widgets n Georgia at no 
additional costs once Georgia implements the EU acquis in TBTs. A 
key point in this scenario is that firms from emerging countries are 
more attuned to the Georgian economic environment than their EU 
competitors: they work with skills and labour costs on the production 
side, and incomes and tastes on the consumption side that are more 
similar to those in Georgia than typically are EU firms. Hence, they 
may well be induced to invest in Georgia (much) faster than are the 
EU firms. In short, the haste to impose the full EU acquis to Georgia 
may well advantage non-EU firms compared to EU firms. 
To sum up, as currently formulated, the 2009 Matrix has three very 
negative impacts: it distorts the Georgian industrial sector by greatly 
reducing the benefits of the Georgian reforms because it induces Georgian 
producers to canton themselves into the two-thirds of the universe of 
products not covered by the EU TBT acquis; it hinders the pace of Georgia’s 
industrialization by making more expensive the products to be sold in the 
Georgian markets; and it favours trade flows between Georgia and non-EU 
countries to the detriment of those between Georgia and the EU. 
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4.6 Proposals 
First and foremost, it should be underscored that, since Georgia has met the 
relevant subset of preconditions of the March 2009 Matrix (see Figure 4.1), 
the DCFTA negotiations should be launched without further delay. That 
said, the above section shows an urgent need to reshape the other 
preconditions when negotiating the context of the DCFTA content. 
4.6.1 Export-oriented Georgian firms: Make Georgia a model enforcer of the 
New Legislative Framework 
As is the case with any exporter to the EU, the export-oriented Georgian 
firms have to comply with EU norms for their export operations. In other 
words, the 2009 Matrix represents only a marginal challenge to them. That 
said, it is possible to greatly improve the ‘one size fits all’ of the 2009 Matrix 
by using the rich body of EU law. 
Indeed, a key provision of the recent EU TBT acquis has so far been ignored 
by the Commission. The New Legislative Framework, which rules 
functions such as the certification, accreditation, etc., allows any EU MS to 
have recourse to the institutions of another EU MS, as stated by Article 4, 
paragraph 2, of the EU Regulation 765/2008: 
Where a Member State considers that it is not economically 
meaningful to have a national accreditation body or to provide 
certain accreditation services, it shall, as far as possible, have 
recourse to the national accreditation body of another Member 
State. 
Included in the DCFTA, this provision would allow Georgia to request the 
accreditation body of a given EU MS to cooperate in handling the needs of 
export-oriented Georgian firms. This option deserves three remarks: 
• As the accreditation bodies are the core institution in the whole EU 
TBT institutional machinery, it seems logical to extend the benefit of 
Article 4.2 to Georgia for the other bodies required by the EU TBT 
acquis (conformity assessment bodies, laboratories, etc.). 
• The only institution that escapes Article 4, paragraph 2 is the market 
surveillance authority. But this is not a problem since Georgia has 
already established such an institution. 
• Finally, this option does not prevent Georgia from creating all these 
institutions in due course. But, it would be a domestic decision taken 
after a comparison of competing regulations on technical norms from 
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other countries and at a speed that will be supportive of Georgia’s 
growth, rather than harmful to it. 
The benefits of this proposal for Georgia are obvious and large. A 
legislative and bureaucratic nightmare is set aside, with all its costs. The 
focus is shifted from a bureaucratic and nation-wide approach to an 
approach that focuses on firms, and hence fits much better Georgia’s need 
to boost its growth and development. 
But there are also two main large benefits for the EU. First, relying on EU 
MS institutions would eliminate all the suspicions and accusations on the 
quality of implementation of the EU TBT acquis by Georgia that a hasty 
implementation of the EU acquis in Georgia would almost certainly create. 
Second, the use of Article 4.2 would become an attractive option for other 
EU neighbours—the foreign policy dimension of a DCFTA model. This use 
would allow the rapid creation of a larger geographical coverage of EU 
norms without forcing trading partners to renounce their current policies in 
the TBT area. If the EU decides to limit the offer of using Article 4.2 to those 
neighbours that have made serious reforms, benefiting from this provision 
may become an incentive for faster and/or deeper autonomous reforms in 
the neighbours that are slow to reform before entering into negotiations 
with the EU. In all these cases, the political benefits for the EU are huge. 
4.6.2 Georgian firms selling on domestic markets: Reschedule the timing of the 
transposition 
The 2009 Matrix is particularly detrimental to the Georgian firms selling in 
the domestic markets—weakening and/or delaying the creation of a lively 
pool of nascent firms in Georgia. In this respect, substantial changes in the 
2009 Matrix are needed. They consist of a rescheduling of the transposition 
of the New Approach Directives necessary all the more because the current 
schedule generates serious risks of introducing distortions into the 
Georgian economy. 
The risks of distortions come from two factors, which are shown in Table 
4.3. First, trade distortions are more likely if tariffs are relatively high. For 
instance, a high protection of EU firms favours the existence of inefficient 
EU firms which could then use a preferential access to the Georgian 
markets to sell their products there—keeping at bay more efficient non-EU 
firms and grabbing unjustified rents from Georgian consumers. The 
average EU tariffs imposed on the products under the directives to be 
transposed are often not too different from the average tariff for all the 
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industrial products (5.6%). But, the maximum tariffs (that protect segments 
of the products in question) are very high for Waves 2, 4 and 5, with a 
noticeable share of tariffs higher than 15% (peak tariffs) for the group 1 of 
Wave 2. These observations suggest substantial potential risks of inefficient 
EU firms trying to grab rents in Georgian markets although Georgia’s low 
tariffs on industrial products are a powerful ‘shield’ protecting Georgian 
consumers since they allow these consumers to turn easily to non-EU 
products if necessary. 
Table 4.3. Waves of transposition of the New Approach Directives into Georgia’s 
legal regime (%) 
 
Sources: WTO-IDB and COMTRADE databases. Authors’ calculations. As one tariff line can be covered 
by two or more Directives, the figures in the table cannot be cumulated. The 2009 Matrix defines 
‘waves’ of transposition, that is, sets of Directives to be transposed at roughly the same time (see above 
section 3). 
 
A second source of costs from trade distortions is the importance of trade 
flows (the larger they are, the higher the related costs can be). From the EU 
side, there are notable trade flows for all the products in question, except 
for Groups 1 and 3 of the Wave 1 Directives. That said, Georgia imports 
mostly from non-EU sources, and its unconditional mutual recognition of 
the norms of all OECD countries is a powerful ‘shield’ protecting her 
consumers by allowing them to get easy access to the widest range of 
varieties of such products available in the OECD (and CIS) zone. On the 
export side, Georgian exporters tend to export to non-EU markets, 
mirroring the fact that Georgia is very different from the Central European 
EU MS before their accession. 
Wave Wave Wave
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 2 3 4 5
EU average and maximum tariffs of the products covered by the Directives (%)
maximum tariff 8.1 11.0 9.0 17.6 19.8 7.8 18.7 24.4
average tariff 6.5 5.4 6.6 5.9 5.2 4.6 5.4 5.6
share of tariffs >15% 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 1.6 0.0 1.3 0.6
Share of the products covered by the Directives in total manufacturing exports (%)
EU to the World 0.3 7.1 0.8 8.4 22.4 8.5 24.2 17.1
Georgia to the EU 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.1 4.5 0.9 3.3 19.8
Georgia to Rest of World 0.0 4.2 0.3 1.6 3.4 0.4 10.0 20.3
Share of the products covered by the Directives in total manufacturing imports (%)
EU to the World 0.2 8.4 1.4 4.6 28.8 5.7 15.3 17.9
Georgia to the EU 0.1 5.5 0.0 6.9 32.1 7.5 21.2 12.3
Georgia from Rest of World 0.3 7.2 0.1 5.3 26.5 4.9 18.2 17.1
Wave 1 Wave 2
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All these factors suggest the following changes in the schedule of 
transposition. First, there should be a rescheduling of the six Directives that 
Georgia has agreed to transpose: 
• No change needs to be made for the Group 1 of Wave 1 since these 
Directives cover limited (even nil) trade flows for both partners, and 
no production in Georgia, hence limit the costs of the transposition to 
the administrative ones in the short term. However, if there are no 
immediate consequences for Georgia’s industrial structure, there may 
be consequences for its future industrial structure since the 
transposition acts as a de-industrialisation and anti-diversification 
policy. 
• Group 3 of Wave 1 should be transposed before Group 2 of Wave 1 
because it shows two features minimising the risks of large costs: a 
lower trade coverage and norms mostly expressed in ISO terms. The 
costs of transposing the EU acquis will thus not be associated with 
dramatic decisions to be made by Georgian exporters between the 
EU, Georgian and non-EU markets. 
• Group 2 of Wave 1 should be transposed over a much longer period 
of time because, in sharp contrast with the Group 3 of Wave 1 
directives, the Group 2 of Wave 1 Directives cover a notable share of 
industrial trade for both partners, are protected by high peak tariffs in 
the EU, and are expressed largely in EN norms. 
Second, there should be a provision leaving to Georgia’s discretion 
whether, and if so, when, it will transpose the rest of the New Approach 
Directives (Waves 2 to 5 and also possibly Group 2 of Wave 1). This 
approach reflects the trust that Georgia’s credentials in reform deserves. 
As argued in chapter 1, Georgia and the EU could agree on periods of 
transition in order not to leave completely open-ended these flexibilities. As 
argued in chapter 1, transition periods should not be expressed in a 
number of years fixed arbitrarily, but in terms that are economically 
meaningful such as the GDP per capita. For instance, the transposition of 
the six first directives could be triggered when Georgia will have a GDP 
per capita equivalent to the GDP per capita of Bulgaria when it acceded to 
the EU. Once again, such a transition criterion ensures that Georgia will 
abide by its commitments and that the EU acquis is supportive of Georgia’s 
growth. 
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4.6.3 Proposal on Georgia’s policies accompanying the DCFTA implementation 
In accordance with its unilateral path of reforms, Georgia should keep its 
own policy of unconditional mutual recognition. Not only it is more in line 
with the spirit of the EU case law (Cassis de Dijon) than the current EU 
acquis, but it also enables Georgian consumers to have the largest possible 
range of products to choose among, since no product could be banned from 
entering Georgian markets (or to be produced in Georgia) for reasons due 
to the ‘nationality’ of the technical norms used. 
The EU should thus refrain from making any attempt to curb this Georgian 
provision. 
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5. PRECONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE 
COMMISSION ON SPS MEASURES 
Summary 
1. If applied as currently formulated, the full set of the 2009 Matrix preconditions 
on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures would have two negative impacts: 
• They would create a huge surge in food prices, which can be estimated at 
90% of the current cost of the food products bought by the one-third of the 
Georgian population living in poverty. 
• They would require an inspection mechanism covering hundreds of 
thousands of very small farmers (less than 1.5 hectares) which would be 
unmanageable and/or would fuel corruption. 
2. DCFTA negotiations should start without further delay since Georgia fulfils the 
relevant subset of preconditions. They should thus address the above problems by 
including: 
1. a provision excluding the small-farms sector from the EU SPS acquis for what 
would be a long period of transition. Fixing this transition period on 
indicators such as the GDP per capita would not be proper because the 
small-farms sector is so large and disconnected from the rest of the economy. 
The transition period should thus rely on a review of the situation to be 
undertaken on a regular basis. 
2. a provision allowing a progressive introduction of the general food safety 
laws in Georgia. The progressivity dimension is crucial in order to minimize 
the risks of destabilizing food price surges. 
3. a provision defining a mechanism ensuring Georgian compliance with the 
SPS acquis for major Georgian agricultural exports to the EU. This 
mechanism should be implemented in a progressive way, that is, as and 
when Georgian exports become notable (in quantities) and regular (in time). 
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3. With respect to Georgia’s policies accompanying the DCFTA implementation, 
the country should continue to strengthen its own emerging SPS policy in pursuit 
of its own unilateral path of reforms. 
 
The problems raised by the transposition of the EU acquis in SPS measures 
into Georgian law are of similar nature than those raised in the TBT area. 
But, they are much more intractable for two reasons: i) the sheer complexity 
of the SPS regulations; and ii) the huge gap between the Georgian and EU 
agricultural sectors. 
5.1 The Georgian agricultural sector 
To appreciate how completely unrealistic are the Commission’s 
preconditions in the SPS area, one must realise that Georgian agriculture is 
very similar today to the prevailing conditions found in the farming sector 
in the early 1950s in the poorest regions of some of the founding EU 
member states. 10  
• The farm labour force (self-employed people included) represents 
55% of the total labour force—more than ten times the EU average. 
• This farm labour force is relatively unskilled, often stays in the farm 
sector as a ‘last resort’ option and has very limited entrepreneurship 
capacities – all features inherited from the large collective farms in 
place until the early 1990s. 
• The early 1990s privatisation policy excessively fragmented the large 
collective farms (the average size of the farms was 1.1 hectare in 
2009). This feature makes it socially very difficult to establish the core 
of large estates required by a ‘modern’ farm sector. However, the fact 
that 60% of the farmers are older than 55 years will slowly facilitate 
the much-needed consolidation of the Georgian farm estates. 
• These features explain the very low level of labour productivity: 55% 
of the Georgian labour force employed in agriculture produces 10% 
of the Georgian GDP (the GDP share of the value added in 
agriculture) while the 5.5% share of EU labour working in agriculture 
produces 3% of the EU GDP. The growth rate in the Georgian farm 
                                                     
10 In this section, agriculture is divided into two sectors for the sake of clarity (the 
problems are not at all similar): the farm sector (farmers) and the food sector (the 
industrial agribusiness sector). 
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sector is low on average, with huge ups and (negative) downs over 
time. 
• A modern farm sector based on large farms with new technologies is 
only emerging, because the fragmentation of the farm land and the 
lack of available entrepreneurs inhibits domestic and foreign 
investment in agriculture. 
• Georgia has comparative advantages in some traditional farm 
products which are already successfully exported: fruits, nuts, waters 
and wine. However, agricultural exports are expected to increase by a 
modest 3 to 5% (as in the past) in the absence of the deep changes in 
the farm structure that would allow production of new agricultural 
goods. 
• The processed food sector is only nascent. Most farm production is 
consumed by the farmers or their close neighbours, while the 
demand for food in the urban areas is satisfied to a large extent by 
imports. 
• The urban and rural Georgian incomes, which were not so different a 
few years ago, exhibit a serious gap in 2009, with rural incomes being 
25% lower than urban incomes—in sharp contrast with what prevails 
in the Western EU MS. 
All these factors reveal the huge gap between the EU and the Georgian 
farm and food sectors—and make the farm and food sectors an extremely 
difficult issue in Georgia in the DCFTA context. 
In such a context, imposing the transposition of a vast chunk of the EU 
acquis in SPS—by far the most complex part of the EU acquis—is puzzling, 
to say the least. It is all the more so because any parallel between Georgia 
and Central European EU MS is even less valid in the SPS case than for the 
other preconditions for a powerful additional reason: Georgian farmers will 
never benefit from the billions of euro of subsidies of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (roughly 40% of the EU budget during the last five 
years) which cushion EU farmers from the high costs of the EU SPS acquis. 
5.2 The Commission’s preconditions on SPS: An overview 
Figure 5.1 summarises the Commission’s requirements (cells 1 and 2 of 
column A in Chart 3.1) as they are listed in the 2009 Matrix and in the 2010 
Document. It also lists the actions taken by Georgia (middle column). 
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Table 5.1. A summary of the preconditions in the SPS area 
Commission’s 
March 2009 Matrix 
Actions taken by 
Georgia 
Commission’s 
December 2010 
Document 
Key Priority 1 
Start implementing the 
suspended food safety 
legislation, including 
through creation if 
needed and 
strengthening of the 
institutional capacities of 
all the bodies in charge. 
1. Implementation of all 
suspended articles of the Law on 
Food Safety and Quality started as 
of July 2010. Inspection and 
traceability articles were enforced 
as of July 2010 and applied to 
export-oriented companies at the 
first stage. 
2. Implementation of: 
• registration requirement for 
food business operators 
started from February 2010. 
• food safety control for all food 
business operators started 
from January 2011. 
3. The 2010 Annual State Control 
Programme of Food Business 
Operators has been elaborated by 
the National Service. In 
accordance with the Programme, 
inspections were carried out in 51 
food business operators exporting 
to the EU.  
4. In accordance with the Food 
Safety Strategy, drafting of new 
Law on Food Safety and 
Veterinary is underway. 
5. For strengthening of the 
institutional capacities, 
comprehensive institutions – 
building was requested for the 
National Service for Food Safety, 
Veterinary and Plant Protection. 
6. Seminars and trainings are 
carried out on SPS issues for the 
relevant governmental 
institutions in coordination with 
donors on a regular basis. 
1. Georgia should 
start implementing 
the articles of the 
Food Safety Law on 
compulsory 
inspections and 
traceability 
requirements for the 
originally foreseen 
group of 
establishments, i.e. all 
food producers, and 
demonstrate that it 
carries out this 
implementation 
effectively and 
properly. 
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Key Priority 2 
Prepare a comprehensive 
strategy, possibly with 
accompanying 
operational programme, 
of establishment of a 
solid food safety system. 
1. Comprehensive Strategy and 
Legislative Approximation 
Programme were agreed with the 
Commission and adopted by the 
Government of Georgia. The 
Government has already started 
implementation of the Strategy 
and Programme. 
2. In accordance with the Strategy, 
the following Implementing 
Legislation has already been 
approved by the Government of 
Georgia:  
• General Hygiene Rules for 
Food/Feed Business 
Operators 
• Official Control Rules for 
implementation of inspection 
and traceability – related 
provisions of the food safety 
law 
• The Rule on How to Destroy 
Food and Feed 
• Relaxed Hygiene Rules for 
Small Food/Feed Business 
Operators.  
• The Government Decree on 
General Crisis Management 
Plan in Food and Feed Safety 
Area was adopted in 2010 Q4, 
which is in compliance with 
Commission Decision 
2004/478/EC of 29 April 2004 
concerning the adoption of a 
general plan for food/feed 
crisis management. 
 
Additional Recommendation 
Continue preparations 
for achieving the inter-
connection with the EU 
Rapid Alert System for 
Food and Feed (RASFF). 
Georgia is a member of the EU 
RASFF system. 
 
Sources: Interviews and the Strategic Papers of the Government of Georgia.  
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In order to appreciate the extremely high costs that such preconditions 
would impose on the Georgian farm and food sectors, Table 5.2 presents 
the structure of the acquis in SPS as defined by the Screening exercises with 
Croatia and Turkey (hereafter the Screening). Table 5.2 deserves three 
major preliminary remarks. 
First, it presents only a portion of the total EU SPS acquis. Second, there is 
no standard contour of the EU SPS acquis. For instance, comparing the SPS 
acquis in Food Law listed in the Screening and the SPS acquis listed in the 
Commission’s website shows many discrepancies. Some EU texts 
considered as key in one document are not mentioned in the other one, and 
vice-versa. This phenomenon is not limited to the SPS domain (for instance, 
the acquis in air transport varies from 32 to 49 directives and regulations 
depending the sources quoted, despite the fact that all these sources were 
from the Commission or were closely working with it [Bertho & Messerlin, 
2009]). 
Last but not least, the Commission did not give to Georgia a list of the texts 
of the SPS acquis to be transposed—an awkward point after what has just 
been said on the fuzzy contour of the EU acquis. Rather, the Commission 
told the Georgian authorities to work out what to do with the help of 
consultants—Table 5.2 gives the outcome of this process which is hardly a 
good example of what could be a well functioning “overall coordination 
negotiating mechanism” (a condition that the Commission imposes on 
Georgia). 
That said, Table 5.2 shows clearly two key features of the preconditions 
imposed by the Commission. First, the regulations to be transposed are 
spread over the whole spectrum of the EU acquis. The only chapters or 
sections with no regulation to be transposed are irrelevant (such as those 
focusing on intra-EU trade or on the EU’s international agreements). 
Second, although Georgia exports mostly plants (fruits, wine, waters) the 
Commission has adamantly insisted on the fact that the transposition into 
Georgian law should cover all the aspects of farm and food sectors—in 
particular animals, a sector well known for its extremely stringent 
constraints in the EU SPS acquis. This insistence means that the 
precondition imposed by the Commission not only inflict heavy costs on 
Georgia’s existing production but also—even more crucially—raises huge 
entry barriers to the development of new farm activities, condemning to 
attrition its present and future farm and food sectors. 
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Table 5.2 The transposition of the EU SPS acquis into the Georgian legal regime 
      Lists of EC texts planned for transposition into Georgian law 
TITLE 1 GENERAL  
  Chapter 1 Food Law 178/2002 
2004/ 
478      
  Chapter 2 Committees (irrelevant)       
  
Chapter 3 Acts of 
Accession (irrelevant)       
TITLE 2 VETERINARY         
  
Chapter 1 Control 
system in the internal 
market  2009/158       
   
I. Live animals, 
semen, ova and 
embryos          
   II. Animal Products 882/2004       
   III. Certification 96/93 2002/99      
   
IV. Mutual 
Assistance         
   
V. Computer 
Systems TRACES: 
new ANIMO         
   
VI. Funding of 
checks         
   
VII. Safeguard 
measures         
  
Chapter 2 Control 
system for imports         
   I. Live animals         
   II. Animal products 882/2004 2002/99      
   
III. Border Inspection 
Posts 882/2004 2002/99      
   
IV. Computer 
Systems TRACES: 
new SHIFT          
   
V. Safeguard 
measures          
   
VI. Funding of 
checks  2002/99       
  
Chapter 3 Identification 
and registration of 
animals and registration 
of their movements         
   I. Bovine animals         
   II. Porcine animals         
   
III. Ovine and 
caprine animals          
   IV. Equidae         
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Chapter 4 Control 
measures for animal 
diseases          
  
Chapter 5 Intra-
community trade in live 
animals semen, ova, 
embryos  (irrelevant)       
  
Chapter 6 Non 
commercial movements 
of pet animals          
  
Chapter 7 Prohibition of 
substances and control 
of residues          
   
I. Prohibition of 
substances          
   II. Residues controls          
  
Chapter 8 Import 
requirements for live 
animals and animal 
products         
   
A. Live animals 
Semen Ova and 
Embryos 2000/13 1924/2006      
   B. Animal Products  852/2004 853/2004 854/2004 2002/99 
1924/ 
2006 
2009/ 
158 
   
C. Lists of 
establishments 854/2004       
  
Chapter 9 Community 
International 
Agreements  (irrelevant)       
  
Chapter 10 Animal 
welfare         
   I. Farm animals         
   
II. Animals during 
transport         
   
III. Animals at the 
time of slaughter or 
killing         
  Chapter 11 Zootechnics         
  
Chapter 12 Veterinary 
expenditures         
TITLE 3 PLACING ON THE 
MARKET OF FOOD AND 
FEED          
  Chapter 1 Hygiene rules. 178/2002       
  
Chapter 2 Specific rules 
for animal products 2002/99 854/2004 882/2004     
  Chapter 3 Control rules  854/2004 882/2004      
  
Chapter 4 Specific 
control rules for animal 
products 854/2004 882/2004      
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Chapter 5 Rules for 
animal by-products          
  
Chapter 6 Funding of 
checks 882/2004       
TITLE 4 FOOD SAFETY 
RULES         
  
Chapter 1 Labelling 
presentation and 
advertising  1924/2006       
  
Chapter 2 Additives 
authorised and purity 
criteria          
  
Chapter 3 Extraction 
solvents         
  Chapter 4 Flavourings         
  
Chapter 5 Food contact 
materials 1935/2004       
  
Chapter 6 Food 
supplements         
  
Chapter 7 Food for 
particular uses Food 
supplements 1333/2008       
  
Chapter 8 Quick frozen 
foodstuffs         
  Chapter 9 Contaminants 315/93       
  
Chapter 10 Novel foods 
and GMOs         
  
Chapter 11 Ionising 
radiation         
  
Chapter 12 Mineral 
waters         
TITLE 5 – SPECIFIC RULES 
FOR FEED         
  
Chapter 1 Feed 
Additives         
  
Chapter 2 Compound 
Feeding stuffs 183/2005       
  
Chapter 3 Feed 
Materials          
  
Chapter 4 Undesirable 
Substances         
  
Chapter 5 Feeding stuffs 
intended for particular 
nutritional purposes         
  
Chapter 6 Certain 
Products used in Animal 
Nutrition (Bioproteins) 183/2005       
  
Chapter 7 Medicated 
Feed         
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TITLE 6 – PHYTOSANITARY          
  
Chapter 1 Plant Health – 
Harmful Organisms         
   
I. General control 
measures         
   
II. Specific control 
measures          
   III. Protected zones         
   
IV. Registration of 
operators - Plant 
passports 92/90       
   
V. Import from third 
countries 2000/29       
   
VI. Inspections and 
notification of 
interception         
   VII. Derogations         
   
VIII. Solidarity and 
liability         
   IX. Infrastructures          
  
Chapter 2 Plant Health – 
Plant Protection 
Products         
   
I. Placing on the 
market 396/2005 183/2005 
1107/ 
2006 2009/128    
   II. Pesticide residues         
  
Chapter 3 Quality of 
Seeds and Propagating 
Material         
  
Chapter 4 Plant Variety 
Rights         
  
Chapter 5 Community 
International 
Agreements (irrelevant)           
Sources: Interviews, the Strategic Papers of the Government of Georgia, Commission website and 
Turkish Government’s website. 
5.3 The preconditions: An unsustainable shock for many 
Georgian consumers 
The magnitude of the costs imposed on Georgian consumers by the EU 
acquis in SPS measures is shown by the rough estimates of Box 5.1. If the 
preconditions in the SPS area are enforceable (a big “if”, taking into account 
the current situation of the Georgian farm sector), the huge food price 
surges that the Commission’s preconditions will inevitably generate in 
Georgia will severely hurt a large share of the Georgian citizens—above all 
the poorest third who live in poverty [EBRD, 2010]—and half of the 
Georgian labour force employed in agriculture (not the richest part of the 
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Georgian labour force). The current events in the EU Southern 
Mediterranean neighbours should remind the Commission of the political 
dangers associated with food price hikes in middle-income countries. 
Box 5.1. Estimated costs of transposing the EU acquis in the SPS area 
The transposition of the EU acquis in the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) area 
can be expected to generate three sets of costs: those imposed on Georgian 
consumers, those on Georgian producers and administrative costs. 
The costs for Georgian consumers will be generated by the price surges imposed 
by the Commission’s preconditions. The table below is based on prices collected 
by the Georgian Statistical Office which have been split into three levels of quality 
(1 being the highest quality and 3 the lowest) for the 12 most important food 
products. What follows relies on the plausible proposition that goods of quality 3 
will be eliminated by the Commission’s preconditions, while the two other types 
of goods will still be sellable under the Commission’s preconditions. 
Expected price increases for 12 selected food products 
 
a Note: Price differences between the goods of quality 2 and 3. The highest quality is 1. 
 
The price increases related to the disappearance of the food products of quality 3 
are huge—on average 91%, with peaks up to 150-200% for cheese, coffee and soft 
drinks. The poorest portion of the population will have little choice: i) to pay the 
full price increases (the price elasticity for such products is likely to be very low) 
if it can afford to do so; ii) to restrict its consumption, which is already often not 
sufficient if it cannot afford the price increases; and iii) to turn to systematic law 
infringement, hence corruption. 
Price
quality quality quality increases for
Product 1 2 3 the poorest [a]
Butter (1 kg) 18.0 12.0 6.5 84.6
Oil (1 l) 7.0 5.3 3.7 43.2
Bread (0.6 kg) 2.5 1.2 0.7 71.4
Milk (1 l.)+ 5.0 3.0 1.8 66.7
Cheese (1 kg) 20.0 10.0 4.0 150.0
Meat (1 kg) 18.0 9.0 5.0 80.0
Coffee (1 kg) 100.0 50.0 20.0 150.0
Tea (1 kg) 84.0 52.0 32.0 62.5
Soft drinks (1 l) 1.4 1.2 0.4 200.0
Egg (a dozen) 4.0 3.6 2.4 50.0
Sugar (1 kg) 4.0 3.0 1.8 66.7
Potato (1kg) 1.5 1.0 0.6 66.7
Average price increase for the poorest Georgians 91.0
Average price (in lari) for goods of
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Transfers from the public budget cannot solve this huge shock. The budget 
already represents almost 40% of the Georgian GDP. The total number of the 
families receiving social assistance today is 450,000 (40% of all families) with more 
than 100,000 families close to qualifying for inclusion on this list.  
Turning to the Georgian farmers, there are two main possibilities. If they decide 
to enforce EU norms, their products will become (much) more expensive and 
hence will not fit domestic demand (which would then turn to imports from 
cheaper non-EU sources), while their chances to be successful in the EU markets 
are slim, to say the least. If the Georgian farmers decide not to enforce EU norms, 
they will keep the Georgian markets at the cost of a systematic breach of the law 
and of some shifts of their exports to non-EU markets. In short, there are the same 
de-industrialization and trade disintegration effects as in the TBT case. 
The trade disintegration effect is likely to be stronger in the SPS case than in the 
TBT case because a vast majority of EU SPS norms are EU-specific. As said above, 
a critical factor determining the costs of the EU acquis on their activities is the 
relative share of EU-specific norms and ISO norms. Norms specific to the 
importing country (such as EU norms) have been shown to inhibit the farm and 
food exports of the EU partner [Chen & Mattoo, 2008; Shepherd & Wilson, 2011]. 
The administrative costs are far from being negligible. It is useful to note that 
such costs for Turkey (which has a farm sector relatively similar to the Georgian 
sector, including a very limited access to EU agricultural markets) are estimated 
to be higher than €2 billions—roughly 1.5% of the total public expenditures 
[Togan, 2011]. Based on the case of Lithuania (roughly the same size of 
population and territory as Georgia), enforcing the EU regulations in SPS in 
Georgia would require at least 800 persons (Lithuania’s staff numbers 1,800 [State 
Food and Veterinary Service of Lithuania website]). It is important to underscore 
that two-thirds of the staff costs are related to enforcing EU regulations on 
animals. Again, what truly counts is the opportunity costs of all these jobs, that is, 
the foregone chance to hire more pro-growth jobs (nurses, doctors, agricultural 
instructors, infrastructure-related staff, etc.). 
The SPS area illustrates a relatively ignored aspect of the preferential trade 
agreements, that is, their bias against small firms in favour of large firms. It is 
reported that the number of food companies after the EU accession has 
dramatically decreased: from 5,000 to 500 in Poland, from 2,000 to 400 in 
Hungary, and from 11,000 to 700 (with only 52 approved for trade with the EU) in 
Romania [Milton, 2010]. Of course, there is some merit to business consolidation, 
and it would be unfair to attribute these dramatic collapses exclusively to the EU 
SPS acquis. That said, the acquis nevertheless is certainly a strong force pushing in 
this direction since it imposes fixed costs. 
Data source: Jandieri (2011). 
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To sum up, all these elements combined suggest that the main—highly 
undesirable—outcome of the transposition of the EU SPS acquis into 
Georgian law are as follows: 
• It would undercut the assumed positive impact of the EU SPS acquis 
on Georgian food safety, including by boosting imports from non-EU 
countries. 
• It would require an army of inspectors to enforce the EU SPS acquis 
on the numerous small Georgian farmers. 
• It would not favour, and probably harm, EU food exports, including 
by making the whole food chain more expensive. 
• It would re-install a culture of corruption in Georgia that would 
require decades to be eradicated all the more so because SPS 
regulations involve a very large number of farmers (while TBT 
regulations involve a limited number of producers). This last aspect 
should not be a surprising scenario for the Commission since it has 
occurred in the EU. When the first elements of the EU SPS acquis were 
introduced in the EU farm sector, it immediately triggered a massive 
wave of corruption in the EU (for instance, veterinary frauds in the 
beef sector, in particular related to hormones).  
5.4 Proposals 
First and foremost, it should be underscored that, as Georgia has met the 
relevant subset of preconditions of the 2009 Matrix (see Table 5.1), the 
DCFTA negotiations should be launched without further delay. That said, 
the above sections showed an urgent need to reshape some of the other 
preconditions when negotiating the context of the DCFTA content. 
5.4.1 The Georgian small-farm sector: Be prepared to exclude it for a long time 
from the coverage of the EU SPS acquis 
The problems raised by the transposition of the EU acquis are much more 
severe in the SPS area than in the TBT domain because they concern all the 
consumers and half of the labour force (the agricultural labour force). The 
proposals to revise the current precondition in SPS measures should thus 
be much more drastic than those in TBTs. 
The most important proposal is that the small-farm sector should be 
excluded from the transposition of the EU SPS acquis for what will be a long 
period of transition. This makes a lot of sense from an economic, 
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institutional (governance) and political view. From an economic 
perspective, imposing the EU SPS acquis on the small-farm sector 
(assuming that it could be done) would imply the collapse of a large share 
of the sector which will be unable to cope with the increased costs. From an 
institutional (governance) point of view, it does not make any sense to try 
to implement an unenforceable legal regime. From a political perspective, 
such a collapse would raise serious tensions in Georgia and fuel anti-EU 
sentiments. Finally, this exclusion presents no risk for the EU consumers 
since, in Georgia as in all the countries, small farmers are not much 
involved in international trade. 
How long should the transition period be? As in the TBT case, fixing an 
arbitrary number of years (5 or 10 years) does not make sense. An 
automatic indicator, such as the level of the GDP per capita, would not be 
capable of taking into account the full extent of current problems of the 
Georgian farm sector—its size, backwardness and its possibilities of rapid 
evolution. The only sure thing is that the transition period will necessarily 
be long since such a large share of the Georgian labour force is in the farm 
sector today. 
As a result, the best solution seems to be a regular review (say every three 
years) of the situation in the small farm sector in order to determine when 
the time would be ripe for including the small-farm sector in the common 
Georgian law in the SPS area. 
5.4.2 The Georgian exporters of food products: Establish a progressive 
mechanism of mutual evaluation 
The most difficult pending problem is the handling of the SPS issues for 
Georgian food products exported to the EU. However, the fact that 
internationally traded goods are mostly produced by large farms (still very 
few in Georgia) and by food firms (multinational firms or Georgian private 
or cooperative firms) – as in all the countries of the world – makes things 
easier than it looks at a first glance. Indeed, Georgia has already established 
registration requirements for food business operators (from February 2010) 
and food safety control for all food business operators (from January 2011), 
among other measures (for details, see Table 5.1). 
The key missing element is an appropriate treatment for Georgian exports 
to the EU. The Commission’s preconditions make no attempt to benefit 
from the rich body of EU practices in this domain. In particular, there are 
two interesting options. 
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• The first option would be to introduce a mechanism similar to the 
EFTA Surveillance Body, which evaluates the regulations prepared 
by the EFTA countries and assesses their consistency with EU rules. 
This approach has the great virtue of being consistent with the latest 
model of EU regulation—namely the EU Services Directive with its 
‘mutual evaluation’ of the partners’ laws and its unconditional 
mutual recognition once the evaluated regulations have been found 
to create no problems. Unfortunately, this approach was not adopted 
for Turkey, a country with very similar food production to Georgia’s. 
The reasons behind such a choice are very diverse, but the dominant 
reason may well be the Commission’s lack of trust towards the EU’s 
Eastern neighbours. 
• The second option would be to extend to Georgia the mechanism 
used for Turkey’s exports of fruits and vegetables to the EU [Togan, 
2010]. This mechanism relies on i) Turkish EU-compatible standards 
[Togan, 2011] and on ii) checks of export operations and control 
certificates as determined by the OECD Scheme for Implementation 
of International Standards on Fruits and Vegetables [OECD, 2006].11 
Control certificates are granted only for the agricultural products to 
be exported within the scope of the standards (mandatory in exports). 
Whatever option is adopted, it leaves a final problem: how to define the 
goods that will be eligible for the mechanism adopted. Here, progressivity 
should be the rule. The principle of progressivity is enshrined in the Treaty 
of Rome and its successors. And, since the Commission’s preconditions 
impose obligations on Georgia that make it a quasi-EU MS, it would seem 
fair that Georgia does benefit from a key principle of the Treaty. As a result, 
the transposition of the EU SPS acquis would: 
• be imposed on very precisely defined farm products; 
• be conditional on a guaranteed minimum size of annual exports to 
the EU so that Georgian exporters could reach a certain scale of 
operation before having to pay the tax equivalent imposed by the 
transposition of the EU acquis in SPS; and also 
                                                     
11 The OECD Scheme facilitates international trade in fruits and vegetables through 
the harmonization of implementation and interpretation of international marketing 
standards. All the EU MS that are also OECD members are signatories. The Scheme 
also has non-OECD country signatories, such as Morocco and South Africa. 
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• be conditional on a guaranteed minimum number of continuous 
years of exporting the farm product in question so that Georgian 
exporters could have a grace period before having to pay the tax 
equivalent imposed by the transposition of the EU acquis in SPS. 
Conflicts over implementation should be sent to a specific dispute 
settlement system relying on a panel of independent experts from the EU 
MS, the Commission and the Government of Georgia. The solutions to the 
conflicts should be explicitly subjected to the rule of proportionality, 
echoing the basic principle of the EU Treaty and the case law of the Court 
of Justice. 
5.4.3 The Georgian consumers: A progressive consolidation of Georgia’s general 
food safety laws 
Georgia should complete its ongoing introduction of the few general food 
safety laws for the food sector. The DCFTA should simply recognize that 
this should be done progressively if one wants to avoid the spill-over 
effects on the Georgian farm sector, in particular severe price hikes 
endangering the living standard (even the life) of a substantial share of the 
Georgian population living in poverty. Such a completion means a 
consolidation and more systematic application of the existing general food 
safety regulations. Such legislation is scheduled to be introduced in the 
Georgian Parliament in the first quarter of 2011. 
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6. THE PRECONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE 
COMMISSION ON COMPETITION 
POLICY AND IPRS 
Summary on competition 
1. If applied as currently formulated, the full set of the 2009 Matrix preconditions 
on the competition issues, strictly speaking (excluding state aid), is unlikely to 
provide net benefits to the Georgian economy. The gains from a competition 
authority in a country such as Georgia, which has a wide open trade, investment 
and norms regime, are tiny, as illustrated by the experience of Estonia. By 
contrast, the costs of an authority that is reminiscent of the price-fixing and rent-
seeking authorities of the Soviet era could rapidly become huge. The 2009 Matrix 
preconditions on state aid do not make sense: there is no state aid discipline at 
the EU MS level, and such disciplines exist only in the context of the trade 
agreement linking the EU MS.  
2. DCFTA negotiations should start without further delay since Georgia fulfils the 
relevant subset of preconditions. They should address the above problems by 
including: 
1. a provision imposing EU-type state aid disciplines on Georgia in exchange 
for the renunciation of the use of antidumping, antisubsidy and safeguard 
measures by the EU against exports from Georgia; and 
2. possibly a provision supporting—not forcing—Georgia’s cooperation with 
EU MS competition authorities on strictly defined competition issues 
(excluding state aid). 
3. Following its unilateral path of reform, Georgia should be supported—not 
forced—in its efforts to open new horizons in good economic governance 
matters. In particular, Georgia should consider how to use the competition 
authority in a more productive way—for instance by granting it (or to a sister 
institution) a role of impact assessment of regulations similar to the one played 
by the Australian Productivity Commission. 
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Summary on intellectual property rights 
1. DCFTA negotiations should start without further delay since Georgia fulfils the 
relevant subset of the 2009 Matrix preconditions. They should recognize the fact 
that Georgia is a lower middle-income country and that most of the 
counterfeited goods in Georgia are imported from much larger economies. As a 
result, they should focus on supporting Georgia’s policy of membership to 
international IPR (intellectual property rights) treaties, and target the sources of 
the counterfeited goods outside Georgia. 
2. Following its unilateral path of reforms, Georgia should continue to strengthen 
its fight against piracy and counterfeiting at a pace that is compatible with its 
economic growth and political stability. 
 
This chapter deals with the two last key preconditions which share the 
same feature: they are far removed from trade policy concerns (the 
introduction of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the WTO is largely the 
result of particular circumstances that occurred during the negotiations of 
the Uruguay Round). This feature is mirrored by the fuzzy—to say the 
least—language used by the Commission’s 2009 Matrix and 2010 
Document on these issues, as best illustrated by the requirement on state 
aid that does not make sense even in the context of the EU acquis. Finally, 
these two last preconditions raise serious basic economic problems that 
have to be taken into account in any economically sound DCFTA and that 
are briefly reviewed at the beginning of each of the two sections of the 
chapter. 
6.1 The preconditions in competition policy 
Since the mid-1990s, the Commission has systematically tried to introduce 
competition policy in trade fora—with no success so far. In 2003, the WTO 
Ministerial in Cancún rejected the Commission’s attempt almost 
unanimously. The EU-Korea FTA has a chapter (Chapter 11) on 
competition policy that is a long series of good intentions with no teeth: 
transparency (a provision that cannot go very far because of the 
confidentiality clause, which is a basic constraint in all competition laws), 
best behaviour, consultation, cooperation, etc. The Commission’s efforts to 
include this issue in the new Economic Partnership Agreements with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries have not been more conclusive, to 
say the least. 
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In these circumstances, imposing the introduction of a competition policy 
as a precondition for negotiating a DCFTA with Georgia appears odd and 
raises serious basic questions. 
6.1.1 Basic questions 
At first glance, the EU acquis in competition matters looks like a good 
candidate to be part of the set of EU regulations that could be included in a 
DCFTA because competition policy is fundamentally pro-growth (see 
chapter 1 on how to define a DCFTA). But, as underscored in chapter 1, the 
transposition of any set of EU regulations into the national law of the 
negotiating partner should not be made mechanically, but should take into 
account the specificities of the negotiating partner. The following sections 
show that the introduction of EU regulations on competition in Georgian 
law is not necessary at this stage. 
6.1.2 Which benefits for Georgia? 
The benefits for Georgia of the transposition of the EU acquis in competition 
policy are in any case small because Georgia is such a largely open 
economy, in terms of trade, foreign direct investment and norms. As amply 
shown in chapter 2, all the available indicators confirm that foreign firms 
can enter Georgian markets easily, whether as exporters or as investors. A 
rough indication of the cases that a Georgian Competition Authority might 
have to handle is given by the cartel cases examined by the Estonian 
Competition Board at the end of the 1990s: milk processors and 
wholesalers, taxi services in Parnu, Association of Estonian International 
Road Carriers and a distributor of sport and leisure goods (Hawai Express). 
None of these cases is huge or has a clear international impact. Indeed, the 
milk case may mirror a reverse causality: it may well have been caused by 
the EU Common Agricultural Policy which favours anti-competitive 
behaviours in the agro-food industries. 
Likewise, state aid disciplines are much less necessary in a very open 
economy than in other economies. The main reason is that subsidies 
rapidly become very expensive when they are not ‘protected’ by tariffs or 
other non-tariff barriers. 
In fact, any lack of competition in the Georgian markets is likely to be due 
to a very specific feature that is totally out of the reach of competition 
policy: Georgia suffers above all from being a small economy located in a 
tormented region. Foreign firms are likely to plan to trade and to invest in 
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other regions before considering extending their activities to the South 
Caucasus. No competition policy can address this issue: it is not in the 
power of any Competition Authority to create competitors. This problem 
can only be handled by creating the most favourable possible environment 
for high growth in Georgia—a target seriously endangered by the 
Commission’s 2009 Matrix with all its preconditions. 
6.1.3 Which benefits for the EU? 
What can be the benefits of the transposition of the EU acquis in 
competition into Georgian law for the EU? From an economic perspective, 
the benefits are close to zero for a simple reason: over the next decade, the 
number of expected cases is tiny (if any) and the economic interests at stake 
in each case are likely to be (very) small. Both features are due to the small 
size of the Georgian economy, the limited trade with the EU and the fact 
that the Georgian economy is very open—and thus sustainable anti-
competitive behaviour is unlikely. 
From the EU perspective of promoting competition rules in the world trade 
regime, the transposition of the EU acquis in competition into Georgian law 
will not create a valuable precedent: Georgia’s economy is too small to be 
expected to initiate a domino effect among EU trading partners. 
Rather, such an initiative imposes substantial political costs on the EU’s 
image as an attractive anchor. All the EU neighbours that could be 
candidates for a DCFTA with the EU—and all the small economies in Asia 
and elsewhere that the EU is approaching for concluding preferential trade 
agreements—will realize that the Commission has twisted the arms of 
Georgia, and hence will think twice before considering a DCFTA. 
Indeed, the EU competition authorities (whether the EU MS competition 
authorities or the Commission’s DG Competition) have never shown a 
great enthusiasm for the introduction of competition policy under the legal 
authority of a trade agreement. These authorities know very well that, to be 
effective, competition policy needs to become part of the national economic 
culture, and that it is a long process. In 2005 Georgia chose the full opening 
of its economy over the reliance on a competition institution: it abolished 
the former competition authority, which was largely discredited. This 
choice made a lot of sense in a very small and open economy which had 
been a command (non-market) economy for a very long time. 
The history of the EU’s competition policy itself echoes all these concerns. 
Only two founding EU MS (France and Germany) had competition 
authorities when the original EEC was created, and the qualification of the 
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French competition law as an ‘exercise in futility’ by two of the best 
specialists in French competition law was still valid until the early 1980s 
[Jenny 7 Weber; 1975].12 One of the founding EU MS (Italy) did not get a 
Competition Authority until 1990, with clearly no serious damage for the 
success of the Single Market until then. 
6.1.4 The preconditions in competition matters 
Table 6.1 summarizes the Commission’s requirements (cells 1 and 2 of 
column A in Figure 3.1) as they are listed in the 2009 Matrix and in the 2010 
Document. It also lists the actions taken by Georgia (middle column). 
The 2009 Matrix requires a draft of a comprehensive strategy in 
competition policy, and it specifies the components that should be part of 
this strategy. Georgia has fulfilled the Commission’s requirements. Before 
analyzing the 2009 Matrix requirements in more details, it is easy to 
observe that the requirements in the Commission’s 2010 Document are 
clearly in breach of the 2009 Matrix. Moreover, they are written in an open-
ended language. What does the expression “relevant powers and 
competences” mean? When does something become relevant? This is not a 
minor question because competition policy is a constantly evolving area, 
requiring frequent institutional and legal updates. For instance, Estonia has 
had three successive versions of its competition law in less than a decade 
(1993, 1998 and 2001) [Estonian Competition Authority, 2001]. Which of 
these three versions would the Commission have considered as fulfilling 
the fuzzy language of the 2010 Document? 
The Commission’s whole approach deserves two comments, one of which 
is related to the competition issues, strictly speaking (that is excluding the 
state aid issues), the other to the state aid issues. 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 In fact, for a long time “competition policy” in France was mostly a price-
monitoring policy. 
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Table 6.1 A summary of the preconditions in the competition policy area 
Commission’s 
March 2009 Matrix 
Actions taken by 
Georgia 
Commission’s 
December 2010 
Document 
Key Priority 
Demonstrate a genuine political commitment to establishing 
a modern competition policy in line with EU standards by 
preparing a comprehensive strategy for this area, including 
the following components:  
• Undertaking the necessary reforms to ensure the 
independence and effective investigative powers of the 
Agency for Free Trade and Competition, both in the area 
of antitrust and state aid. Significant strengthening of the 
Agency's administrative capacities (notably through 
recruitment of additional staff and enhanced training) 
and improvement of its functioning in terms of 
transparency and efficiency. 
• Drafting and adopting a general competition law in the 
area of antitrust. 
• Taking steps to ensure swift implementation of the 
adopted law, including adequate institutional- and 
capacity-building. 
1. Comprehensive Strategy and Operational Programme 
were agreed with the Commission services and 
adopted by the Government of Georgia. The 
Government of Georgia has already started the 
implementation of the Strategy and Programme. 
2. Respective legal amendments to the Law on Free Trade 
and Competition were adopted and the new 
competition agency as an independent legal entity of 
public law was established. 
3. The management and the stuff of the Agency have 
been appointed. 
4. The drafting of the Competition Framework Law is 
underway. 
5. The Agency for Free Trade and Competition has 
started a long-term, systemic, structured assistance 
project with SIDA, the Swedish Competition Agency 
and the Estonian Competition Authority. 
1. Equip the new 
competition 
authority with 
relevant 
powers and 
competences. 
Additional Recommendations 
Start to prepare a reform of the regulatory framework in the 
area of state aid in order to approximate it with the EU and 
international standards. 
1. Preparation of a reform of the regulatory framework in 
the area of state aid has begun.  
2. Necessary legislation drafting is underway. 
 
Sources: Interviews and the Strategic papers of the Government of Georgia.
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6.1.5 Competition issues strictly speaking 
The Commission presents all its requirements with a reference to “EU 
institutional standards”. But there is no such a thing. For instance, the 
alleged standard of one “independent competition authority” does not fit 
the fact that the EU MS with the longest traditions in competition policy 
have several competition bodies (three in Germany and in the UK and two 
in France) and that some of these bodies have close links with the 
Executive. If such diverse and complex structures have emerged and 
survived, it is for good reasons—competition issues are much more 
complex than trade issues, and hence require a subtle balance of 
institutional checks and balances. It happens that Georgia favours one 
competition authority, hence its request for support by the Swedish and 
Estonian competition authorities. But this decision could evolve in the 
future, and there is no robust reason for keeping the Commission’s alleged 
standards. 
Similarly, the Commission’s requirements give the impression that there is 
a ‘general’ competition law in the EU, and that a DCFTA requires the same 
competition provisions in Georgia as in the EU. Neither proposition, 
however, is not supported by evidence. EU competition law is a complex 
aggregate of a handful of Treaty articles and directives, and numerous 
(evolving) regulations which interact with EU MS laws, which are often 
substantial legal pieces. This highly variable legal structure is due to the 
fact that competition problems have multiple pros and cons, that countries 
have a wide range of options with which to strike the best balance they can 
between all these different facets, and that competition cases are dominated 
by the rule of reason (a case-by-case approach).  
6.1.6 State aid issues 
The Commission’s requirement on state aid is puzzling, to say the least. 
The Commission’s precondition on state aid would require logically that 
there exist rules on state aid per se at the EU MS level. But, there are no such 
rules, unless one considers that Parliaments are institutions imposing 
competition-driven discipline on state aid, a view that is hard to justify. The 
strong intra-EC discipline on state aid reflects the principle that the EU MS 
cannot impose countervailing or antidumping measures on the exports of 
other EU MS—in other words, they mirror their decision not to use the 
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WTO-type trade instruments, but to use the disciplines spelt out in the 
Treaty of Rome. It is one single package at the EU level. 
The rules on state aid make sense only at the EU level for a very simple 
reason: these rules state that, in order to be prohibited, state aid should 
have a distortive impact on intra-EU trade flows. If it is not the case, the 
Treaty of Rome and its successors consider state aids as legitimate. In other 
words, disciplines on state aid cannot be defined outside the context of a 
trade agreement (indeed as it is the case for Georgia as a WTO Member). 
In these circumstances it is hard to conceive which state aid disciplines 
Georgia should adopt. For instance, there are possible trade-offs between 
the state aid discipline that Georgia would be ready to adopt and the 
renunciation by the EU to use WTO countervailing and antidumping 
measures against Georgia’s exports. Stricter state aid discipline could be a 
price that Georgia would be happy to pay for the renunciation of the EU to 
use antidumping, countervailing and safeguard measures against Georgia’s 
exports. But so far the EU has shown no inclination to consider such a 
trade-off. Another question is how to deal with the fact that most of 
Georgia’s state aid is likely to be under the threshold of the state aid in the 
EU (simply because of the small size of the Georgian economy). 
Box 6.1 Estimated cost to transpose the EU acquis in the competition area 
In principle, Georgian consumers are expected to gain from the enforcement of a 
competition policy. However, the value of this general proposition depends on the 
specific conditions prevailing in the EU partner. In the case of the very open 
Georgian economy, these gains are expected to be very small, as suggested by the 
few cases examined by the Estonian Competition Authority (with once again, one 
case probably related to the EU Common Agricultural Policy). 
By contrast, there are some substantial costs. Based on the case of the Estonian 
Competition Authority, one can estimate that Georgia’s competition-related 
institutions may need 75 staff members. This does not seem a high price to pay. 
But, the right assessment to do is to balance the tiny gains from a Competition 
Authority in a very open economy with the opportunity costs due to the fact that 
recruiting these staff members mean less staff members in more urgent pro-growth 
jobs (nurses, doctors, agricultural experts, infrastructure specialists, etc.).  
Data source: Jandieri (2011). 
6.1.7 Proposals in the competition policy 
First and foremost, it should be underscored that, as Georgia has met the 
relevant subset of preconditions of the March 2009 Matrix (see Table 6.1), 
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the DCFTA negotiations should be launched without further delay. They 
should also bring a satisfactory solution to the two following questions. 
What could be the state aid disciplines useful for Georgian exports? What 
could be the use of a Competition Authority in a wide open economy? 
6.1.8 The state aid issue 
There are disciplines on state aid among the EU MS because there is a trade 
agreement—the ‘Common Market’—linking the EU MS economies. The EU 
MS do accept state aid disciplines because they have renounced the use of 
antidumping, antisubsidy (in the sense of countervailing measures taken 
by the EU MS themselves) and EU MS-triggered safeguard measures.  
The DCFTA is thus the place to negotiate a similar balance between the EU 
and Georgia. In short, it should include a provision by which Georgia 
would agree to implement EU state aid disciplines, and the EU would 
agree to renounce antidumping, antisubsidy and safeguard measures 
against Georgian exports. 
6.1.9 What to do with the Georgian Competition Authority? 
The net benefits from the implementation of competition policy in Georgia 
are likely to be negligible—if one assumes that it does not awake the old 
ghosts of price-fixing and rent-seeking institutions under the Soviet regime. 
In this context, the minimum that the DCFTA could do would be to 
support—not force—a strengthening of existing Georgian links with EU 
MS competition authorities. 
But, the DCFTA could also include a provision allowing Georgia to make 
better use of its Competition Authority (or to reshape its Competition 
Authority along the following lines). An attractive alternative to a 
traditional competition authority is offered by the model of the Australian 
Productivity Commission (APC). The APC mandate is to be an 
“independent research and advisory body on a range of economic, social 
and environmental issues affecting the welfare of Australians” [APC 
website]. 
This mandate is attractive for two reasons. First, the APC goal is the 
“welfare of Australians” which includes producers, but also consumers and 
taxpayers, hence allowing the APC to take the widest possible economic 
interests into consideration when providing its advice. Second, the APC 
independence is ensured at the cost of no executive power (APC is an 
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advisory body). In other words, the APC is not absorbed by attending to 
the most urgent things first (behave as a government). Of course, this 
independence comes at a cost: the influence of an APC-type institution is 
not instantaneous. Rather, it flows from its capacity, year after year, to deal 
with thorny issues, by collecting the appropriate information, providing 
sound economic analysis and disseminating both via numerous hearings 
involving all parties—in short, from its capacity to build over the years a 
strong reputation to offer sound solutions. All these features make APC-
type institutions quite different from competition authorities—indeed 
much more useful for a wide-open economy such as Georgia looking for 
the best possible governance in order to boost its growth as much as 
possible. 
6.2 The preconditions in intellectual property rights 
There are two very different perspectives to take into account in the IPR 
context. The first one is to remember the basic economic analysis of the IPR, 
which is essential for an enlightened enforcement of IPR policies in an 
international context. The second point discusses the IPR issue in the 
context of the current discussions between Georgia and the EU. 
6.2.1 The economics of IPRs as a guide for international trade relations 
IPRs are monopoly rights granted by governments for a given period of 
time in exchange for innovations produced by firms and beneficial to 
consumers. Unfortunately, if the monopoly rights are sure to generate price 
increases, the existing IPR regimes do not ensure ex ante that these rights 
will deliver what they are supposed to—beneficial innovations. 
Industrialized countries have recently witnessed hot debates revealing an 
increasing recognition of this fundamental problem, often on an ex post 
basis. For instance, institutions managing social security in some EU MS 
have begun to eliminate drugs of dubious value from the list of 
reimbursable drugs, and there is a very lively ongoing debate on the 
magnitude of the share of really useful drugs.13 There are also sectors 
where a lively public debate on IPRs has been stimulated by the emergence 
of new technologies that de facto limit IPRs, as in the case of authors’ rights 
in audiovisuals in some European countries. 
                                                     
13 In the current debate in France, some doctors argue that 50% of the drugs sold in 
France are useless, and 25% of them are only marginally useful.  
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Because of this unavoidable ambiguity of IPRs, trade negotiators of the rich 
countries should be very careful when supporting IPRs if they do not want 
to be seen as having been totally captured by the vested interests of their 
country. In the EU-Georgia context, this risk is illustrated by the fact that, 
as already noted, the Commission’s 2009 Matrix limits the participation in 
an effective dialogue in Georgia on IPRs to the rights’ holders alone, in 
breach of its insistence to include all stakeholders, including consumers, for 
the other preconditions. 
There are two additional reasons for such a restraint on IPRs by trade 
negotiators of the rich countries. First, imposing IPRs on small and 
relatively poor countries is particularly costly for these countries for two 
combined reasons. The relatively poor consumers of these countries are 
asked to pay high (monopolistic) prices (the unavoidable consequence of 
the IPR regimes) when buying goods protected under IPRs. And the 
producers of these countries are unlikely to produce a large flow of 
innovations, hence IPRs. As a result, the net international balance of IPRs 
for small and relatively poor countries is very negative—in short, IPRs are 
large transfers from poor to rich countries. Once again, this situation is 
justifiable, but only when the innovations are proven and beneficial, and as 
mentioned above, the emerging debates in drugs and audiovisuals in 
industrial countries cast serious doubts on how frequently this is the case. 
Second, IPRs are an easier issue to deal with when consumers are rich and 
producers innovative, as in most EU MS. Indeed, the EU’s current fondness 
for IPRs is likely to become cooler when the majority of patents and other 
IPRs will come from India or China (at some point in the course of 2011, 
China is expected to produce more patents than the US). This inescapable 
evolution explains China’s current efforts at a much stronger enforcement 
of IPRs. In other words, the EU has strong long-term incentives to generate 
a more restrained approach towards IPR regimes in the international trade 
system before it is too late for its own interests.  
To sum up, IPRs and freer trade of goods are two very different animals: 
IPRs increase prices and favour vastly large and industrialized countries 
whereas freer trade reduces prices and generates gains for all the countries, 
small or large, industrialized or developing. 
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6.2.2 The IPR issue in the DCFTA context 
Table 6.2 summarizes the Commission’s requirements (cells 1 and 2 of 
column A in Table 3.1) as they are listed in the 2009 Matrix and in the 2010 
Document. It also lists the actions taken by Georgia (middle column). 
Table 6.2 A summary of the preconditions in the intellectual property rights area 
Commission’s 
March 2009 Matrix 
Actions taken by 
Georgia 
Commission’s 
December 2010 
Document 
Key Priority 
Achieve tangible progress in 
the implementation of the 
relevant PCA and ENP 
Action Plan's provisions 
aiming at significantly 
improving the 
implementation and 
enforcement of the existing 
IPR legislation, notably as 
regards the fight against 
piracy and counterfeiting, 
through in particular, 
launching a study on piracy 
and counterfeiting in Georgia 
and ensuring an effective 
dialogue with rights holders 
as foreseen in the ENP Action 
Plan. 
1. Study on piracy and 
counterfeiting was 
completed. 
2. In order to strengthen the 
institutional mechanism 
for copyright protection, 
the Government of 
Georgia approved the 
establishment of an Inter-
Agency Coordinating 
Council on Copyright 
Protection. 
3. Seminars and training are 
carried out on IPR issues 
for the relevant 
governmental institutions 
and other stakeholders in 
coordination with donors. 
1. Establish ex-officio 
powers for the 
enforcement 
authorities (both 
police and customs). 
2. Improved IPR protect-
tion and enforcement 
should then be 
reflected in  increased 
number of i) raids and 
seized pirated and 
counterfeited goods 
(including at the 
borders); ii)  court 
cases (civil and 
criminal) in the IPR 
area; iii)  registered 
cases found to infringe 
IPRs (including at the 
borders); iv) goods 
destroyed. 
Additional Recommendation 1 
Accomplish drafting, adopt 
and start to implement the 
new separate design law 
approximated with the EU 
acquis. 
1. New separate Design 
Law is in force.  
2. In order to ensure the 
smooth implementation 
of the Design Law, 
respective secondary 
legislation was adopted, 
namely the 
Implementation Rules for 
Design Registration. 
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Additional Recommendation 2 
Accomplish drafting, adopt 
and start to implement the 
new legislation concerning 
supplementary protection 
certificate. 
Legislation on 
supplementary protection 
certificate is in force. 
 
Additional Recommendation 3 
Amendments to the system 
of fees in the areas of designs 
and patents will be approved 
together with draft legislation 
on industrial designs and 
amendments to patent law. 
New system of fees will not 
be based on the GDP level of 
the origin of the applicant 
and it will be in full 
accordance with TRIPS 
requirements (envisaged 
after the launching the 
negotiations on DCFTA)a 
IPR registration fees are 
now equal for local and 
foreign persons. The WTO 
requirement of non-
discrimination is thus 
fulfilled.b 
 
a The preparation of a Strategy was not a precondition of starting DCFTA negotiations and was 
requested by the Commission only for the implementation stage of DCFTA. However, Georgia decided 
that this issue is very important and addressed it as a matter of urgency. 
b This action was requested by the EU only for the implementation stage of DCFTA, not as a 
precondition to start negotiations. 
Sources: Interviews and the Strategic Papers of the Government of Georgia. 
 
The 2009 Matrix focuses mostly on the fights against piracy and 
counterfeiting within the existing Georgian IPR law. The December 2010 
Commission document changes dramatically the situation and the whole 
tone by introducing a long list of additional requirements. Some of those 
new requirements seem to restate previous requirements, raising the 
question of the rationale behind such repetitions. 
The additional requirements raise serious concerns. First, an important case 
concerns the ex-officio powers for customs actions in the IPR area, which 
was listed in the 2009 Matrix as among the things to be done after the 
beginning of the negotiations (column B of Table 3.1). Second, as said 
earlier in this chapter, the language is often ‘open-ended’. For instance, 
when would the level of ‘increased’ actions and outcomes be judged 
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sufficient for opening the DCFTA negotiations, and by whom? Last but not 
least, the language of the additional requirements is a mix of quantitative 
targets for actions and results, such as the points 2(i) to 2(iv) which were 
also shifted from preconditions during the DCFTA negotiations to 
preconditions for launching the DCFTA negotiations. Which is the critical 
criterion—actions or outcomes? What would happen when there will be a 
gap between actions and outcomes—for instance if the increased number of 
raids does not lead to a substantial increase in the number of seized pirated 
and counterfeited goods?  
 
Box 6.2 Estimated costs to transpose the EU acquis in the IPR area 
As in the TBT and SPS case, there are three major possible sources of costs: the 
costs imposed on the Georgian consumers, those imposed on the Georgian 
producers and exporters, and the administrative costs of implementing the EU 
regulations. 
The costs imposed on the Georgian consumers are hard to estimate because of the 
lack of data. These costs are likely to hurt all layers of the population—for 
instance, the middle to relatively rich consumers for media or software products, 
the poor to the middle-class consumers for brand clothes. 
The immediate costs to the Georgian producers are small because most of the 
counterfeited products available in Georgia are imported: media and software 
products from Russia, clothes from Turkey, Iran or China. If the EU wants a better 
IPR enforcement, the best policy would thus be to target the producers of 
counterfeited products. In the long run, the industrial structure and the current 
skills of the Georgian labour force do not give much hope for gains from IPRs for 
the Georgian economy since IPRs tend to favour large firms and/or large 
markets, and Georgia has none of these two features. 
The administrative costs have been estimated on a basis of 300 staff members (200 
inspectors, 40 border controllers and the rest for the legal implementation, such as 
supervisors, lawyers, etc.). Once again, the opportunity costs in terms of pro-
growth jobs (doctors, infrastructures specialists, etc.) that could have been filled 
instead are the best measure of the losses due to the implementation of the IPR 
regime. 
Data source: Jandieri (2011).  
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6.2.3 Proposals in the intellectual property rights area 
First and foremost, it should be underscored that, since Georgia has met the 
relevant subset of preconditions in the March 2009 Matrix (see Table 6.2), 
the DCFTA negotiations should be launched without further delay. 
That said, the above section underscores that IPRs are a difficult question 
for every country since their benefits (useful innovations) are much less 
certain than their costs (price increases generated by the monopoly power). 
On top of this common feature, IPRs are a very difficult item to sell 
politically in an international context. This is because they are a source of 
vast transfers (costs) from the small and/or poorer countries such as 
Georgia to the large and industrialized countries—with even less certainty 
that IPRs largely designed for rich consumers deliver beneficial and useful 
innovations for significantly poorer consumers. 
Since Georgia does not seem to pose any more serious problems in pirating 
or counterfeiting than an average country [UNDP, 2010] – if only because it 
is not a notable producer of counterfeited products, it seems wise for the 
EU to keep to a very moderate approach in the DCFTA by supporting 
Georgia’s efforts to fight piracy and counterfeiting. 
There is no miracle in this area. The fight against piracy and counterfeiting 
is long and complex (because it is also economically ambiguous). It 
certainly requires effective police and judicial institutions. But it equally 
requires a (much) better design of the current IPR laws, as suggested by a 
new body of economic literature. 
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ANNEX  
GEORGIA’S TRADE PATTERNS BY PRODUCT 
GROUP AND COUNTRY, 2002-2008 
Table A1. Merchandise exports by product group, 2002-08 
  2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total exports ($ million) 346.3 648.8 866.2 991.5 1,232.9 1,497.5 
 (per cent of total) 
Total primary products 58.5 60.8 57.3 49.1 49.5 41.5 
Agriculture 32.0 33.2 37.0 25.7 26.3 18.3 
Food 29.7 31.0 34.9 23.5 24.0 16.5 
1124 Spirits 1.6 2.9 3.4 3.0 4.7 3.9 
1121 Wine of fresh grapes (including 
fortified wine) 9.6 7.5 9.4 4.2 2.5 2.7 
1110 Non-alcoholic beverage, n.e.s. 5.8 5.1 6.1 4.7 4.4 2.6 
 0577 Edible nuts fresh, dried 2.0 2.7 8.1 5.7 5.3 2.1 
Agricultural raw material 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 1.8 
2484 Wood of non-coniferous, sawn to a 
thickness > 6 mm 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.0 
Mining 26.5 27.6 20.3 23.4 23.2 23.2 
 Ores and other minerals 19.2 23.9 17.0 20.2 19.0 20.0 
2831 Copper ores and concentrates 3.8 4.9 4.2 8.0 6.4 7.9 
2823 Other ferrous waste and scrap 8.8 12.7 8.5 5.5 5.2 6.4 
2882 Other non-ferrous base metal 
waste and scrap, n.e.s. 2.9 2.9 2.7 4.5 4.5 3.1 
2822 Waste and scrap of alloy steel 1.8 2.1 1.2 1.8 2.6 2.1 
Non-ferrous metals 1.9 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 
Fuels 5.5 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.7 3.0 
3330 Crude oils of petroleum and 
bituminous minerals 1.9 1.5 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.6 
3510 Electric energy 1.9 0.0 0.4 0.2 1.4 1.1 
Manufactures 33.2 36.2 38.7 46.0 44.9 51.7 
Iron and steel 4.9 7.7 9.8 9.4 13.4 19.5 
 6715 Other ferro-alloys (excl. radio-
active ferro-alloys) 3.6 5.4 7.8 8.5 12.2 15.6 
 6714 Ferro-manganese 0.9 1.2 1.5 0.5 0.8 2.2 
 Chemicals 7.0 6.8 6.7 7.9 9.6 10.5 
5621 Mineral or chemical fertilizers, 
nitrogenous 3.5 4.4 4.1 4.7 4.6 7.0 
5429 Medicaments, n.e.s. 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.3 
Other semi-manufactures 0.5 1.8 2.8 4.3 7.2 6.3 
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6612 Portland cement and similar 
hydraulic cements 0.0 0.7 2.0 2.9 5.2 5.3 
Machinery and transport equipment 19.2 18.7 17.0 20.8 12.4 12.9 
Power generating machines 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.2 
Other non-electrical machinery 1.7 2.1 3.4 5.6 2.2 1.1 
Agricultural machinery and tractors 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Office machines & telecommunication 
equipment 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Other electrical machines 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 
Automotive products 0.5 1.1 2.8 7.1 6.1 7.9 
7812 Motor vehicles for the transport of 
persons, n.e.s. 0.2 0.6 2.1 5.1 5.7 7.6 
Other transport equipment 16.0 14.5 10.3 6.9 2.7 3.0 
7911 Rail locomotives, external powered 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 2.1 
Textiles 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Clothing 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 
Other consumer goods 1.1 0.9 1.3 2.4 0.9 1.0 
Other 8.3 2.9 4.0 4.9 5.6 6.9 
 9710 Gold, non-monetary (excl. gold 
ores and concentrates) 8.3 2.9 4.0 4.9 5.6 6.7 
Source: UNSD Comtrade database, SITC Rev. 3, WTO, Trade Policy Review: Georgia, 2009. 
 
 
Table A2. Merchandise imports by product group, 2002-08 
  2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total imports ($ million) 793.3 1,847.0 2,490.9 3,674.5 5,214.1 6,055.7 
 (per cent of total) 
Total primary products 43.1 39.3 38.3 37.0 34.9 35.9 
Agriculture 21.4 21.4 17.8 16.9 16.3 15.9 
Food 20.5 20.9 17.4 16.4 15.7 15.3 
0412 Other wheat (including spelt) and meslin, 
unmilled 1.9 2.9 1.4 2.4 2.5 1.6 
0461 Flour of wheat or of meslin 1.1 2.6 1.8 0.8 0.9 1.2 
1222 Cigarettes containing tobacco 2.4 1.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 
4215 Sunflower seed or safflower oil, and their 
fractions 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.8 
0123 Poultry, meat and offal 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 
 0989 Food preparations, n.e.s. 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Agricultural raw material 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Mining 21.7 17.9 20.5 20.1 18.7 20.0 
Ores and other minerals 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.5 
2877 Manganese ores and concentrates 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.2 
Non-ferrous metals 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Fuels 20.8 17.3 19.9 19.4 17.6 18.0 
3432 Natural gas, in the gaseous state 6.1 4.0 3.5 5.6 5.5 3.3 
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Manufactures 56.6 58.9 60.1 60.9 59.8 63.6 
Iron and steel 2.6 6.6 2.5 2.9 4.4 4.8 
Chemicals 13.4 9.9 9.6 9.0 8.5 9.1 
5429 Medicaments, n.e.s. 7.0 3.9 3.4 2.7 2.4 2.6 
Other semi-manufactures 7.2 7.4 8.7 8.6 8.5 9.5 
6612 Portland cement and similar hydraulic 
cements 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 
6624 Non-refractory brick, tiles, pipes, etc. 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 
Machinery and transport equipment 25.4 26.7 29.4 28.9 27.8 29.2 
Power generating machines 0.6 2.8 3.0 0.8 0.4 0.4 
Other non-electrical machinery 7.9 7.1 5.5 6.3 6.4 6.2 
Agricultural machinery and tractors 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 
Office machines & telecommunication equipment 5.7 4.0 4.5 6.3 6.2 6.8 
7643 Radio or television transmission apparatus 2.1 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.9 2.3 
7611 Colour television receivers 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
7641 Electrical apparatus for line 
telephony/telegraphy 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 
 Other electrical machines 2.9 3.3 3.7 3.6 4.0 4.4 
7731 Insulated wire, cable etc.; optical fibre cables 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 
Automotive products 4.3 7.9 9.9 10.6 9.3 10.2 
7812 Motor vehicles for the transport of persons, 
n.e.s. 2.8 6.3 7.2 8.0 7.1 7.7 
7821 Goods vehicles 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.0 
Other transport equipment 3.9 1.6 2.8 1.3 1.4 1.1 
Textiles 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.2 
Clothing 0.4 1.5 1.4 2.0 1.8 2.3 
8458 Other garments, not knitted or crocheted 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 
Other consumer goods 6.7 6.0 7.4 8.0 7.4 7.3 
8215 Furniture, n.e.s., of wood 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Other 0.4 1.7 1.6 2.2 5.2 0.6 
Source: UNSD Comtrade database, SITC Rev.3, Trade Policy Review: Georgia, 2009. 
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Table A3. Merchandise exports by destination, 2002-08 
  2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total exports ($ million) 346.3 648.8 866.2 991.5 1,232.9 1,497.5 
(per cent of total) 
America 4.2 3.9 8.1 12.6 20.1 19.9 
United States 3.9 3.3 3.1 5.9 12.1 6.8 
 Other America 0.3 0.6 5.0 6.6 7.9 13.1 
Canada 0.0 0.6 4.1 4.9 5.7 8.8 
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 1.0 3.5 
Europe 42.3 41.0 39.6 39.4 36.5 40.0 
EC(27) 18.4 19.8 25.0 25.8 21.8 22.3 
Bulgaria 0.0 2.4 4.9 6.3 4.8 7.1 
United Kingdom 9.5 4.9 3.7 2.5 1.9 2.9 
France 0.9 1.5 1.3 3.1 0.9 2.7 
Germany 1.6 2.5 3.3 4.6 4.6 2.2 
Spain 0.2 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.3 
Italy 2.2 1.8 3.9 2.4 1.4 1.1 
Romania 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.9 
Netherlands 1.3 1.5 1.3 0.7 1.0 0.8 
EFTA 7.0 2.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 
 Other Europe 16.9 18.4 14.2 13.4 14.6 17.7 
Turkey 15.5 18.3 14.1 12.6 13.9 17.6 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) 48.7 50.7 47.1 39.8 37.5 36.2 
Azerbaijan 8.5 3.9 9.6 9.3 11.1 13.7 
Ukraine 3.7 2.4 4.3 5.7 7.6 9.0 
Armenia 5.8 8.4 4.6 7.4 9.0 8.3 
Russian Federation 17.7 16.1 17.8 7.6 3.7 1.9 
Kazakhstan 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.6 2.8 1.5 
Belarus 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 
 Other CIS 11.6 18.4 9.4 7.8 2.8 1.1 
Africa 0.8 0.4 1.6 1.4 0.4 0.1 
Middle East 2.0 1.5 1.2 3.5 3.4 1.8 
United Arab Emirates 0.6 0.4 0.5 2.3 1.5 0.7 
Iran Islamic Republic 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Asia 1.9 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.8 
 China 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.6 
Japan 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
 Six East Asian Traders 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 
Other Asia 0.8 1.4 0.5 1.3 1.0 0.7 
India 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.6 
 Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Source: UNSD, Comtrade database, Trade Policy Review: Georgia, 2009. 
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Table A4. Merchandise imports by origin, 2002-2008 
  2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total imports ($ million) 793.3 1,847.0 2,490.9 3,674.5 5,214.1 6,055.7 
 (per cent of total) 
America 12.2 8.2 8.0 5.6 5.9 6.3 
United States 8.7 6.0 6.0 3.5 3.9 4.0 
Other America 3.5 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.4 
Brazil 2.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 
Europe 45.7 49.0 43.9 45.8 44.9 43.8 
EC(27) 31.3 36.2 31.5 30.0 29.5 27.4 
Germany 7.3 8.2 8.3 9.6 7.4 7.1 
Italy 5.3 3.3 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.0 
Netherlands 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 
Bulgaria 1.7 2.1 2.9 3.1 3.5 2.0 
France 2.0 3.4 3.9 1.9 1.9 1.5 
Romania 0.7 0.8 1.6 1.1 1.7 1.5 
United Kingdom 3.4 9.3 2.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 
Austria 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 
Czech Republic 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.0 
Greece 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.9 
EFTA 2.5 1.6 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.2 
Switzerland 2.3 1.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.1 
Other Europe 11.9 11.2 11.6 14.8 14.1 15.3 
Turkey 11.3 10.9 11.4 14.2 14.0 15.1 
 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 36.9 35.6 40.1 38.1 35.5 33.0 
Ukraine 7.4 7.7 8.8 8.7 11.0 10.8 
Azerbaijan 10.1 8.5 9.4 8.7 7.3 10.0 
Russian Federation 15.4 14.0 15.4 15.2 11.1 7.0 
Turkmenistan 1.8 1.8 3.8 2.8 2.9 2.2 
Armenia 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Kazakhstan 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.7 1.2 0.9 
Africa 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 
Middle East 2.1 3.8 4.5 4.8 5.9 6.2 
United Arab Emirates 0.8 2.5 2.9 3.0 4.1 4.5 
Asia 2.9 2.9 3.3 5.3 7.0 9.3 
China 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.8 4.0 4.9 
Japan 0.5 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.1 1.6 
 Six East Asian Traders 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.8 
 Other Asia 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.0 
 Other 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Source: UNSD, Comtrade database, Trade Policy Review: Georgia, 2009. 
 
